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Abstract 
This study aimed to define and characterise subsistence and semi-subsistence farms (SSFs) in the 
Hungarian context, with particular attention given to identifying the determinants of their production, 
labour allocation and market participation decisions. In order to reveal the determining factors of 
Hungarian SSFs’ market participation and sales decisions for goods and labour, the thesis identified the 
household’s seven simultaneous decision equations and econometrically estimated them using a 2013 
cross-sectional dataset of Hungarian SSFs and the seemingly unrelated regressions (SUR) framework. For 
the econometric estimation, the traditional farm household model served as a theoretical basis. The farm 
household model outlined that imperfect markets, and transaction costs in particular, prompt the 
household to be increasingly self-subsistent or autarkic by increasing the price band the household faces. 
The descriptive analysis of the data showed that (i) SSFs’ agricultural activities play a very 
important role in the life of rural households as they increase households’ disposable income by 30 
percent; (ii) SSFs’ farming activities in fact have a “buffer role” and provide a risk aversion strategy for 
small impoverished rural households in Hungary; however (ii) agriculture is only an auxiliary activity of 
these SSF households; and (iii) small farms’ agricultural activities do not contribute significantly to the 
competitiveness of the agricultural sector given their small share in production. The econometric results 
showed that transaction cost proxies and household characteristics in fact influence the semi-subsistent 
household’s decisions. In particular, we found that credit constraints have a significantly negative impact 
on production, and unemployment positively affects sales; suggesting that transaction costs distort 
Hungarian SSFs’ production and labour allocation decisions. Similarly, tax breaks were found to prevent 
potentially market-oriented households from pursuing higher sales and off-farm incomes; implying that 
becoming a tax payer on the margin (i.e. becoming the “bottom” of the next income group) does not 
provide large enough compensation for SSF households to develop.  
In terms of policy, targeting the heterogeneous small farm group with heterogeneous policies and 
adequate support could enhance their chances to compete in the national economy. In particular, reducing 
SSFs’ transaction costs by providing credit, insurance and large enough subsidies could aid market-
oriented SSFs to develop to be profit maximising producers.  
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Chapter 1 – Introduction 
In the aftermath of the 2004 enlargement of the European Union (EU) and at the plight 
of reforming Europe's Common Agricultural Policy (CAP), farmers in Central and East 
European countries (CEECs1) are facing increasingly complex decisions about their income-
generating activities. These decisions are particularly cumbersome for some 5.8 million semi-
subsistence farms (SSFs), whose organisational system, inefficient or not, have persisted over 
time and stirred recent policy debate. This debate with respect to Hungary will be explored 
hereafter. 
  
1.1  General Background of Agriculture in Hungary  
Hungary, together with nine other countries, joined the EU in May 2004. As a result, 
between 2003 and 2013 the country’s total exports to the EU-27 increased from EUR 32.06 
billion to EUR 61.88 billion (Hegedűs and Kiss, 2014), and in 2014 Hungary contributed 0.7 
percent of the EU’s GDP (EC, 2015b). At the same time, the Hungarian economy’s GDP 
growth reflected the typical trend of economic restructuring; and in particular the gradual 
displacement of agriculture. In line with the international trends, the share of agriculture in the 
Hungarian economy has decreased relative to the growth of other industries such as services. 
Between 2000-2005, the share of agriculture in the GDP fell from 4.6 to 3.7 percent (ARDA, 
2014:18), and in 2013 it converged to 4 percent (KSH, 2014:5).  
Despite the decrease of agriculture’s share in the overall economy, Hungary managed to 
remain one of the successful CEECs that has a positive agri-export balance within the EU 
(ARDA, 2014; EC, 2003). Moreover, Hungary’s agricultural sector has regained 
competitiveness as the country improved its positive agri-trade balance with the world as well 
as within the EU (KSH, 2014). In particular, it produced 1.9 percent of the EU’s total 
agricultural produce with 2.2 percent of plant and 1.6 percent of animal produce in 2013 (KSH, 
2014:3). Moreover, between 2003 and 2013, Hungarian agricultural trade grew more 
dynamically than the country’s total trade, i.e. the share of imported agricultural products 
1 “Central and Eastern European Countries (CEECs) is an OECD term for the group of countries comprising 
Albania, Bulgaria, Croatia, the Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland, Romania, the Slovak Republic, Slovenia, and 
the three Baltic States: Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania.” (OECD, 2001) 
1 
 
                                                 
increased from 3.5 percent to 6.0 percent, and the share of agri-exports from 7.5 per cent to 9.9 
percent, showing the potential of Hungarian agriculture.  
The growth of agricultural trade and production has been supported by the divergent 
uses of agri-land in the 19 different NUTS32 regions of Hungary (excluding the capital city 
Budapest). In this respect, the Southern and Northern Great Plain with six NUTS3 regions have 
the highest proportion of agricultural areas (22-23%), whilst agriculture takes up only seven 
percent in Central-Hungary (see figure 1.1.1.). The country encompass 7.4 mill hectare 
production area (62.5 % of Hungary's territory), with 5.3 million ha (or 57%) used for 
agricultural purposes and 1.9 million ha (or 21%) for forestry (EC, 2007; KSH, 2014:2). 
 
 
In terms of production types, commercial farms and individual (or family farms) dictate 
different patterns and trends in their specialisation. As such, 48 percent of agri-businesses are 
specialised on crop and plant production, 6 percent on animal husbandry and 46 percent on 
mixed farming; whereas 52 percent of individual (or family farms) specialises in crop and plant 
production, 21 percent in animal husbandry and 27 percent mixed production  (KSH, 2014:12). 
Since 2010, 6 percent of agri-businesses have moved from pure crop and plant production to 
2 Nomenclature of Units for Territorial Statistics 
1.1.1. Figure - Hungary in NUTS2 and NUTS 3 specification 
Source: Nagy and Kanalas (2009) 
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mixed production, whilst family farms have shifted from mixed production to crop and plant 
production. Only the share of animal husbandry remained stable over the years (KSH, 
2014:12). These statistics indicate a trend of increasing specialisation into crop production, 
which corresponds to Hungary's comparative advantage in the crop sector (EC, 2003). 
With respect to the importance of small farms in the Hungarian agriculture, the most 
recent findings of Kemény et al. (2014:14) reveal that around 470 000 or 85 percent of all 
Hungarian farms registered in the general census produce less than 4000 EUR Standard Output 
(SO) and over 65 percent produce less than 2000 EUR SO. Henceforth, according to the 
EUROSTAT classification of SSF, where SSFs are defined as farms below 4000 EUR SO, 85 
percent of Hungarian farms can be classified as SSFs. The national statistical office, KSH 
(2014:12), reveals that not less than 47 percent of all individual farms produce only for own 
consumption (i.e. they are subsistence farms (SFs)), 19 percent market the surplus produced 
above own consumption (i.e. they are SSFs), and only 34 percent is purely market orientated. 
In terms of trends, the number of SFs decreased by 13 percentage points whilst the number of 
purely market-oriented farms grew by 15 percentage point since 2010.  
Looking at production, farms smaller than 4000 EUR SO produce only 10 percent, 
whilst farms larger than 500,000 EUR SO with less than 1 percent of overall holdings produce 
more than 40 percent of total produce (Kemény et al., 2014:15). Thus, a significant 
fragmentation and polarisation, or “duality”, can be identified in the farm structure (EC, 2007). 
Farm size distribution and structural differences are more uneven and pronounced in Hungary, 
than in other European countries such as Greece, Italy, Spain, Portugal or France (Kemény et 
al., 2014:14). The  uneven  distribution  of  farm  structure  is  also  reflected  by  land 
ownership: the average holding size is 2.3 ha (EC, 2007); yet large farms above 100 hectares, 
constituting only one percent of all farms, use 72.2 percent of all areas (ARDA, 2014).   
1.2  Motivation and Context of the Study 
Tackling the dominance of subsistence and semi-subsistence sector in many CEECs is 
an urging issue, because their existence is intertwined with rural unemployment and poverty. 
SFs and SSFs are understood to be “small, family run agricultural holdings, associated with 
production for own food needs and a low degree of market participation” (Davidova et al., 
2013); and “characterised as labour-intensive, under-capitalised, lacking modern technology, 
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and maintaining a low degree of specialisation” (JRC, 2010:4). It has, however, been very 
difficult to assess the exact role of subsistence farms in the different CEECs as statistics on 
their characteristics and detailed activities are generally scarce or often completely unavailable 
(Mathijs and Noev, 2004; Davidova et al., 2010; Davidova et al., 2013; EC, 2013a; JRC, 
2010). Consequently, the subsistence and semi-subsistence group of small scale farmers, who 
are both sellers and consumers of own-produced food, are often under-represented or even left 
out of agricultural support and poverty reduction programmes3 (Davidova et al., 2010; 
Davidova et al., 2013; EC, 2013a). Data scarcity and the tendency to overlook the smallest 
farms stem from the fact that European Agencies are generally interested in targeting 
commercial agricultural activities of those who can reliably produce for markets. Illustrations 
of which are that the Farm Accountancy Data Network (FADN) database does not include 
entries on farms smaller than 2000 standard output (SO4) (EC, 2014; Kemény et al., 2014); and 
that “there is a consistent feeling running through the general public submissions that the ‘little 
guy’ is worst off under the CAP” (EC, 2013b:24). In addition, small farms feel left out of other 
rural development programmes too due to their burdensome day-to-day administration and 
paperwork that pose significant challenge for small farmers to handle (EC, 2015).  
Besides the increasing policy concerns around small farms, subsistence agriculture in 
the CEECs has been increasingly seen as an important strategy for rural households to deal 
with the hardships of transition by providing a buffer for survival (JRC, 2010; Davidova et al., 
2013). Transition in the CEEC context implies macroeconomic instability, high unemployment 
and inflation with inadequate social security systems and often missing markets for insurance 
(Mathijs and Noev, 2004). However, a quarter of a century into the “transition” and ten years 
after the EU accession (for Hungary and 9 other countries), subsistence and semi-subsistence 
farms still provide the dominant organisational form for the economic activity for most people 
in rural areas of the EU, especially in the CEECs (Davidova et al., 2010, Davidova et al., 2013; 
JRC, 2010). Today, SFs and SSFs encompass nearly 70 percent of all farms that have less than 
5 ha of agricultural land; and involve 86 percent family labour by the farm holder or by 
3 Conceptually, small farms, SFs and SSFs are different, since their motivations and resource constraints are 
different. Here, the term ‘small farm’ refers to the rather heterogeneous group altogether including both SFs, 
SSFs, hobby farms and commercial farms below a threshold level, that is 4000 EUR SO in this study. 
4 “SO is the average monetary value of the agricultural output at farm-gate price, in euro per hectare or per head of 
livestock” (EUROSTAT, 2015).  
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members of the sole holder's family (EC, 2013a). Davidova et al. (2013) point out that 
subsistence production contributes not less than 20-50 percent to the incomes of households 
who are at the risk of poverty. Therefore, we can see that SFs and SSFs play an important role 
in the EU’s agriculture; and they represent a significant functional unit of the European 
economy (EC, 2013a; Davidova et al., 2010; Davidova et al., 2013). Despite this, some view 
the SFs’ and SSFs’ exit from agriculture as a positive structural change (JRC, 2010:23), 
because these farms are also associated with low cash incomes, sub-optimal use of land and 
labour, lack of capital, and little contribution to rural growth (Davidova et al., 2013). In order 
to reconcile the debate on the contribution of small farms, increased attention to their analysis 
is deserved to be given.  
1.3  Problem Statement 
In the EU-27, there are 5.8 million SFs and SSFs encompassing almost half of all 
agricultural holdings. In particular, 86% of these holdings are in the new member states 
(NMSs) of 2004, namely 61% in Romania, and about 8-9% in each of Hungary and Poland 
(Davidova et al., 2013). Their overwhelming majority is a clear indication of the important 
socio-economic role they play in the livelihood of millions of rural inhabitants and national 
economies. Despite this, a standardised European definition of SFs, SSFs is still absent; 
comprehensive statistical information on SSFs is scarce; and inconsistent policy signals have 
been projected towards small farms at both EU and national level. With respect to mixed policy 
signals, the general attitude has been two-fold. On one hand, SFs and SSFs are seen as 
inefficient, unwanted features of the economy that undermine national competitiveness. On the 
other, they are acknowledged for contributing to rural development, European cultural heritage 
and the environment through their capacity to function in accordance with investment-scarce, 
natural, traditional and remote areas (Davidova et al., 2010). In addition, EU policy reports 
increasingly point out structural changes that pose difficulty for small farms (e.g. regulatory 
and policy innovations, aging farmers), and stress that SSFs survival and market participation 
is dependent on diversification of farm activities and/or increasing off-farm activities 
(pluriactivity) (Davidova et al., 2010). Thus, the recognition and debate of SSFs at the EU level 
is gathering speed from many angles. However, discussion about the localised issues of SFs 
5 
 
and SSFs in previously centrally-planned economies such as Hungary is embryonic, but much 
needed to support the ongoing EU policy debate around small farms.  
In Hungary, one of the most influential aspects in the life of SSFs is the significant 
“rurality” of the country. In this respect, the ‘New Hungary Rural Development Programme’ 
(NHRDP) identifies 87 percent of Hungary’s territory including 95 percent of the country’s 
settlements with homes for 45 percent of the total population as rural in 2007-20135 (ARDA, 
2014; EC, 2007). These rural areas are characterized by low population density, heavy reliance 
on land as source of livelihood, and a non-urbanized settlement structure such as villages, small 
towns and isolated farms. In comparison, Germany’s rural regions account for 29% of its 
surface area with 12% of the population (OECD, 2007); and in Romania rural areas cover 87.1 
percent of the territory accommodating 41 percent of the population (Sîrbu, 2012). In addition, 
after over a decade into the privatisation process6, the average plot size in Hungary has become 
2.3 hectares, “which except for plantations or intensive horticultures, hardly provide a secure 
livelihood for a family” (ARDA, 2014:15). In order to overcome SSFs unfavourable position 
rooted in small land sizes and lack of production efficiency, producer and marketing 
organisations, or cooperatives, could prove useful. However, “bad experiences with 
cooperative ventures during the socialist era made farmers reluctant to participate” (JRC, 
2010:34). 
Exacerbating the structural duality of agriculture and the rurality of the country is the 
discrepancy between subsistence level of wages7 and actual wages in the countryside. In this 
respect, the identified amount of minimum monthly wage necessary for sustenance level 
(approx 830 EUR or 253,779 HUF) for a two-parent two-child family in Hungary exceeds the 
actual average net income of two adults in agricultural employment in each and every province 
of Hungary according to the KSH (2014B) and KSH (2015) datasets (own calculations). With 
respect to the labour market, the number of people employed in agriculture dropped from 9.0 
percent to 5.0 percent in the last decade (ARDA, 2014). The main obstacle of the restructuring 
process for the labour force is the mismatch between the roles available and the large numbers 
5 ARDA (2014) [Agricultural and Rural Development Agency of Hungary] identifies settlements with a 
population density not exceeding 120 persons/km2 or having less than 10,000 inhabitants as rural areas. 
6 Private ownership of agricultural land reached 83 percent share by 2005 in Hungary, whereas state land 
ownership and cooperatives significantly decreased. 
7 Direct translation from Hungarian word “létminimum”. It refers to the poverty line, under which sustenance of 
minimum living standards cannot be accomplished. 
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of (un)skilled labour force. There  is  a  clear shortage  of  educated and professional labour  
force  required  by  the  prospering  branches  of  the  economy such as the growing services 
sector. Moreover, Csáki et al. (2010) point out that the high share of old farmers is an 
indication of the new generation being interested in the opportunities provided by the off-farm 
job market. Contrary to this, Bíró et al. (2012) emphasise that the 2011 general austerity 
measures led people to seek agricultural employment, which replaced the previously 
decreasing agri-employment trend with a revival of agri-jobs.  
Demographically, the increase in population in rural areas is low and the aging 
population in rural livelihoods amplifies the rural areas’ unfavourable age-structure 
characteristics. Székely (2012) points out that on average 75 percent of farms are taken over by 
next generation family members, however, there is an increasing tendency for younger people 
to quit family farming as they find farming duties uninteresting or unnecessarily time-
consuming. Despite the fact that younger generations’ work efficiency, risk taking and ability 
to increase profits are much higher than older farm owners’, they are less interested to continue 
farming and have less capital to start agri-businesses (Székely, 2012).  
Székely (2012) argues that the general attitude and financial constraints of young 
people result in the mushrooming of a “new kind of investor” in rural areas who has neither the 
interest to farm nor the background knowledge in farming. Many examples of land acquisitions 
by Székely (2012)’s “new kind of investor” have resulted in EU subsidies going to farm holder 
landlords that do not end up farming the agricultural land (but take the various subsidies). 
Moreover, the privatisation of land can cause traditional farmers to be “pushed off” their 
communal land (Szabó and Jellinek, 2015) when they cannot comply with complicated 
application forms for new subsidies and land acquisitions (Davidova et al., 2010; Davidova et 
al., 2013; EC, 2013a). In particular, non-governmental advocacy and monitoring agencies raise 
attention to two main types of land grabbing in Hungary: the so called ‘pocket contracts’ for 
foreign land ownership, and the lease of formerly state-owned land for Hungarians or 
foreigners both aimed at capturing lucrative agricultural subsidies (TNI, 2013). Thus, land 
ownership, access to land; the ongoing privatisation of land with not-well-defined property 
rights and procedures are serious issues in Hungary for both agricultural efficiency and the 
activities of traditional rural households (Mathijs and Noev, 2004). 
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Since agriculture, forestry, game and fisheries are the primary activities of rural 
populations in Hungary (ARDA, 2014), it is understandable that the three counterproductive 
economic mechanisms, such as (1) Hungary’s growing agricultural exports, (2) shrinking share 
of agriculture in the national economy and (3) increasing pressure from privatisation of land 
that accompany transition processes, do not only play a decisive role in the life of rural 
populations but also influence the quality of rural livelihoods and the winners and losers of 
such processes. The above outlined trends and statistics suggest that large masses of 
populations, who have neither the land nor output potential, are ‘locked into’ small scale 
agriculture for survival; whilst large scale competitive farms are striving for profits in their 
immediate doorstep. Therefore, this thesis aims to analyse the characteristics and determinants 
of SFs and SSFs below 4000 EUR standard output in the Hungarian context in order to draw 
relevant agricultural policy recommendations.  
1.4  Objective of the study 
The main objective of this study is to define and characterise SFs and SSFs below 4000 
EUR standard output in the Hungarian context, with particular attention given to identifying 
the determinants of their production, labour allocation and market participation decisions. In 
particular, the thesis will:  
(1) To rigorously define and assess the role and importance of SFs and SSFs using a 2013 
database of small farms. 
(2) To develop a farm household model, identify the household’s simultaneous decision 
equations and econometrically estimate them in order to reveal the determining factors of 
Hungarian family farms’ market participation and sales decisions for goods and labour.  
(3) To assess the policy implications of the model.  
1.5  Research Hypothesis and Expectations 
Corresponding to the study’s objectives, the first hypothesis states that SFs and SSFs 
play an important role in agricultural production and the procurement of income for both (i) 
rural populations and (ii) the national economy. In accordance with previous findings such as 
Davidova et al. (2013) and JRC (2010), the study expects to find that (1a) the large number of 
SFs and SSFs (i.e. 85 percent of Hungarian farms) is a reflection of their important role for 
rural populations, (1b) but not for the competitiveness of the Hungarian agricultural sector.  
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Secondly, the study hypothesises that (2a) the majority of examined farms operate as 
‘auxiliary economy’, whose main function is to supplement income from other sectors, even 
though other sectors may provide only a limited number of job opportunities, or access to such 
off-farm jobs may be constrained by transaction costs. Thus, (2b) the macroeconomic 
environment and own socio-economic background of the farms are expected to have a 
significant role in determining both production and labour allocation decisions of small farms.  
The third hypothesis presumes that (3) only a small number of SFs and SSFs can further 
develop to undertake full-time farming activities and become professional agri-producers. 
Thus, the rural economy will need a separate but concurrent targeting of poverty reduction, as 
well as structured farm development programmes for up-scalable small farms. 
1.6  Methodology and Data Used 
The following chapters will develop the traditional farm-household model to serve as 
the theoretical basis for the econometric analysis. The theoretical framework will identify eight 
decision equations of the household. Then, the econometric estimation will use the seemingly 
unrelated regression framework to estimate seven of the eight identified household decision 
equations. Only seven equations are estimated in order to overcome measurement and data 
reliability issues, as data on leisure time is not available. The econometric analysis will take 
into account the interdependence or non-separability of household decisions; and define 
dependent and exogenous independent variables according to the economic theory and the 
previous literatures findings.  For this study, a dataset containing 294 farm-household 
observations from 2013 will be used (AKI, 2014). The NUTS3 level dataset was provided by 
AKI8, the Research Institute of Agricultural Economics of Hungary. The dataset contains 
detailed information on household and production characteristics, as well as on sales incomes 
and subsidies of semi-subsistence farms between 2000-4000 EUR SO size. 
1.7  Outline 
The research is developed in seven chapters including introduction (Chapter I) and 
conclusions with policy implications (Chapter VII). In the second chapter, previous findings on 
the concepts and determinants of SFs and SSFs will be reviewed and this study’s contributions 
8 [Agrárgazdasági Kutató intézet] Research Institute of Agricultural Economics in Hungary. 
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outlined. Chapter two will also bring previous discussions about the traditional household 
model into perspective in order to motivate the theoretical framework of this study. Chapter 
three will set out the theoretical framework that underlies the econometric approach in chapter 
four. Then, the data will be described, summary statistics explained and variables defined in 
chapter five. Chapter six will present and discuss the results of the analysis. Finally, 
conclusions and policy implications will be drawn in chapter seven. 
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Chapter 2 – Literature Review 
The literature review first sets out the already existing concepts and the typology of SFs 
and SSFs in the European context. Then, it highlights previous studies’ findings on the 
determinants of subsistence farming in developing countries, in the CEECs and in Hungary. 
After this, the literature on the conceptual model will be reviewed and its underlying 
assumptions outlined. Finally, the contribution of this study will be emphasised. 
2.1. Concepts of subsistence and semi-subsistence farms 
The literature on typologies and conceptualisation of SFs and SSFs in the European 
context is rich. European policy studies published by the European Network for Rural 
Development (Davidova et al., 2010),  the European Comission’s (EC) Joint Research Centre 
(JRC, 2010), and the European Parliament Directorate General for Internal Policies (Davidova 
et al., 2013) extensively discuss the classification of heterogeneous small farms according to 
physical parameters (e.g. labour use), economic size, market participation and land size.  
Classification by economic size is the most common differentiation method among 
farms. In this respect, EUROSTAT defines semi-subsistent farms as those having less than 
4000 EUR SO and the FADN farm classification, based on the same SO method9, refers to any 
farm below 25 thousand EUR SO as small farm (breakdown included in Table 1). 
(Agrosynergie EEIG, 2013). According to the UK’s Farm Business Classification, farms can be 
classified by number of full-time equivalent (FTE10) labour force: 
2.1.1. Table - UK and FADN Typologies 
 UK classification UK classification FADN classification 
Very small < 1 FTE Spare time or Part time  
Small 1 < 2 FTE Full time <=24,999 EUR SO 
Medium 2 < 3 FTE Full time 25 000 – 249 999 EUR SO 
Large 3 < 5 FTE Full time 250 000 EUR SO and over 
Very Large >= 5 Full time  
Considering market participation, it is conventional to classify farms as subsistence-
oriented if they produce only for home consumption or less than 50 percent of their produce is 
9 Standard Output (SO) is defined as the monetary value of agricultural output, including sales, re-use, self-
consumption, changes in the stock of products, evaluated at farm-gate prices and not including direct support 
(Agrosynergie EEIG, 2013). 
10 FTE is calculated by multiplying the numbers of different livestock hectares of crops by the relevant Standard 
Labour Requirement coefficients and then adding the results together. The number of hours can be converted to an 
equivalent number of full-time workers, on the basis that a full-time worker works a 39 hour week (RBR, 2015:4). 
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marketed. If more than 50 of their produce is marketed or they only produce for the market, 
then they are classified as market-oriented (Davidova et al., 2010, Davidova et al., 2013, JRC, 
2010). However, this threshold is rather arbitrary and the application of other thresholds is also 
possible (see JRC, (2010:30). In addition, McConnell and Dillon (1997) suggest that holdings 
with 0.5-2.0 ha of cultivated land might be a good proxy indicator for SSFs. In Europe, there is 
a broad consensus that small farms are those that operate on an agricultural area of 5 ha or less 
(Davidova et al., 2010). Moreover, JRC (2010:30) point out that dependency ratios for own 
consumption and input perspectives could also be considered as classification methods. 
In terms of empirical literature, Davidova (2011) shows that SSFs is a heterogeneous 
group of rural land holders with different motivations and levels of commitment to agriculture. 
SSFs are (1) farm  holders that operate SSFs as a survival strategy because they are pushed  
into  subsistence  farming  by  poverty; (2) or they are part-time  farmers  with  other  gainful  
activities;  (3) or semi-subsistence farmers  by  choice (including hobby farmers). Hawkins et 
al. (1993) identify three groups of farms by their adjustment patterns in West Europe, namely 
those who further engage with agriculture; who further disengage with agriculture and an in-
between group that is stable. Hawkins et al. (1993)’s categorisation hinges on the 
differentiating character of pluriactivity, whereby pluriactivity or off-farm work is attributed to 
dis-engagers. Daskalopoulou and Petrou (2002) identify three types of farm households, 
namely subsistence, survivalist and productivist farm households. Their scale ranges from part-
time production for self-consumption on less than 1 ha to being a full-time farm on farm sizes 
above 10 ha, with an in-between category where pluriactivity is highly important. Davidova et 
al. (2009) define part-timers (including a sub-group of hobby farmers), subsistence farms (SFs 
and SSFs), small commercial farms, and large commercial farms, where the first three groups 
engage with off-farm work at different levels and ways.  
Overall, the literature distinguishes between farms by economic size, land size, labour 
use, market participation, dependency ratios and production behaviour or orientation. All 
distinctions are useful; and highlight the different roles small farms have in the economy. 
Depending on the adopted definitions, the number of SSFs and SFs fluctuates greatly. 
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2.2. Previous Findings on the Determinants of SFs and SSFs 
Many scholars have already studied smallholder commercialisation in developing 
countries. As a result, there is a large body of literature exploring the determinants of 
smallholder participation and commercialisation decisions in the developing country context. 
The most relevant literature pieces and their variables determining production and sales 
decisions are listed in Appendix A. The most common determinants highlighted in this 
literature can be grouped under the following headings: (1) household characteristics (including 
human capital); (2) farm endowments (including assets); and (3) access, information and 
infrastructure endowments (Sebatta et al., 2014). The most often used determining factors 
according these groupings are (1) age, gender, farm size, experience, education level, 
household size, (2) value of livestock owned, value of household durables, monthly non-farm 
income, (3) distance to nearest market, extension visits made to the farm per year, membership 
in farmers’ organisation, road/transport condition to nearest market.  
The developing country literature has many common features with studies in CEECs. 
However, variables such as livestock ownership and location (“rurality”) are much emphasised 
indicators of wealth and transport related transaction costs in developing countries. In the 
CEECs, these variables are expected to have less additional meaning since transport to local 
markets is generally accessible; and animal husbandry is a traditional activity that can be 
carried out by both small scale and more specialised farmers.  
In terms of the Eastern European context, the most relevant studies have been of 
Latruffe et al. (2009), Rizov et al (2000), Davidova et al. (2012), and the EU reports mentioned 
above, that summarise the determinants and characteristics of SFs in CEECs. According to 
their findings, the most important trends in rural areas of CEECs are demographic aging, rural 
out-migration of young male, less geographic and occupational mobility of workforce, poor 
education and information gathering possibilities, land constraints, missing or ill-functioning 
input, insurance, capital and credit markets, structural unemployment, imperfect information, 
poor social protection, and general distrust in cooperation inherited from the (“demonised”) 
previous socialist systems (JRC, 2010). In terms of the Hungarian context, Rizov (2005), 
Mathijs and Noev (2004), Bakucs et al. (2010) and Genius (2013) raise important findings. 
Their results are almost in perfect agreement with the generic East European picture; only 
some country specific details can be added. The most important groups of determinants for 
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SFs’ and SSFs’ production and sales decisions fall under six themes outlined in the synoptic 
table of previous findings. The Hungary specific findings are highlighted with italic letters.   
2.2.1. Table - Synoptic Table of Previous Findings 
Theme 1: Household characteristics and human capital 
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number of members (-) impact on the share of output sold (Latruffe et al., 2008) 
(+) engage in individual farming (Rizov et al., 2000; Genius, 2013) 
(+) market participation and sales of goods(Mathijs and Noev, 2004) 
(+) probability of introducing a new crop (Genius, 2013) 
(+) amount of on-farm labour, no effect ondecision (Rizov, 2005) 
2 education, skills, training (+) workers ability, off-farm work (Davidova et al., 2012) (Rizov et al., 2000) 
3 age (+) remaining in agriculture  (Davidova et al., 2012; Rizov, 2005) 
(+) market participation (-) sales of goods (Mathijs and Noev, 2004) 
(-) investment (Genius, 2013) 
4 share of food expenditure (+) on-farm work (Genius, 2013) 
Theme 2: Production type, organisational form and exiting agriculture 
5 number of cultivated crops  (-) household integration in the output markets (Latruffe et al., 2008) 
6 human capital type variables significant effect on the choice of production (i.e. association, hybrid or individual farming) 
(Rizov et al., 2000) 
7 specialised agri-education 
managerial ability 
does not correlate to the chosen method of farming (Rizov et al., 2000) 
(+) on-farm work, allocation of labour to farming (Rizov, 2005) 
8 experience significant effect on choice between association and individual farming, but not for the 
choice to work off-farm (Rizov et al., 2000) 
9 hired workers (+) output sold (Latruffe et al., 2008) 
10 engaged in off-farm work (+) future increase of off-farm work (Genius, 2013; Mathijs and Noev, 2004) 
(-) net farm income, investment, subsidies (Bakucs et al., 2010) 
(-) production and sales decisions(Mathijs and Noev, 2004) 
11 unearned income (-) on-farm labour allocation (Rizov, 2005) 
12 membership in cooperative (+) market participation and sales of goods (Mathijs and Noev, 2004) 
13 specialisation(especially on corn 
and pig (not veg) 
(-) changing from traditional crops (Genuis, 2013) 
(-) work off-farm (Genuis, 2013) 
Theme 3: Land and physical capital 
14 access to land, capital, credit (-) on-farm investment (Davidova et al., 2012) 
(+) sale growth, investment (Latruffe et al., 2008; Bakucs et al., 2010) 
15 farm size (+) sales (Davidova et al., 2012) (-) transaction costs  (+) changing crop mix, new crops 
(Genius, 2013) (-) exiting agriculture (Bakucs et al., 2010) 
16 rented land (+) sales (Davidova et al., 2012) 
17 share of irrigated land (+) sales (Latruffe et al., 2008) 
18 owning more machinery, 
buildings, car, livestock and land 
choice of production organization (Rizov et al., 2000) 
(+) produced and marketed goods; and the decision and amount of labour on-farm (Mathijs 
and Noev 2004; Rizov, 2005) 
Theme 4: Location, markets and distance 
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distance from towns/markets (-) sales (Latruffe et al., 2008) (+) production (-) allocation decision (Mathijs and Noev 
2004) (+) off-farm work (+) being mixed farmer (Rizov et al., 2000) 
Theme 5: Information and social capital 
20 imperfect information  (-) off-farm work (Davidova et al., 2012) 
21 insurance (+) innovation, diversification, expansion, higher-risk higher-yield crops/activities 
(Davidova et al., 2012) 
22 age (-) information gathering (Genuis, 2013) 
23 “trust” (-) information gathering and information flow (Genuis, 2013) 
24 perception of being well-
informed 
(-) changing from traditional crops (Genuis, 2013) 
(-) work off-farm (Genuis, 2013)  
25 information from other users  (+) work off-farm (Genuis, 2013)  
(-) future investment 
26 information from passive source 
(internet)  
(-) uncertainty of future(investment) 
Theme 6: Macroeconomic factors  
27 job opportunities  (+) off-farm work, optimal labour allocation decision (Davidova et al., 2012) 
28 access to services (+) off-farm work, optimal labour allocation decision (Davidova et al., 2012) 
29 functioning capital and land 
markets 
(+) perfect markets 
(-) transaction costs (Latruffe et al., 2008) 
Legend: 1-29 number of variables; italic letters refer to Hungary specific findings and non-italic letters refer to findings for CEECs. 
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In this table, findings (1), (4) and (5) reveal that households produce in order to cover 
household food demand and the variety of food the household and farm need (i.e. to ensure 
food security), and not in response to market demand, suggesting that households’ food 
security and risk considerations have severe implications for policies that aim to target the 
market integration of small farms. No (2) and (7) imply that education can enhance both farm 
profitability and off-farm engagement, whereas farm-managerial ability shifts the allocation of 
labour towards farming since it increases the marginal product of labour in farming.   
In terms of land, smaller-sized farms in Hungary are less willing to change their crop 
mix and move into new cultivations; and the larger, more specialised the farm gets, the less 
likely it is to change crops or exit agriculture for employment (13, 15). Moreover, membership 
in a cooperative has an unambiguously positive impact for production and sales in Hungary 
(12). This may be because cooperatives can ensure better access to inputs, machinery, 
marketing and general opportunities, for which they can increase the household’s capacity to 
face market imperfections and positively affect both the produced and marketed goods and the 
allocation of on-farm labour (18). Latruffe et al. (2008)’s, and Bakucs et al. (2010)’s findings 
(14, 29) suggest that farm investment decisions are based on market conditions; and that the 
presence of capital market imperfections is the cause of limited investment expenditures and 
market participation.  
With respect to information, Davidova et al. (2012) find that imperfect information 
leads to uncertainty about obtaining wage labour; and means full exposure to volatile yields 
and prices (20). Risk averse farmers without adequate access to insurance withhold innovation, 
diversification and expansion; as well as they exchange the higher-risk-greater-yield activities 
to lower-risk-lower-yield ones (21). In addition, Genius (2013) finds that age, information 
source and specialization are the most important factors affecting farmers’ market responses in 
Hungary (22, 23, 25, 26). Hungarian farmers who are informed about the CAP policy from 
other users, such as agricultural unions, cooperatives, extension agents, are more willing to 
work off-farm (25), implying that these farmers have likely been getting a negative picture 
about the future of farming within the EU from their environment.  
In terms of labour market imperfections, structural unemployment, few diversification 
opportunities, low incomes, the seasonality of agriculture with imperfect information and poor 
social protection all play a role in preventing the optimal labour allocation of households 
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(Davidova et al., 2012). Rizov (2005) finds that regional differences by the NUTS2 
specification in Hungary are large with respect to the activity set and the number of farm 
opportunities that farmers face (14). Davidova et al. (2012) state that on average less skilled 
rural farm holders are uncompetitive in the off-farm labour market (2) and are often pushed 
into long-term unemployment, thereby immobility and rigidity in the labour supply is created. 
Furthermore, Bakucs et al. (2010) claim that in transition countries non-farm income is not 
used as a substitute to credit to cover investment expenditures in the presence of capital market 
imperfections, contrary to assumptions about developing countries. Rather, there is a 
competition between farm and non-farm activities in Hungarian agriculture.  
2.3. Review of the theoretical model underlying the empirical analysis  
As outlined earlier, most studies conclude that certain factors of the transition period 
(such as macroeconomic instability, unemployment, and uncertainty) together with transaction 
costs and household characteristics are behind the expansion and non-reducing role of 
subsistence farming in CEECs (Kostov and Lingard, 2004; Mathijs and Noev, 2002; Latruffe et 
al., 2008). Therefore, this study outlines a farm household model cast into imperfect markets in 
order to explain the way these different factors can affect household decision processes; and 
provide the theoretical framework for the proceeding econometric analysis. 
2.3.1 The Traditional Household Model in Imperfect Markets 
The empirical investigation of traditional neo-classical economics with the theory of 
firm had first concluded that small-scale farm-households respond perversely to price 
incentives, due to being irrational decision makers (JRC, 2010). Evolution of this theory was 
made by developing agricultural farm-household models, and by including additional elements 
such as risk aversion, market failure, and transaction costs that can relax the neo-classical 
theory (Kostov and Lingard, 2004; JRC, 2010). However, these models remained to explain the 
economic side of the household decisions only11. Today, “there are good reasons to assume 
11 “The construction of household models started with the work of Chayanov in the 1920s as part of the debate 
between populists and Bolsheviks in Russia” (Sadoulet and de Janvry, 1995:164). Then Becker (1965) and 
Michael and Becker (1973) formalised the process of time allocation of the household. However, the  full  version  
of  the  neo-classical  farm  household  model  was developed by Barnum and Squire (1979) and further elaborated 
by a series of authors in Singh, Squire, and Strauss (1986) and later on by de Janvry et al. (1991), Sadoulet and de 
Janvry (1995), Sadoulet et al. (1998) and Key et al.. (2000) among others (Sadoulet and de Janvry, 1995). 
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that small-scale farm households are also driven by non-economic aspects” such as non-
economic goals, preferences and orientation (JRC, 2010:32; Kostov and Lingard, 2004). The 
next paragraphs will explore these developments.  
The problems of production, consumption and labour supply decisions are often 
analysed separately in economic theory, however the entity of the household integrate these 
decisions into one single household problem where the decision maker is simultaneously 
engaged in production, consumption and work decisions. Typically, there are two models 
distinguished: (i) the model of households’ utility maximisation under perfect and (ii) 
imperfect market conditions. Under perfect markets, all products and factors are tradable and 
their opportunity cost is represented by the price they can be traded for on existing markets. 
These conditions enable separability – i.e. the household can solve both its production and 
consumption decision sequentially or recursively. The household, however, typically faces a 
number of imperfections or market failures for attaining factors and selling produce. The 
extreme case of market failure is the nonexistence of markets. Since this is not the case in 
Hungary, the next paragraph will focus on imperfect markets with market failures.  
According to Sadoulet and de Janvry (1995), markets may fail for a household when it 
is forced to face a price gap (or a price band) between the low selling price (Ps sell) and high 
buying price (Ps buy) of the same produce or factor illustrated in figure 2.3.1. (Goetz, 1992).  
If the household can equate its own demand and supply in its fictitious own intra-household  
market where ‘exchange’ is determined by internal shadow prices that fall within the price 
band (gray area), the household may be better off by remaining autarkic and choosing self-
sufficiency (or complete subsistence) (Goetz, 1992).  
 
2.3.1. Figure - Price formation of the household 
        Source: Goetz (1992:446) 
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Sadoulet and de Janvry (1995) outline the following factors for which the price band 
(and subsequently the probability of self-sufficiency) may increase. These are: (1) transaction 
costs 𝜏𝜏 (distance from markets, legal and physical infrastructure, limited access to credit, 
transportation, monopoly power, high search and negotiation costs due to imperfect 
information); (2) shallow local markets (when harvests are good price falls due to increased 
competition of sales from other households); and (3) prise risks (farmers’ certainty equivalent 
price is a discounted value of the expected price by the markup). The market imperfections 
related to transaction costs that are likely to occur in Hungary are: (1) the output markets are 
imperfect and the household received a lower price than possible for its produce; (2) the input 
markets are imperfect and the household must purchase inputs for higher price than possible; 
and (3) the labour market is imperfect and the household receives less wage than possible 
(Latruffe et al., 2009). Of course, apart from transaction costs, shallow local markets and price 
risk can also be the cause of market imperfections in Hungary (as explained in previous 
section). 
With such market failures the price band increases and the household is likely to set an 
internal price for its produce. Consequently, its produce becomes nontradable on conventional 
markets, i.e. goods will be traded intra-household at shadow prices that are internally formed. 
In this situation, the household is forced to simultaneously decide what to produce, sell, how to 
earn income and allocate labour. Thus, the assumption about the separability of production and 
consumption decision breaks down. Both production and consumption decisions will be 
determined at the same time (non-separably) when the household maximises household utility.  
2.3.2 The Non-Separable Two-Stage Decision Process 
Kostov and Lingard (2004:6) extend the household model by emphasising that not only 
the production and consumption decisions (due to transaction costs) are non-separable, but also 
the sales decision of the household is simultaneously made with the production decision. The 
key to their logic is to first imagine that the household’s decision making process is over a long 
period of time, characterised by high risk, uncertainty and transaction costs. Kostov and 
Lingard (2004)’s idea is represented in figure 2.3.2. The first decision (ex-ante decision) the 
household faces is to buy or produce, which is non-separable with regard to the underlying 
labour allocation, production and consumption decisions in an environment with high 
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transaction costs (as explained above). However, once production happened and the produce is 
available, the household has to decide whether to sell the produce or keep it for own 
consumption. At this stage, ex-ante decisions of already allocated labour and production 
choices cannot be changed anymore; and the consumption and sales decision is separable from 
the production decision. Importantly, at this point transaction costs will be a determinant of the 
participation and the sales decision but will not make the sales decision non-separable from 
production because ex-ante production decisions are sunk. Kostov and Lingard (2004) reason 
that in this two-stage-procedure the pair of decisions produce/buy and sell/consume often 
become conflated into a “confused” decisions problem of produce/sell, whilst in fact only the 
ex-ante decision is non-separable and the ex-post decision is separable due to the already sunk 
production costs. 
 
2.3.2. Figure - Two-Stage Decision Process 
Despite this, many studies (e.g. those in Appendix A) analyse non-separable sales and 
production decisions; and claim that even sales decisions are non-separable due to transaction 
costs. This can only be true in the realm of a small farm household that purposefully produces 
more-than-enough, i.e. where the household is market-oriented and favours production. 
Favouring production and sales is indeed reasonable to assume if production maximises the 
survival capacity of the household in a highly uncertain environment; and the household bear 
some foresight of such uncertain future. Kostov and Lingard (2004) name the phenomena of 
‘favouring production in an uncertain environment’ “uncertain anticipation” which means that 
small farmers prepare for surprising changes in the uncertain environment by organising their 
production in such a way that if an opportunity to sell arises they are prepared to do so. In case 
of subsistence-oriented farmers, it is the anticipation of remaining at subsistence level and 
being exposed to severe future shocks as a subsistence farm that makes them production 
orientated. Assuming households’ exposure to both transaction costs and risks is in accordance 
with the ‘price-band’ theory by Sadoulet and De Janvry (1998); and the general view on 
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subsistence agriculture in East Europe, stating that subsistence farming is often a means of 
reducing risk and a way of survival for rural populations (Davidova et al., 2010).  
2.3.3 Underlying assumptions of the traditional household model 
The implications of analysing household models that unite consumption and production 
decisions are extremely sensitive to assumptions about the households’ internal workings and 
their external integration into markets (Huffman, 2012). In the typical Becker-type household 
model, the household maximises utility, a strictly concave utility function, with respect to 
consumption goods that give direct utility to the household (Huffman, 2012). These neo-
classical Beckerian models are founded on a few explicit and a number of auxiliary 
assumptions. This section will pay particular attention to these assumptions. 
Pollak (2002) claims that Becker (1976)’s initial household model is based on three 
main assumptions such as “maximising behaviour, market equilibrium and stable preferences”. 
In terms of auxiliary assumptions, joint production12 and measurability of commodities are 
often dismissed in household analysis for reasons of simplicity. Assuming joint production 
introduces serious complications about the interpretation of shadow prices as they depend not 
only on the households’ resources but also on their preferences.  However, joint production is 
present whenever individuals care how they spend their time, we could (and probably should) 
assume it. Similarly, it is not easy to ensure that all utility-providing commodities are 
observable or measurable, (for example, pleasure of the senses and music appreciation are 
ordinal goods and cannot be cardinally measured). Yet measurability is a regular assumption of 
neoclassical models.  
Furthermore, the concept of “household utility” can be challenged on intra-family 
allocational grounds too: it is often assumed that the household allocates goods and time 
efficiently and that the household pools resources (i.e. that control over resources does not 
affect expenditures and allocation within the household). Of course, it is not easy to prove 
complete efficiency, and evidence is rather strong against resource pooling. As such, empirical 
evidence makes it clear that households do not pool their resources; and the control over 
resources (e.g. women or man ‘dominance’) significantly affects household expenditure and 
12 Joint production refers to the household gaining utility from a certain activity it prefers. For example, on-farm 
work gives direct utility to the household if the members prefer working on-farm. 
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consumption choices (Pollak, 2002). It is also limiting to assume that preferences and incomes 
are shared by all household members. In reality, interests of individual household members 
diverge and not all incomes enter the common pot (Taylor and Adelman, 2003). 
In addition, due to households being sellers and buyers at the same time, the farm 
household’s budget is assumed to be endogenous and dependent on production decisions that 
contribute to income through profits (Taylor and Adelman, 2003). This is significantly 
different to pure consumer models where budget is assumed to be fixed. Similarly, in 
household models non-labour income, human capital investment, and assets (or investment) are 
assumed to be exogenous. Strauss and Thomas (1995:1930) argue that this is acceptable in 
static models, but these variables should be endogenous in dynamic models.  
Another key assumption is that the household can obtain perfect substitutes for family 
labour and home-produced goods in the local markets and it can sell its own labour at market 
wage. However, empirical literature such as Latruffe et al. (2008) argues that family labour and 
hired labour should not be viewed as perfect substitutes. Looking at the use of input and 
outputs, it is often implicitly assumed that tradables compete with non-tradables for inputs that 
are mobile across activities and whose total availability to the household is fixed. If inputs are 
non-tradable such as labour and land when land and labour markets are imperfect, and land is 
fixed by activity, a missing market for the output will still not affect the supply response 
(Pollak, 2002). Thus, assuming full mobility of fixed inputs may be challenging for the validity 
and the generalisation of the model. 
2.4. Contribution of this study 
Firstly, the research will contribute to the general discussion about SFs and SSFs in the 
New Member States. As outlined above, policy formation for SFs and SSFs is a current debate 
due to the continued role of SFs and SSFs in transition economies despite the decades of 
restructuring and effort to create more competitive markets.    
Secondly, the research will contribute to identifying the determining factors and 
characteristics of subsistence and semi-subsistence farms in Hungary. In this respect, previous 
studies used older data (Mathijs and Noev, 2004), focused on larger farms (Bakucs et al., 
2010), or only carried out a descriptive analysis of small farms (Kemény et al., 2014). 
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Therefore, this research will use post-EU succession data and will focus on the econometric 
analysis of small farms that classify as SFs or SSFs.  
Thirdly, the study will pay particular attention to the role of off-farm work in the labour 
allocation decision for the production, market participation and exit of small farms in Hungary 
in order to draw relevant policy recommendations that can assist SFs and SSFs. In this respect, 
previous research have emphasised the role of off-farm work as a strategy of survival and 
diversification of small farms, however assessing whether agricultural income is the dominant 
source of income for the farm household has not been carried out (JRC, 2010:30). Likewise, an 
empirical study investigating simultaneous farm household decisions in Hungary has not been 
undertaken.  
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Chapter 3 – Conceptual Framework 
3.1. Household production model 
Inspired by the work of Sadoulet and de Janvry (1995), Vakis et al. (2004), Key et al. 
(2000), Huffman (2010) and Woldeyohanes (2014), the household model outlined below 
illustrates the simultaneous decision problem. The household’s problem is to maximise utility 
with respect to consumption of own-produced goods (𝑞𝑞𝑖𝑖𝑐𝑐), market-bought goods (𝑞𝑞𝑚𝑚𝑐𝑐 ), leisure 
time (𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙), and on-farm work (𝑙𝑙𝑖𝑖) subject to constraints (1b)-(1h). In this model, 𝑖𝑖 = 1,2,3 … 𝐼𝐼 
are goods consumed and produced by the household, and 𝑚𝑚 = 1,2,3 …𝑀𝑀 are other market-
bought commodities. Important to notice that on-farm work enters household utility function 
(1a) directly in order to ensure joint production. The notion of gaining direct utility from 
farming is motivated by Kostov and Lingard (2004)’s observation which states that there are 
two kinds of households in transition economies: market-oriented households whose main goal 
is to produce for sales and consumption is only a residual term; and subsistence-oriented ones 
who have the primary motive of securing consumption whilst trying to sell marketable surplus. 
For market-oriented households, we can believe that working on-farm is their preferred activity 
since they aim to improve their own farms. On the other hand, we can assume that the 
subsistence-oriented group prefers to exit on-farm work if opportunities arise. Therefore, in this 
model the household gains direct utility (or disutility) not only from consuming consumption 
goods, which can be either produced (𝑞𝑞𝑖𝑖𝑐𝑐) or bought (𝑞𝑞𝑚𝑚𝑐𝑐 ), but also from on-farm labour (li). 
More formally, the utility maximisation problem of the farm-household is: 
(1a)  max𝑞𝑞𝑖𝑖𝑐𝑐,𝑞𝑞𝑚𝑚𝑐𝑐 ,ll,li   u(𝑞𝑞𝑖𝑖𝑐𝑐, 𝑞𝑞𝑚𝑚𝑐𝑐 , ll, li; zh) 
subject to 
(1b) ∑ 𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖(𝑞𝑞𝑖𝑖𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑖 −  𝑞𝑞𝑖𝑖𝑐𝑐 − 𝑘𝑘𝑖𝑖) + ∑ 𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖𝐸𝐸𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + 𝑙𝑙𝑜𝑜𝑤𝑤𝑙𝑙𝑜𝑜 + 𝑉𝑉 + 𝑆𝑆 − 𝑙𝑙𝑖𝑖𝑤𝑤𝑙𝑙 − 𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑤𝑤𝑙𝑙 −  ∑ 𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖 𝑘𝑘𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 −  ∑ 𝑝𝑝𝑘𝑘 𝑚𝑚𝑘𝑘𝑚𝑚𝑘𝑘𝑚𝑚 −
∑ 𝑝𝑝𝑚𝑚𝑞𝑞𝑚𝑚
𝑐𝑐
𝑚𝑚 ≥ 0       full income constraint 
(1c)  ∑ (𝑞𝑞𝑖𝑖𝑠𝑠 − 𝑘𝑘𝑖𝑖 − 𝑞𝑞𝑖𝑖𝑐𝑐 + 𝐸𝐸𝑖𝑖)𝑖𝑖 ≥ 0      commodity balance 
(1d) 𝐿𝐿 − 𝑙𝑙𝑖𝑖 − 𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙 − 𝑙𝑙𝑜𝑜  = 0        total labour endowment 
(1e) 𝑙𝑙𝑜𝑜 ≥ 0         traded labour  
(1f) 𝑞𝑞𝑖𝑖𝑠𝑠 = 𝐺𝐺𝑖𝑖�𝑘𝑘𝑖𝑖,𝑘𝑘𝑚𝑚, 𝑙𝑙𝑖𝑖; 𝑧𝑧𝑞𝑞�     general production technology 
(1g) 𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖 =  𝑝𝑝𝚤𝚤� , 𝑖𝑖 ∈ 𝑇𝑇;  𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎 𝑤𝑤𝑙𝑙 =  𝑤𝑤𝑙𝑙𝑜𝑜, 𝑙𝑙 ∈ 𝑇𝑇      exogenous market prices for 
tradable goods, inputs and labour 
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(1h) 𝑞𝑞𝑖𝑖𝑠𝑠, 𝑞𝑞𝑖𝑖𝑐𝑐, 𝑞𝑞𝑚𝑚𝑐𝑐 ,𝑘𝑘𝑖𝑖,𝑘𝑘𝑚𝑚, 𝐿𝐿 ≥ 0        non-negativity constraint, 
where zh and 𝑧𝑧𝑞𝑞 are household and production characteristics respectively; 𝑞𝑞𝑖𝑖𝑠𝑠  total value of 
goods produced by the household for consumption, input use and sale; 𝑙𝑙𝑜𝑜 is hours worked off-
farm;  V is non-labour income including net governmental transfers, remittances, benefits, in-
kind transfers, subsidies, dividends and unanticipated gifts; S is savings; 𝑤𝑤𝑙𝑙𝑜𝑜 is market labour 
wage; 𝐸𝐸𝑖𝑖 is initial household endowments of own-produced goods and inputs; 𝑘𝑘𝑖𝑖 is input 
produced by the household, 𝑘𝑘𝑚𝑚 is input bought by the household, 𝑝𝑝𝑘𝑘𝑚𝑚 is the price of inputs 𝑘𝑘𝑚𝑚, 
𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖 is product price for goods produced by the households; 𝑝𝑝𝑚𝑚 is other product prices consumed 
by the household but not produced by the household; and (𝑞𝑞𝑖𝑖𝑠𝑠 −  𝑞𝑞𝑖𝑖𝑐𝑐 − 𝑘𝑘𝑖𝑖) is sales. T means that 
the product or labour resource is tradable and NT means that it is non-tradable.  
A typical cash income constraint would state that the household cash income from 
sales, off-farm work and non-labour income must be more or equal to market bought inputs 
and consumption goods. Instead of this, a full income constraint is used in this model; and it is 
stated in equation (1b). The full income constraint in (1b) takes into account the opportunity 
cost of time spent on on-farm work (𝑙𝑙𝑖𝑖𝑤𝑤𝑙𝑙) and leisure (𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑤𝑤𝑙𝑙). According to Huffman (2010:8) 
inclusion of opportunity cost is needed for correct specification of the household model as 
“econometric studies that ignore household expenditures on leisure and price of time of 
household members will suffer from misspecification bias included omitted variable bias”. The 
interpretation of constraints (1c)-(1e) is straightforward. 
Looking at the production side, the household produces 𝑞𝑞𝑖𝑖𝑠𝑠 which is shared between 
consumption 𝑞𝑞𝑖𝑖𝑐𝑐, own input use 𝑘𝑘𝑖𝑖 and sales as a residual (𝑞𝑞𝑖𝑖𝑠𝑠 −  𝑞𝑞𝑖𝑖𝑐𝑐 − 𝑘𝑘𝑖𝑖). This assumes that 
𝑘𝑘𝑖𝑖 ∈ 𝑞𝑞𝑖𝑖
𝑠𝑠  and new input production is part of the production process captured by the general 
transformation function (1f) where home-produced inputs are a share of home-produced goods. 
Given product and input heterogeneity we can also assume that 𝑞𝑞𝑖𝑖𝑠𝑠 ≠ 𝑘𝑘𝑚𝑚 ≠ 𝑞𝑞𝑚𝑚𝑐𝑐 , or 𝑖𝑖 ≠
𝑚𝑚,meaning that the household cannot produce all consumption goods and inputs needed for its 
consumption and activities. These non-produced, market-bought commodities are signalled 
with subscript m; and they are purchased at market prices 𝑝𝑝𝑚𝑚 and 𝑝𝑝𝑘𝑘𝑚𝑚 respectively. For these 
market-bought commodities, no intra-household trade is possible, and therefore no shadow 
prices exist. It is important to note that if the household sells surplus consumption goods or 
inputs, it will market them at the market price 𝑝𝑝𝚤𝚤� , however if it does not sell at all, then the 
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price of goods and inputs will collapse to the shadow prices. The same is true for labour and 
these notions are captured by (1g); and shadow prices are derived in (2a) and (2b). 
Now, by explicitly introducing the three types of transaction costs affecting output, 
input and labour allocation decisions, we can see how these additional costs increase the price 
band; and thereby the probability of the household undertaking internal pricing. We can rewrite 
the full income constraint in equation  (1b) as (Key et al., 2000:247; Woldeyohanes, 2014): 
(1i) 
∑ �𝑞𝑞𝑖𝑖
𝑠𝑠 �𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖
∗ − 𝛿𝛿𝑖𝑖𝜏𝜏
𝑖𝑖(𝑧𝑧ℎ,𝐴𝐴,𝐺𝐺,𝐶𝐶)� − 𝑞𝑞𝑖𝑖𝑐𝑐 �𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖∗ + 𝛾𝛾𝑖𝑖𝜏𝜏𝑖𝑖(𝑧𝑧ℎ,𝐴𝐴,𝐺𝐺,𝐶𝐶)� − 𝑘𝑘𝑖𝑖 �𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖∗ − 𝛿𝛿𝑖𝑖𝜏𝜏𝑖𝑖(𝑧𝑧ℎ,𝐴𝐴,𝐺𝐺,𝐶𝐶)�� 𝑖𝑖 +
∑ 𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖𝐸𝐸𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + 𝑙𝑙𝑜𝑜�𝑤𝑤𝑙𝑙𝑜𝑜 − 𝜉𝜉𝑙𝑙𝜏𝜏𝑙𝑙(𝑧𝑧ℎ,𝐴𝐴,𝐺𝐺,𝐶𝐶)�  + 𝑉𝑉 + 𝑆𝑆 − 𝑙𝑙𝑖𝑖𝑤𝑤𝑙𝑙∗ − 𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑤𝑤𝑙𝑙∗ − ∑ 𝑘𝑘𝑖𝑖  �𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖∗ − 𝛿𝛿𝑖𝑖𝜏𝜏𝑖𝑖(𝑧𝑧ℎ,𝐴𝐴,𝐺𝐺,𝐶𝐶)�𝑖𝑖 −  ∑ 𝑘𝑘𝑚𝑚  �𝑝𝑝𝑘𝑘𝑚𝑚 + 𝜏𝜏𝑘𝑘(𝑧𝑧ℎ,𝐴𝐴,𝐺𝐺,𝐶𝐶)�𝑘𝑘𝑚𝑚 − ∑ 𝑞𝑞𝑚𝑚𝑐𝑐 �𝑝𝑝𝑚𝑚 +𝑚𝑚
𝜏𝜏𝑚𝑚(𝑧𝑧ℎ,𝐴𝐴,𝐺𝐺,𝐶𝐶)� ≥ 0 
where 𝜏𝜏𝑖𝑖 and 𝜏𝜏𝑙𝑙 are the (produced) commodity and labour specific transaction costs determined 
by (or a function of) household characteristics 𝑧𝑧ℎ; household assets including liquidity and 
credit A; public goods and services G (e.g. access to public funds, advisors, English speaking 
officials to inform about new legislations and opportunities); and social capital C (e.g. 
connection to other farmers, cooperation, facilities used in common, information availability 
and accessibility). In order to include transaction costs into the price formation, 𝛿𝛿𝑖𝑖 takes value 
one for a seller household, 𝛾𝛾𝑖𝑖 takes a value one for buyer household, and 𝜉𝜉𝑙𝑙 takes value one for 
households engaged in off-farm work. All multipliers take value zero when the household is 
autarkic in labour allocation or production. If the household is autarkic, the price 𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖∗ will 
represent the shadow price, if not the price 𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖∗ will represent the transaction cost induced 
market price 𝑝𝑝𝚤𝚤� . 𝜏𝜏𝑘𝑘 and 𝜏𝜏𝑚𝑚 are input and non-produced commodity specific transaction costs. 
Since the prices of non-produced goods 𝑞𝑞𝑚𝑚𝑐𝑐  and market bought inputs 𝑘𝑘𝑚𝑚 in the last two terms 
will always have transaction costs attached to them (if and only if transaction costs are 
generally present in the economy), there is no need to introduce a multiplier before 𝜏𝜏𝑘𝑘 and 𝜏𝜏𝑚𝑚.  
In general, the sign and magnitude of transaction costs may differ for buyer and seller 
households, as well as for different products and inputs. 
Since production and consumption decisions of the household are closely related due to 
their non-separability, we can also say that 𝑞𝑞𝑖𝑖𝑐𝑐 = 𝑓𝑓(𝑞𝑞𝑖𝑖𝑠𝑠, 𝑧𝑧ℎ) where 𝑓𝑓(. ) determines the fraction 
of consumption from the home produced goods. This simplification reflects the dependency of 
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consumption on the relationship between quantities produced and household characteristics 
(e.g. larger households may demand larger share of produce). Following Huffman (2010:9), 
this assumption and the general production technology (1f) can be substituted into the objective 
function. Then, the maximisation problem becomes: max
𝑘𝑘𝑖𝑖,𝑘𝑘𝑚𝑚,𝑙𝑙𝑖𝑖,𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙,𝑞𝑞𝑚𝑚𝑐𝑐  u�𝑓𝑓�𝐺𝐺𝑖𝑖�𝑘𝑘𝑖𝑖,𝑘𝑘𝑚𝑚, 𝑙𝑙𝑖𝑖; 𝑧𝑧𝑞𝑞�, 𝑧𝑧ℎ�, 𝑞𝑞𝑚𝑚𝑐𝑐 , ll, li; zh� 
By inserting (1f) and 𝑓𝑓(. ) in the place of 𝑞𝑞𝑖𝑖𝑠𝑠 and 𝑞𝑞𝑖𝑖𝑐𝑐 respectively, and using (1i) instead of (1b) 
the Lagrangian of the maximisation problem can be written as: 
ℒ =  u�𝑓𝑓�𝐺𝐺𝑖𝑖�𝑘𝑘𝑖𝑖,𝑘𝑘𝑚𝑚, 𝑙𝑙𝑖𝑖; 𝑧𝑧𝑞𝑞�, 𝑧𝑧ℎ�, 𝑞𝑞𝑚𝑚𝑐𝑐 , ll, li; zh�+  λ � �𝐺𝐺𝑖𝑖�𝑘𝑘𝑖𝑖,𝑘𝑘𝑚𝑚, 𝑙𝑙𝑖𝑖; 𝑧𝑧𝑞𝑞� �𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖∗ − 𝛿𝛿𝑖𝑖𝜏𝜏𝑖𝑖�𝑧𝑧ℎ,𝐴𝐴,𝐺𝐺,𝐶𝐶��
𝑖𝑖 
− 𝑓𝑓�𝐺𝐺𝑖𝑖�𝑘𝑘𝑖𝑖,𝑘𝑘𝑚𝑚, 𝑙𝑙𝑖𝑖; 𝑧𝑧𝑞𝑞�, 𝑧𝑧ℎ� �𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖∗ + 𝛾𝛾𝑖𝑖𝜏𝜏𝑖𝑖�𝑧𝑧ℎ,𝐴𝐴,𝐺𝐺,𝐶𝐶�� − 𝑘𝑘𝑖𝑖 �𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖∗ − 𝛿𝛿𝑖𝑖𝜏𝜏𝑖𝑖�𝑧𝑧ℎ,𝐴𝐴,𝐺𝐺,𝐶𝐶���  + �𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖𝐸𝐸𝑖𝑖
𝑖𝑖
+ 𝑙𝑙𝑜𝑜 �𝑤𝑤𝑙𝑙𝑜𝑜 − 𝜉𝜉𝑙𝑙𝜏𝜏𝑙𝑙�𝑧𝑧ℎ ,𝐴𝐴,𝐺𝐺,𝐶𝐶��  + 𝑉𝑉 + 𝑆𝑆 − 𝑙𝑙𝑖𝑖𝑤𝑤𝑙𝑙∗ − 𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑤𝑤𝑙𝑙∗
−  �𝑘𝑘𝑖𝑖  �𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖∗ − 𝛿𝛿𝑖𝑖𝜏𝜏𝑖𝑖�𝑧𝑧ℎ ,𝐴𝐴,𝐺𝐺,𝐶𝐶��
𝑖𝑖
−  �𝑘𝑘𝑚𝑚  �𝑝𝑝𝑘𝑘𝑚𝑚 + 𝜏𝜏𝑘𝑘�𝑧𝑧ℎ,𝐴𝐴,𝐺𝐺,𝐶𝐶��
𝑘𝑘𝑚𝑚
−�𝑞𝑞𝑚𝑚
𝑐𝑐 �𝑝𝑝𝑚𝑚 + 𝜏𝜏𝑚𝑚�𝑧𝑧ℎ,𝐴𝐴,𝐺𝐺,𝐶𝐶��
𝑚𝑚
�
+ ηi � �𝐺𝐺𝑖𝑖�𝑘𝑘𝑖𝑖,𝑘𝑘𝑚𝑚, 𝑙𝑙𝑖𝑖; 𝑧𝑧𝑞𝑞�–𝑘𝑘𝑖𝑖 − 𝑓𝑓(𝐺𝐺𝑖𝑖�𝑘𝑘𝑖𝑖,𝑘𝑘𝑚𝑚, 𝑙𝑙𝑖𝑖; 𝑧𝑧𝑞𝑞�, 𝑧𝑧ℎ) + 𝐸𝐸𝑖𝑖�
𝑖𝑖
� + µ�𝐿𝐿 − 𝑙𝑙𝑖𝑖 − 𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙 − 𝑙𝑙𝑜𝑜�+ ν[𝑙𝑙𝑜𝑜] 
where λ is the marginal utility of full income given by constraint (1b), η is the marginal utility 
of commodity balance induced by constraint (1c), µ is the marginal utility of labour 
endowment given by (1d), and ν is the shadow price of wage labour when 𝑙𝑙𝑜𝑜 is zero. The first 
order conditions of the Lagrangian are derived in Appendix B. From the Kuhn-Tucker 
conditions we know that: 
(2a) ηi = 0  ⊥  ∑ �𝑞𝑞𝑖𝑖𝑠𝑠 –𝑘𝑘𝑖𝑖 − 𝑞𝑞𝑖𝑖𝑐𝑐 + 𝐸𝐸𝑖𝑖�𝑖𝑖 > 0 𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎 ηi > 0  ⊥  ∑ �𝑞𝑞𝑖𝑖𝑠𝑠 –𝑘𝑘𝑖𝑖 − 𝑞𝑞𝑖𝑖𝑐𝑐 + 𝐸𝐸𝑖𝑖� = 0𝑖𝑖   
(2b) ν = 0 ⊥ 𝑙𝑙𝑜𝑜 > 0 𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎 ν > 0 ⊥ 𝑙𝑙𝑜𝑜 = 0  
where (2a) states that if the household consumes all its produce (i.e. the household is fully 
subsistent) and the commodity balance is set to zero, then η will be larger than zero and it will 
represent the shadow price of the non-traded good i that becomes traded in the fictitious intra-
household market at the internally set shadow price. If the commodity balance is positive, i.e. 
there are sales, the sales will be traded at market prices. Similarly, (2b) states that if off-farm 
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labour is not traded (𝑙𝑙𝑜𝑜 = 0) then ν will be larger than zero and will represent the shadow wage 
of labour that could have been supplied to external markets but instead was traded intra-
household at the shadow wage. If there is off-farm work supplied, ν will be set to zero and 
labour will be traded on market wages. In terms of opportunity costs, if 𝑖𝑖, 𝑙𝑙 ∈ 𝑇𝑇, the opportunity 
cost is represented by the market price; and if 𝑖𝑖, 𝑙𝑙 ∈ 𝑁𝑁𝑇𝑇, the opportunity costs is the shadow 
price. 
Thus, the household can trade ‘two types’ of goods and labour symmetrically by 
solving the optimisation and defining (endogenous) decision prices (Sadoulet and de Janvry, 
1995): 
(3a)  𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖∗ =  𝑝𝑝𝚤𝚤� ,   𝑖𝑖 ∈ 𝑇𝑇       exogenous market prices for tradable goods 
(3b)   𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖∗ =  ηi, 𝑖𝑖 ∈ 𝑁𝑁𝑇𝑇   shadow prices for non-tradable goods 
(3c)  𝑤𝑤𝑙𝑙∗ =  𝑤𝑤𝑙𝑙𝑜𝑜 , 𝑙𝑙 ∈ 𝑇𝑇   exogenous labour wage for tradable labour 
(3d)   𝑤𝑤𝑙𝑙∗ = 𝜈𝜈 , 𝑙𝑙 ∈ 𝑁𝑁𝑇𝑇   shadow price of non-tradable labour, 
where tradable goods have a market or farm-gate price of 𝑝𝑝𝚤𝚤�  and non-tradables are traded intra-
household at shadow prices ηi. Labour is employed off-farm for market wage 𝑤𝑤𝑙𝑙𝑜𝑜 and on-farm 
for shadow wage 𝜈𝜈. 
3.2. Reduced form equations 
Because the decision prices of non-tradable are endogenously determined due to the 
above mentioned transaction costs and quotas, production and consumption decisions will not 
be separable. According to the first order conditions of the Lagrangian derived in Appendix B, 
the household will solve the following system of reduced form equations simultaneously, 
where the endogenous variables are expressed as a function of all exogenous variables: 
(4a)  𝑞𝑞𝑖𝑖𝑐𝑐∗ =  ℎ2�𝑧𝑧ℎ, 𝑧𝑧𝑞𝑞 ,𝑝𝑝𝑚𝑚,𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖 ,𝑝𝑝𝑘𝑘 ,𝑤𝑤𝑙𝑙𝑜𝑜,𝑉𝑉, 𝑆𝑆,𝐸𝐸𝑖𝑖 , 𝜏𝜏𝑖𝑖, 𝜏𝜏𝑘𝑘 , 𝜏𝜏𝑚𝑚, 𝜏𝜏𝑙𝑙� 
(4b)  𝑞𝑞𝑖𝑖𝑠𝑠∗ =  ℎ3�𝑧𝑧ℎ , 𝑧𝑧𝑞𝑞 ,𝑝𝑝𝑚𝑚,𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖 ,𝑝𝑝𝑘𝑘 ,𝑤𝑤𝑙𝑙𝑜𝑜,𝑉𝑉, 𝑆𝑆,𝐸𝐸𝑖𝑖 , 𝜏𝜏𝑖𝑖, 𝜏𝜏𝑘𝑘 , 𝜏𝜏𝑚𝑚, 𝜏𝜏𝑙𝑙�  
(4c)  𝑞𝑞𝑚𝑚𝑐𝑐∗ = ℎ4�𝑧𝑧ℎ, 𝑧𝑧𝑞𝑞 ,𝑝𝑝𝑚𝑚,𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖 ,𝑝𝑝𝑘𝑘 ,𝑤𝑤𝑙𝑙𝑜𝑜,𝑉𝑉, 𝑆𝑆,𝐸𝐸𝑖𝑖 , 𝜏𝜏𝑖𝑖, 𝜏𝜏𝑘𝑘 , 𝜏𝜏𝑚𝑚, 𝜏𝜏𝑙𝑙� 
(4d) 𝑙𝑙𝑖𝑖∗ = ℎ1(𝑧𝑧ℎ, 𝑧𝑧𝑞𝑞 ,𝑝𝑝𝑚𝑚,𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖 ,𝑝𝑝𝑘𝑘 ,𝑤𝑤𝑙𝑙𝑜𝑜,𝑉𝑉, 𝑆𝑆,𝐸𝐸𝑖𝑖 , 𝜏𝜏𝑖𝑖 , 𝜏𝜏𝑘𝑘 , 𝜏𝜏𝑚𝑚, 𝜏𝜏𝑙𝑙  ) 
(4e)  𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙∗ = ℎ5�𝑧𝑧ℎ, 𝑧𝑧𝑞𝑞 ,𝑝𝑝𝑚𝑚,𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖,𝑝𝑝𝑘𝑘 ,𝑤𝑤𝑙𝑙𝑜𝑜,𝑉𝑉, 𝑆𝑆,𝐸𝐸𝑖𝑖 , 𝜏𝜏𝑖𝑖 , 𝜏𝜏𝑘𝑘 , 𝜏𝜏𝑚𝑚, 𝜏𝜏𝑙𝑙� 
(4f)  𝑙𝑙𝑜𝑜∗ = ℎ6�𝑧𝑧ℎ, 𝑧𝑧𝑞𝑞 ,𝑝𝑝𝑚𝑚,𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖,𝑝𝑝𝑘𝑘 ,𝑤𝑤𝑙𝑙𝑜𝑜,𝑉𝑉, 𝑆𝑆,𝐸𝐸𝑖𝑖 , 𝜏𝜏𝑖𝑖 , 𝜏𝜏𝑘𝑘 , 𝜏𝜏𝑚𝑚, 𝜏𝜏𝑙𝑙� 
(4g)  𝑘𝑘𝑖𝑖∗ = ℎ7�𝑧𝑧ℎ , 𝑧𝑧𝑞𝑞 ,𝑝𝑝𝑚𝑚,𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖 ,𝑝𝑝𝑘𝑘 ,𝑤𝑤𝑙𝑙𝑜𝑜,𝑉𝑉, 𝑆𝑆,𝐸𝐸𝑖𝑖 , 𝜏𝜏𝑖𝑖, 𝜏𝜏𝑘𝑘 , 𝜏𝜏𝑚𝑚, 𝜏𝜏𝑙𝑙� 
(4h)  𝑘𝑘𝑚𝑚∗ = ℎ8�𝑧𝑧ℎ, 𝑧𝑧𝑞𝑞 ,𝑝𝑝𝑚𝑚,𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖 ,𝑝𝑝𝑘𝑘 ,𝑤𝑤𝑙𝑙𝑜𝑜,𝑉𝑉, 𝑆𝑆,𝐸𝐸𝑖𝑖, 𝜏𝜏𝑖𝑖 , 𝜏𝜏𝑘𝑘 , 𝜏𝜏𝑚𝑚, 𝜏𝜏𝑙𝑙� 
27 
 
It is visible that all exogenous variables will enter all equations due to the 
interdependencies of endogenous variables among themselves given by the assumption of non-
separability. The interaction between endogenous variables will depend on the exogenous 
variables’ effect and magnitude on the different endogenous variables; and the different ways 
they enter each others’ equations. Consequently, the variable selection for household 
characteristics, non-earned income and transaction costs will be decisive.  
According to Huffman (2010:20), a usual prediction of this model is that if non-labour 
income V increases (ceteris paribus) the household will allocate the additional income to 
purchase goods and leisure on the market. On the other hand, an increase in  𝑝𝑝𝑚𝑚 (ceteris 
paribus) will reduce the real wage rate and will consequently increase the amount of time 
allocated to and the quantity of home produce. Thus, the net impact on leisure, work and 
quantities consumed will be determined by the income and substitution effects.  
To further the model, Vakis et al. (2004:5) demonstrates that non-separability breaks 
down not only because of transaction costs’ effect on products and labour trade but also due to 
the limit on labour demand, which is imposed by a quota on available off-farm labour 
opportunities 𝐿𝐿� in the region. In this respect, the net labour seller households for whom the 
quota is binding will sell labour up to amount  𝐿𝐿� on the labour market and supply on-farm 
labour up to the point where the marginal product of labour equates the marginal utility from 
leisure. Consequently, the allocation of on-farm labour will not only depend on typical 
exogenous variables but also on consumption side variables such as household characteristics, 
and on the exogenously imposed quota  𝐿𝐿� . Thus, we can amend the reduced form model with 
including the quota: 𝑙𝑙𝑖𝑖∗ = ℎ1( .  ;𝐿𝐿� = 𝑙𝑙𝑜𝑜) where the dot represents all exogenous variables that 
determine on-farm labour supply. Consequently, the off-farm labour allocation rule is 𝑙𝑙𝑜𝑜 =
�
𝑙𝑙𝑜𝑜∗( . )  𝑖𝑖𝑓𝑓 𝑙𝑙𝑜𝑜∗ < 𝐿𝐿�
𝐿𝐿�   if  𝑙𝑙𝑜𝑜∗ ≥ 𝐿𝐿�        where 𝑙𝑙𝑜𝑜∗ is the unconstrained level of off-farm labour. 
3.3. Empirical Model Specification 
Our interest is the household’s interaction with the broader economy. In particular, the 
way it allocates its labour and produced goods for sales on the supply side; and the 
consumption decisions on the input demand and household consumption side. In order to shed 
light on the household’s labour allocation, market sales and consumption decision, the effects 
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of transaction costs and labour quotas will have to be explicitly included in the econometric 
estimation. The empirical model specification for the estimation of eight possible equations is 
the following:  
(5a) 𝑙𝑙𝑜𝑜 = ℎ9(𝑧𝑧ℎ, 𝑧𝑧𝑞𝑞 ,𝑝𝑝𝑚𝑚,𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖,𝑝𝑝𝑘𝑘 ,𝑤𝑤𝑙𝑙𝑜𝑜,𝑉𝑉, 𝑆𝑆,𝐸𝐸𝑖𝑖 , 𝐿𝐿�, 𝜏𝜏𝑓𝑓𝑖𝑖𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓 , 𝜏𝜏𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑜𝑜𝑝𝑝𝑜𝑜𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖𝑜𝑜𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑙𝑙  ) 
 Wage labour supplied as off-farm work 
(5b)  𝑙𝑙𝑖𝑖 = ℎ1(𝑧𝑧ℎ, 𝑧𝑧𝑞𝑞 ,𝑝𝑝𝑚𝑚,𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖 ,𝑝𝑝𝑘𝑘 ,𝑤𝑤𝑙𝑙𝑜𝑜,𝑉𝑉, 𝑆𝑆,𝐸𝐸𝑖𝑖 , 𝐿𝐿�, 𝜏𝜏𝑓𝑓𝑖𝑖𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓 , 𝜏𝜏𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑜𝑜𝑝𝑝𝑜𝑜𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖𝑜𝑜𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑙𝑙) 
  On-farm work supplied 
(5c) 𝑞𝑞𝑖𝑖𝑚𝑚 =  ℎ11�𝑧𝑧ℎ, 𝑧𝑧𝑞𝑞 ,𝑝𝑝𝑚𝑚,𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖 ,𝑝𝑝𝑘𝑘 ,𝑤𝑤𝑙𝑙𝑜𝑜,𝑉𝑉, 𝑆𝑆,𝐸𝐸𝑖𝑖 , 𝐿𝐿�, 𝜏𝜏𝑓𝑓𝑖𝑖𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓 , 𝜏𝜏𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑜𝑜𝑝𝑝𝑜𝑜𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖𝑜𝑜𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑙𝑙�  
 Quantity of produce sold 
(5d)  𝑞𝑞𝑖𝑖𝑐𝑐 =  ℎ2�𝑧𝑧ℎ, 𝑧𝑧𝑞𝑞 ,𝑝𝑝𝑚𝑚,𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖 ,𝑝𝑝𝑘𝑘 ,𝑤𝑤𝑙𝑙𝑜𝑜,𝑉𝑉, 𝑆𝑆,𝐸𝐸𝑖𝑖 , 𝐿𝐿�, 𝜏𝜏𝑓𝑓𝑖𝑖𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓 , 𝜏𝜏𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑜𝑜𝑝𝑝𝑜𝑜𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖𝑜𝑜𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑙𝑙� 
 Own consumption 
(5e)  𝑞𝑞𝑚𝑚𝑐𝑐 = ℎ4�𝑧𝑧ℎ, 𝑧𝑧𝑞𝑞 ,𝑝𝑝𝑚𝑚,𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖 ,𝑝𝑝𝑘𝑘 ,𝑤𝑤𝑙𝑙𝑜𝑜,𝑉𝑉, 𝑆𝑆,𝐸𝐸𝑖𝑖, 𝐿𝐿�, 𝜏𝜏𝑓𝑓𝑖𝑖𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓 , 𝜏𝜏𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑜𝑜𝑝𝑝𝑜𝑜𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖𝑜𝑜𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑙𝑙� 
 Bought consumption 
(5f)  𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙 = ℎ5�𝑧𝑧ℎ, 𝑧𝑧𝑞𝑞 ,𝑝𝑝𝑚𝑚,𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖,𝑝𝑝𝑘𝑘 ,𝑤𝑤𝑙𝑙𝑜𝑜,𝑉𝑉, 𝑆𝑆,𝐸𝐸𝑖𝑖 , 𝐿𝐿�, 𝜏𝜏𝑓𝑓𝑖𝑖𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓 , 𝜏𝜏𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑜𝑜𝑝𝑝𝑜𝑜𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖𝑜𝑜𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑙𝑙� 
 Leisure time demanded 
(5g)  𝑘𝑘𝑖𝑖 = ℎ7�𝑧𝑧ℎ , 𝑧𝑧𝑞𝑞 ,𝑝𝑝𝑚𝑚,𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖 ,𝑝𝑝𝑘𝑘 ,𝑤𝑤𝑙𝑙𝑜𝑜,𝑉𝑉, 𝑆𝑆,𝐸𝐸𝑖𝑖 , 𝐿𝐿�, 𝜏𝜏𝑓𝑓𝑖𝑖𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓 , 𝜏𝜏𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑜𝑜𝑝𝑝𝑜𝑜𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖𝑜𝑜𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑙𝑙� 
 Own input use (demand) 
(5h)  𝑘𝑘𝑚𝑚∗ = ℎ8�𝑧𝑧ℎ, 𝑧𝑧𝑞𝑞 ,𝑝𝑝𝑚𝑚,𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖 ,𝑝𝑝𝑘𝑘 ,𝑤𝑤𝑙𝑙𝑜𝑜,𝑉𝑉, 𝑆𝑆,𝐸𝐸𝑖𝑖, 𝐿𝐿�, 𝜏𝜏𝑓𝑓𝑖𝑖𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓 , 𝜏𝜏𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑜𝑜𝑝𝑝𝑜𝑜𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖𝑜𝑜𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑙𝑙� 
 Bought input demand 
where 𝜏𝜏𝑖𝑖 , 𝜏𝜏𝑘𝑘 , 𝜏𝜏𝑚𝑚, 𝜏𝜏𝑙𝑙 ∈  𝜏𝜏and 𝜏𝜏 = 𝜏𝜏𝑓𝑓𝑖𝑖𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓 + 𝜏𝜏𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑜𝑜𝑝𝑝𝑜𝑜𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖𝑜𝑜𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑙𝑙. Moreover, 𝜏𝜏𝑓𝑓𝑖𝑖𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓 and 𝜏𝜏𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑜𝑜𝑝𝑝𝑜𝑜𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖𝑜𝑜𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑙𝑙 are 
fixed (FTCs) and proportional transaction costs (PTCs) respectively. As Key et al. (2000) 
describes PTCs are per unit costs associated with transportation and imperfect information 
costs that raise the price of a product paid by buyers and lower the price gained by sellers; 
whilst FTCs are invariant to the quantity of a good traded but effect the household’s decision to 
participate in markets. FTCs may include costs of searching for customers and markets, 
negotiation and bargaining, screening, enforcement and supervision.  
3.4. Limitations of the household production model 
The literature review has already outlined most of the limiting assumptions effecting the 
interpretation and conclusions of the traditional household model. Pollak (2002:115) argues 
that the real action is “not in relaxing the assumptions to achieve greater generality but in 
strengthening them to achieve greater specificity. […] The simplicity and tractability of these 
more specific models depend on imposing just the right combination of auxiliary assumptions.”  
In this spirit, the model prescribed in the contextual framework assumes that market 
equilibrium (or autarky) is achieved by maximising behaviour. The model is characterised by 
joint production and measurable commodities such as consumption goods that give direct 
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utility to the household. The household allocates goods and time efficiently and the household 
pools resources. Budget is assumed to be endogenous and perfect substitutes for family labour 
and home-produced goods can be traded in the local markets. Inputs are assumed to be mobile 
across activities whereas their total availability to the household is fixed, even though it is 
challenging to reflect on such assumptions in a static model. Similarly, assets, investment and 
human capital accumulation is considered to be exogenous given that we are working with a 
static model (Strauss and Thomas, 1995:1930). 
On the other hand, this household model dismisses the point on interdependent 
preferences and transferrable utility as it would make the analysis unnecessarily complicated 
and would lose focus. Moreover, the assumption of the household pooling resources and any 
assumption with respect to intra-household resource conflict are overlooked. They are so 
because equity considerations within the family are not the focus of this study; and inequitable 
resource use is unlikely to be the main determinant of labour allocation decisions in Hungary, 
given that it is a developed country where adults’ life choices are generally respected 
independent of gender or age, even if there may exist some discrimination towards the 
opportunities available for certain groups such as women, undereducated, Romani or the 
elderly (EC, 2012).  Instead, this model considers the household’s single decision-making 
process to be either a situation where a single household member decides on behalf of the 
others; or there is a general consensus among household members in decision making, and 
resources are pooled into a unique strategy (Sadoulet and de Janvry, 1995:167). 
Lastly, the most controversial limitation of traditional household models is that the 
static, micro-focused and individualistic household model cannot integrate the household into 
the ‘real economy’ where households have clear horizontal and vertical linkages amongst 
themselves, and to upstream and downstream industries. In reality, food and production prices 
(and the weather) are likely to affect all households in the region. As such, market signals may 
be amplified through their economic linkages, which can further manipulate household 
decisions and choices. In addition, income effects of policy changes are unlikely to be equally 
distributed among households neither, and may even increase village income inequality. Thus, 
it is important to consider these limitations and be precautious when drawing results from such 
a model. 
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Chapter 4 – Data Description and Econometric Approach 
4.1 Data Description 
A cross-sectional dataset with 294 farm-household observations from 2013 will be used 
for this study. The dataset (AKI, 2014) was surveyed and provided for this research by AKI, 
the Research Institute of Agricultural Economics of Hungary. In the dataset, farm location is 
identified at NUTS3 level, thus there is no specific information on farms’ exact location, or 
their distance from markets. However, the dataset contains information on household and 
production characteristics, as well as on sales income and subsidies received by semi-
subsistence farms between 2000-4000 EUR SO size. The AKI survey for this particular dataset 
used FADN data collection methodology. However, it extended the FADN survey methods 
with including household characteristics, and simplified them with respect to monetary 
variables (Kemény et al., 2014:10). In general, data collection remained to follow FADN 
guidelines and EU interests, for which only semi-subsistence farmers who sell more than 50 
percent of their produce were included in this sample. Despite this, Kemény et al. (2014:11) 
claim that inferences and conclusions gained from this dataset can be generalised to both SFs 
and SSFs in the 2000-4000 EUR SO category because the share of animal producers and mixed 
farmers, who are traditionally subsistence farmers, included in this sample are identical to their 
share in the true population of 73,203 small farms (Kemény et al., 2014:11). In this way, the 
true population of this sample represents 14.9 percent of total farm population producing 1.06 
percent of output. Thus, the dataset represents the second largest group of the Hungary’s agri-
producers by number (Kemény et al., 2014). However, given that the dataset does not include 
“true” SFs and farms smaller than 2000 EUR SO size, the generalisation of the results to true 
SFs and to smaller than 2000 EUR SO size farms will have to be very careful; or even omitted 
if the behavioural assumptions made about the two groups are assumed to be very different.  
It is striking that in this sample of 294 observations, 135 farm households or 45 percent 
of the sample receive pension income, i.e. they have at least one member of the household who 
is a pensioner; whereas only 55 percent do not receive any. 67 percent of these pensioner 
households have two or less members. Thus, they can be classified as “true” pensioner couples, 
whereas only 16 percent of these households are families with more than four members. Due to 
the large number of pensioner households and their different agricultural behaviour and 
31 
 
motivations, we can divide the sample into two groups of interest: one of pensioners and one of 
non-pensioners. In this respect, pensioner households are those who receive any pension 
income, and non-pensioners are those who receive no such income and are economically 
active. This differentiation between pensioners and non-pensioners is made because the two 
groups’ behaviour and economic motivations are very different. The pensioner group is in need 
of appropriate social policy; whereas the non-pensioner group, who are already active in selling 
products and has the potential to become more market-oriented, is in need of targeted 
agricultural policy. Therefore, the thesis will provide a thorough investigation of non-
pensioners as they are: (i) more specialised and more capable of developing their agricultural 
venture; (ii) younger; (iii) more educated; (iv) respond more to agricultural incentives such as 
subsidies; and (v) need less social policy and more agricultural policy than pensioners. This is 
also in line with the recommendations of JRC (2010:70) and Kemény et al. (2014) who suggest 
that certain groups such as pensioners should be examined separately given their different 
objectives and orientation. Thus, the econometric analysis of the next chapter will focus on the 
159 observations of non-pensioners only.  
4.2 Review of Previous Methods 
Most literature exploring the two-stage household decision of marketed supply of goods 
or labour apply a Probit model for the participation decision with a Heckman two-step 
procedure; a Tobit model with double hurdle specification; or a multivariate approach13. These 
studies focus on segregating the sales decision of those with positive sales from the ‘zeroes’ 
who choose to be self-subsistent and not participate in markets; and estimating the participation 
and sales equations. These models are inappropriate in our case as (i) they only investigate one 
decision, either sales or labour, and disregard other decisions of the household; and (ii) the 
sample used for this study contains data only on those farmers only who participate in markets, 
i.e. they are all SSFs with more than 50 percent of their produce being sold (Kemény et al. 
2014). Despite this, a participation equation for off-farm labour participation could be 
considered for those who choose to supply labour off the farm, versus the zeros, to model 
corner solutions (Pudney, 1989:138-181). However, in our reduced sample of non-pensioners 
13 Some of these studies are Mathijs and Noev (2004), Goetz (1992); Coady (1995); Minot et al. (2000); Winter-
Nelson and Temu (2005); Woldeyohanes (2014); Tocco (2014b), Beyene (2008), Sauer et al. (2012), Sauer et al. 
(2012b), Tocco et al. (2013), Tocco et al. (2014), Iraizoz (2003), Chaplin et al. (2004) and others in Appendix A.   
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of 159 observations only 22 non-participatory zeroes are found, constituting only 14 percent of 
the sample. This proportion is rather small; and by comparing a preliminarily robust Tobit and 
the final estimates of the off-farm labour equation, we can conclude that in our instance there 
are no significant differences between the estimates of the final and the Tobit models: the 
significant coefficients and their p-values are nearly identical under both specification of the 
off-farm work equation. Thus, the econometric approach in this study will not include a 
participation equation for off-farm work. However, including it would be recommended and 
would enhance the econometric estimation. Therefore, such extension to the model, i.e. paying 
particular attention to the zeroes, will be dealt with at a later stage to improve the econometric 
estimation in this paper; however, it will not be included in this thesis given the space and time 
limitations of this study. Similar observations can be made for own input use and own 
consumption of produce, where the autarkic households’ number takes up about half of the 
sample. For these equations, estimating a robust Tobit specification does not change the results 
either compared to the final results. Only one additional variable becomes significant in the 
own input use equation and no sign or significance changes happen otherwise. Yet again, 
improving the model specification with including participation equations would be 
recommended; and would give meaningful results. For now, focus will be kept on the 
simultaneous decision making of the household only. 
4.3 Model selection and Estimation method 
Overall, it can be said that the nature of the data, the treatment of zero values and the 
behavioural assumptions about households’ market participation are decisive factors when 
deciding the econometric approach. Previous applications and the theoretical framework 
outlined in Section 2.3 and Chapter Three show that the production, consumption and labour 
allocation decisions of farm households facing market imperfections are not indeed 
independent (Lopez, 1983, Key et al., 2000). Therefore, estimating the consumption, 
production and input allocation equations jointly can lead to significant gains in explanatory 
power and efficiency (Lopez, 1983). This suggests that the reduced form equations prescribed 
in the end of Chapter Three can be estimated by using the seemingly unrelated regressions 
(SUR) model and the feasible generalised least squares (FGLS) estimator.  
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In contrast to 3SLS or 2SLS estimation (Zellner and Theil, 1962), where a system of 
structural equation is defined and some equations contain endogenous variables among the 
explanatory variables; the SUR estimation indicates that all right-hand-side (RHS) variables are 
treated as exogenous (StataCorp, 2013b). Based on the traditional household model in Section 
2.3 and the conceptual framework in Chapter Three, this thesis treats the identified RHS 
variables as exogenous and the eight decision variables as simultaneously determined. 
Therefore, the application of the SUR model is suitable. This judgement is based on: (i) Strauss 
and Thomas (1995:1930) who argue that human capital investment, assets, and investment can 
be treated exogenous in static models; and (ii) the derived reduced form equations, that define 
all endogenous variables as a function of exogenous variables, based on microeconomic theory 
and traditional household model by Sadoulet and de Janvry (1995), Key et al. (2000), Huffman 
(2010), and Vakis et al. (2004).  
The applied SUR model (proposed by Zellner (1962)) is an extension of the linear 
regression model where a group of variables are related; and thus makes sense to consider the 
different models jointly (Greene, 2012:331). In the general SUR model, each equation has its 
own vector of parameters 𝛽𝛽𝑀𝑀, which seem to be unrelated. However, the error terms across the 
equations are assumed to be correlated, and this feature can be exploited in estimation 
(Wooldridge, 2002:144). An often raised example of such equation systems is the set of 
demand functions for a population of families in a country. The multiple equation structure can 
be envisaged as: 𝑦𝑦1 = 𝑋𝑋1𝛽𝛽1 + 𝜀𝜀1, 𝑦𝑦2 = 𝑋𝑋2𝛽𝛽2 + 𝜀𝜀2, … , 𝑦𝑦𝑀𝑀 = 𝑋𝑋𝑀𝑀𝛽𝛽𝑀𝑀 + 𝜀𝜀𝑀𝑀. There are M 
equations and T observations. When working with cross-section, the same model can be used 
(Greene, 2012:332). Each equation has Ki regressors, in total 𝐾𝐾 = ∑ 𝐾𝐾𝑖𝑖𝑀𝑀𝑖𝑖=1 . The SUR model in 
short form is 𝑦𝑦𝑖𝑖 = 𝑋𝑋𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + 𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖, 𝑖𝑖 = 1, …𝑀𝑀. The vector of disturbances define as 𝜀𝜀 = [𝜀𝜀1′𝜀𝜀2′ , … , 𝜀𝜀𝑀𝑀′ ]. 
Strict exogeneity of Xi and homoscedasticity is assumed: 𝐸𝐸[𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖|𝑋𝑋1,𝑋𝑋2, … ,𝑋𝑋𝑀𝑀] = 0, 𝑖𝑖 = 1, …𝑀𝑀. 
and 𝐸𝐸[𝜀𝜀𝑚𝑚𝜀𝜀𝑚𝑚′ |𝑋𝑋1,𝑋𝑋2, … ,𝑋𝑋𝑀𝑀] = 𝜎𝜎𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝐼𝐼𝑇𝑇 respectively. Furthermore, the data are assumed to be 
well behaved. We also assume that the disturbances are uncorrelated across observations but 
correlated across equations. Therefore, 𝐸𝐸�𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖𝑝𝑝𝜀𝜀𝑗𝑗𝑠𝑠|𝑋𝑋1,𝑋𝑋2, … ,𝑋𝑋𝑀𝑀� = 𝜎𝜎𝑖𝑖𝑗𝑗, 𝑖𝑖𝑓𝑓 𝑡𝑡 = 𝑠𝑠 𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎 0 
otherwise14. By adding the assumption about the errors’ correlation and the conditional 
14 The disturbance formulation is then: 𝐸𝐸�𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖𝜀𝜀𝑗𝑗′|𝑋𝑋1,𝑋𝑋2, … ,𝑋𝑋𝑀𝑀� = 𝜎𝜎𝑖𝑖𝑗𝑗𝐼𝐼𝑇𝑇. Or 𝐸𝐸[𝜀𝜀𝜀𝜀′|𝑋𝑋1,𝑋𝑋2, … ,𝑋𝑋𝑀𝑀] = Ω, where 
Ω = Σ⊗ I and Ω−1 = Σ−1 ⊗ I in which I is the identity matrix and Σ is the conditional variance matrix of the 
disturbances, where we can denote the ijth element of Σ-1 by σij (Greene, 2012:333). 
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variance matrix of εi (with other words system homoscedasticity assumption), Wooldridge, 
2002:161), we strengthen the fairly weak assumptions of 𝐸𝐸(𝑋𝑋𝑖𝑖′𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖) = 0 (Wooldridge, 2002:148). 
Under stronger assumptions (i.e. system homoscedasticity assumption), the generalised least 
squares (GLS) estimation procedure will give more efficient estimates than OLS15 (Woolridge, 
2002:153,163). Clearly, the efficiency of the GLS over OLS comes with the price of stronger 
assumptions than that of OLS. The GLS estimator in vector form can be written as: ?̂?𝛽 =[𝑋𝑋′Ω−1𝑋𝑋]−1𝑋𝑋′Ω−1𝑌𝑌 = [𝑋𝑋′(Σ−1 ⊗ 𝐼𝐼)𝑋𝑋]−1𝑋𝑋′(Σ−1 ⊗ 𝐼𝐼)𝑌𝑌 , where I is the identity matrix and Σ 
is the conditional variance matrix of the disturbances,where we denote the ijth element of Σ-1 
by σij (Greene, 2012:334). However, “GLS is not usually feasible because it requires knowing 
the variance matrix of the errors up to a multiplicative constant” (Wooldridge, 2002:153). 
Therefore, the feasible GLS (FGLS) is to be used for estimation. In FGLS, we replace the 
unknown matrix Σ with a consistent estimator 𝛴𝛴�16. Given 𝛴𝛴�, the FGLS estimator of β is: 
?̂?𝛽 = �𝑋𝑋′Ω�−1𝑋𝑋�−1�𝑋𝑋′Ω�−1𝑌𝑌� = �𝑋𝑋′�𝛴𝛴�−1 ⊗ 𝐼𝐼�𝑋𝑋�−1�𝑋𝑋′�𝛴𝛴�−1 ⊗ 𝐼𝐼�𝑌𝑌� (Wooldridge, 2002:158). 
In this way, the identified equations in (5a)-(5h) will be more efficiently estimated by FGLS 
than with OLS. However, if identical regressors were included in each regression or the 
equations were actually unrelated, the FGLS would be equivalent to an equation by equation 
OLS. 
Moreover, if the sample contains heteroskedasticity, which it does in our case as it was 
detected through -hettest- command in the preliminary equation by equation OLS regressions, 
the ‘system homoscedasticity assumption’ breaks down. In this case, the FGLS estimator 
ceases to be able to ‘pay the price’ of keeping stronger assumptions for increased efficiency. 
Thus, the FGLS estimator becomes inefficient. If heteroscedasticity is present, robust standard 
errors should be used for the estimation, which is derived in Wooldridge (2002:160). 
Unfortunately, Stata13 (StataCorp, 2013) does not support robust estimation in the SUR 
framework, with the -sureg- command. It only allows an alternative command called -mysureg- 
15 Or it is at least as efficient as OLS: when the same regressors included GLS is equivalent to OLS (Woolridge, 
2002). On the discussion about the gained efficiency of GLS vis-á-vis OLS consult Greene (2012:334). 
16 The least squares residuals may be used to estimate consistently the elements of 𝛴𝛴�, which are 𝜎𝜎𝚤𝚤𝚤𝚤� = 𝑓𝑓𝑖𝑖′𝑓𝑓𝑗𝑗𝑇𝑇  .  The 
consistency of 𝜎𝜎𝚤𝚤𝚤𝚤� is ensured by the assumption about the density of ε, which was assumed to be symmetric, as it is 
when assuming normality. Thereafter it follows that bi is unbiased and 𝜎𝜎𝚤𝚤𝚤𝚤�  is consistent (Greene 2012:336). 
However unbiasedness of the estimator of Σ here is an uncertain virtue of the model: “The asymptotic properties 
of the feasible GLS estimator, ?̂?𝛽 do not rely on an unbiased estimator of Σ; only consistency is required” (Greene, 
2012:336). Furthermore, degrees of freedom correction in the denominator is suggested when estimating 𝜎𝜎𝚤𝚤𝚤𝚤� . 
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that uses maximum likelihood (ML) to fit a seemingly unrelated regression model with robust 
standard errors (Gould et al., 2010). With the -mysureg- command, the -robust- option is 
allowed which specifies that the Huber/White/sandwich estimator of variance (Gould et al., 
2010). An alternative estimation method to the heteroskedasticity robust -mysureg- estimation 
would be a -sureg- estimation procedure with bootstrapped standard errors and degree of 
freedom adjustment that can help overcome the detected heteroskedasticity. However, we will 
pursue the -mysureg- command and the ML estimator. This is because a preliminary SUR 
model (with the -sureg- command, degrees of freedom adjustment and bootstrapped standard 
errors) was run to compare -sureg- and robust -mysureg- estimates (results in Table C1 
Appendix C). The robust -mysureg- estimation produced equivalent coefficient estimates to 
that of -sureg-; however, as expected, the standard errors were different in the two models. 
Thus, the -mysureg- command is preferred in order to formally correct for heteroscedasticity.   
In general, the interpretation of the ML estimators will be the same as the FGLS 
estimators, however the standard errors and the iteration process is different. The ML estimates 
maximise the value of the log-likelihood function for GLS (multivariate normal distribution): 
 𝑙𝑙𝑎𝑎𝐿𝐿 = −𝑝𝑝
2
ln(2𝜋𝜋) − 𝑝𝑝
2
ln 𝜎𝜎2 − 1
2𝜎𝜎2
(𝑦𝑦 − 𝑋𝑋𝛽𝛽)′Ω−1(𝑦𝑦 − 𝑋𝑋𝛽𝛽) − 1
2
ln |Ω| (Greene, 2010:552). The 
log-likelihood function will be maximised with the use of FGLS, because Ω is unknown due to 
the absence of knowledge on Σ.17 The ML estimator is Σ is 𝜎𝜎𝚤𝚤𝚤𝚤� = �𝑦𝑦𝑖𝑖′−𝑋𝑋𝑖𝑖𝛽𝛽𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀��′�𝑦𝑦𝑖𝑖′−𝑋𝑋𝑖𝑖𝛽𝛽𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀��𝑁𝑁  = ?̂?𝑓𝑖𝑖′?̂?𝑓𝑗𝑗𝑁𝑁  , 
which is based on β (Greene, 2010:561). Thus, both error variances and β require one another 
(Greene, 2010:552, Maddala, 2001:117). To overcome this, Oberhofer and Kmenta (1974) 
show that “one can iterate back and forth between the two estimators. Thus, the MLEs are 
obtained by iterating to convergence” between the ML estimator of Σ and  
?̂̂?𝛽 = ��𝑋𝑋′Ω�−1𝑋𝑋�−1�𝑋𝑋′Ω�−1𝑌𝑌�� (Greene, 2010:561). The process may begin with the (consistent) 
FGLS estimator, then the ML estimator of Σ, and so on. Stata13 uses the iterative approach of 
the Newton-Raphson technique for computing ML (StataCorp, 2013). 
Of course, before turning to the FGLS and ML estimates, it is reasonable to test the null 
hypothesis (H0) that the regressions are actually unrelated and the residuals between the two 
17 Greene (2010:560) adds the assumption of normally distributed disturbances to the model and develops the 
maximum likelihood estimator. As prescribed earlier, the ML estimator of  𝜎𝜎2 will be biased.  The covariance 
structure is 𝐸𝐸�𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖𝜀𝜀𝑗𝑗′|𝑋𝑋1,𝑋𝑋2, … ,𝑋𝑋𝑀𝑀� = 𝜎𝜎𝑖𝑖𝑗𝑗𝐼𝐼𝑇𝑇  and 𝐸𝐸[𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖|𝑋𝑋1,𝑋𝑋2, … ,𝑋𝑋𝑀𝑀] = 0. 
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models are independent.  We test by using the likelihood ratio (LR) statistic to compare the two 
models: (i) the unrestricted model is the ML estimate, whereas (ii) the restricted model is the 
“groupwise” separate heteroscedastic regression models of OLS (LR can only be done without 
robust). We carry out the LR statistic by testing the H0 of a diagonal covariance matrix 
(unrelated regressions)18. Wooldridge (2009:580) and Greene (2003:349) suggests that the LR 
test can be computed as minus twice the difference in the log likelihoods of the restricted and 
unrestricted models: 𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿 = −2(ℒ𝑝𝑝 − ℒ𝑢𝑢𝑝𝑝). We can reject the H0 if the estimated chi squared 
value is larger than the 95 percent critical value from the chi squared distribution, or if the p-
value of the likelihood ratio test is less than 5 percent (Greene, 2010:565). The LR test can be 
obtained by computing it manually or by using Stata’ -lrtest- command, which assumes that the 
log likelihood and dimension of the full model, in case of a composite model, are obtained as 
the sum of the log-likelihood values and dimensions of the constituting models (StataCorp, 
2013). 
4.4 Estimated Model  
The specification of the empirical model is based on the theoretical framework outlined 
in Section 2.3 and Chapter Three. Variable selection for the model corresponds to previous 
studies’ specification (Section 2.2); and it is bound by data availability and the variable 
requirements of the theoretical framework. Variable selection will be discussed in the next 
section and Table 4.6.1 in section 4.6 will summarise all variables used in the econometric 
analysis. According to the generic production function 𝐺𝐺(𝑧𝑧, 𝑞𝑞, 𝑙𝑙,𝑘𝑘) ≡ 0 all inputs (k, l) and 
characteristics (z) are combined to produce output (q). In the resulting production process the 
household’s eight decision variables can be expressed as a function of exogenous variables as 
they appear in Eq. (5a)-(5h). Given measurement problems and absent data on leisure time, the 
estimation will focus on seven identified equations out of eight. Namely, the dependent 
variables of the seven seemingly unrelated regressions will be: (1) sales income and (2) off-
farm income, representing the income sources of the household; (3) hours worked on-farm, (4) 
input use of own produce and (5) bought inputs, representing inputs demanded by the 
18 For this, we use the unconstrained model ML’s diagonal matrix formed from the estimate of Σ, or Σ� and the 
constrained OLS model’s diagonal matrix of covariance for the OLS residuals (Greene, 2010:566). Then, the LR 
test statistic can be maintained as 𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿 = 𝑇𝑇�∑ 𝑙𝑙𝑜𝑜𝑙𝑙𝜎𝜎�𝑖𝑖2 − log |Σ�|𝑀𝑀𝑖𝑖=1 �, where 𝜎𝜎�𝑖𝑖2 is from the individual OLS regressions 
and Σ� is the ML estimate of Σ (Greene, 2010:564). 
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production process; and (6) bought food consumption and (7) consumption of own produce, 
representing consumption decisions. The actual estimated equations with the included 
explanatory variables for which data was available are the following: 
(6a) 𝑠𝑠𝑎𝑎𝑙𝑙𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑖𝑎𝑎𝑐𝑐 = 𝛼𝛼0 + 𝛼𝛼1𝑤𝑤𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑡𝑡 + 𝛼𝛼2𝑝𝑝𝑙𝑙𝑎𝑎𝑖𝑖𝑎𝑎 + 𝛼𝛼3𝑚𝑚𝑠𝑠𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑠𝑠𝑚𝑚 + 𝛼𝛼4𝑎𝑎𝑙𝑙𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑖𝑠𝑠𝑎𝑎𝑔𝑔 + 𝛼𝛼5ℎ𝑖𝑖𝑙𝑙ℎ𝑠𝑠𝑚𝑚𝑠𝑠𝑎𝑎𝑔𝑔 + 𝛼𝛼6𝑎𝑎𝑙𝑙𝑠𝑠 +
𝛼𝛼7𝑎𝑎𝑙𝑙𝑠𝑠2 + 𝛼𝛼8𝑐𝑐𝑚𝑚𝑜𝑜𝑝𝑝 + 𝛼𝛼9𝑜𝑜𝑡𝑡ℎ𝑠𝑠𝑚𝑚 + 𝛼𝛼10𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑖𝑚𝑚𝑠𝑠𝑎𝑎 + 𝛼𝛼11𝑜𝑜𝑤𝑤𝑎𝑎𝑙𝑙𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎 + 𝛼𝛼12𝑡𝑡𝑜𝑜𝑡𝑡𝑎𝑎𝑙𝑙𝑠𝑠𝑞𝑞𝑔𝑔𝑖𝑖𝑝𝑝𝑚𝑚𝑠𝑠𝑎𝑎𝑡𝑡 + 𝛼𝛼13𝑠𝑠𝑎𝑎𝑝𝑝𝑠𝑠 +
𝛼𝛼14𝑡𝑡𝑎𝑎𝑚𝑚𝑓𝑓𝑚𝑚𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠 + 𝛼𝛼15𝑙𝑙𝑜𝑜𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎 + 𝛼𝛼16𝑖𝑖𝑎𝑎𝑠𝑠𝑔𝑔𝑚𝑚𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑐𝑐𝑠𝑠 + 𝛼𝛼17𝑠𝑠𝑜𝑜𝑐𝑐𝑡𝑡𝑚𝑚𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑠𝑠 + 𝛼𝛼18𝑔𝑔𝑎𝑎𝑠𝑠𝑚𝑚𝑝𝑝𝑙𝑙𝑜𝑜𝑦𝑦𝑠𝑠𝑎𝑎 + 𝑔𝑔𝑖𝑖 
(6b) 𝑜𝑜𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑎𝑎𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑖𝑎𝑎𝑐𝑐 = 𝛽𝛽0 + 𝛽𝛽1𝑤𝑤𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑡𝑡 + 𝛽𝛽2𝑝𝑝𝑙𝑙𝑎𝑎𝑖𝑖𝑎𝑎 + 𝛽𝛽3𝑚𝑚𝑠𝑠𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑠𝑠𝑚𝑚 + 𝛽𝛽4𝑎𝑎𝑙𝑙𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑖𝑠𝑠𝑎𝑎𝑔𝑔 + 𝛽𝛽5ℎ𝑖𝑖𝑙𝑙ℎ𝑠𝑠𝑚𝑚𝑠𝑠𝑎𝑎𝑔𝑔 + 𝛽𝛽6𝑎𝑎𝑙𝑙𝑠𝑠 +
𝛽𝛽7𝑎𝑎𝑙𝑙𝑠𝑠2 + 𝛽𝛽8𝑐𝑐𝑚𝑚𝑜𝑜𝑝𝑝 + 𝛽𝛽9𝑜𝑜𝑡𝑡ℎ𝑠𝑠𝑚𝑚 + 𝛽𝛽10𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑖𝑚𝑚𝑠𝑠𝑎𝑎 + 𝛽𝛽11𝑜𝑜𝑤𝑤𝑎𝑎𝑙𝑙𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎 + 𝛽𝛽12𝑡𝑡𝑜𝑜𝑡𝑡𝑎𝑎𝑙𝑙𝑠𝑠𝑞𝑞𝑔𝑔𝑖𝑖𝑝𝑝𝑚𝑚𝑠𝑠𝑎𝑎𝑡𝑡 + 𝛽𝛽13𝑠𝑠𝑎𝑎𝑝𝑝𝑠𝑠 +
𝛽𝛽14𝑡𝑡𝑎𝑎𝑚𝑚𝑓𝑓𝑚𝑚𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠 + 𝛽𝛽15𝑙𝑙𝑜𝑜𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎 + 𝛽𝛽16𝑖𝑖𝑎𝑎𝑠𝑠𝑔𝑔𝑚𝑚𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑐𝑐𝑠𝑠 + 𝛽𝛽17𝑠𝑠𝑜𝑜𝑐𝑐𝑡𝑡𝑚𝑚𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑠𝑠 + 𝛽𝛽18𝑔𝑔𝑎𝑎𝑠𝑠𝑚𝑚𝑝𝑝𝑙𝑙𝑜𝑜𝑦𝑦𝑠𝑠𝑎𝑎 
(6c) ℎ𝑚𝑚𝑜𝑜𝑎𝑎𝑓𝑓𝑎𝑎𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚 = 𝛾𝛾0 + 𝛾𝛾1𝑤𝑤𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑡𝑡 + 𝛾𝛾2𝑝𝑝𝑙𝑙𝑎𝑎𝑖𝑖𝑎𝑎 + 𝛾𝛾3𝑚𝑚𝑠𝑠𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑠𝑠𝑚𝑚 + 𝛾𝛾4𝑎𝑎𝑙𝑙𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑖𝑠𝑠𝑎𝑎𝑔𝑔 + 𝛾𝛾5ℎ𝑖𝑖𝑙𝑙ℎ𝑠𝑠𝑚𝑚𝑠𝑠𝑎𝑎𝑔𝑔 + 𝛾𝛾6𝑙𝑙𝑠𝑠𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑠𝑠𝑚𝑚 +
𝛾𝛾7𝑎𝑎𝑙𝑙𝑠𝑠 + 𝛾𝛾8𝑎𝑎𝑙𝑙𝑠𝑠2 + 𝛾𝛾9𝑐𝑐𝑚𝑚𝑜𝑜𝑝𝑝 + 𝛾𝛾10𝑜𝑜𝑡𝑡ℎ𝑠𝑠𝑚𝑚 + 𝛾𝛾11𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑖𝑚𝑚𝑠𝑠𝑎𝑎 + 𝛾𝛾12𝑜𝑜𝑤𝑤𝑎𝑎𝑙𝑙𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎 + 𝛾𝛾13𝑡𝑡𝑜𝑜𝑡𝑡𝑎𝑎𝑙𝑙𝑠𝑠𝑞𝑞𝑔𝑔𝑖𝑖𝑝𝑝𝑚𝑚𝑠𝑠𝑎𝑎𝑡𝑡 + 𝛾𝛾14𝑠𝑠𝑎𝑎𝑝𝑝𝑠𝑠 +
𝛾𝛾15𝑡𝑡𝑎𝑎𝑚𝑚𝑓𝑓𝑚𝑚𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠 + 𝛾𝛾16𝑙𝑙𝑜𝑜𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎 + 𝛾𝛾17𝑖𝑖𝑎𝑎𝑠𝑠𝑔𝑔𝑚𝑚𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑐𝑐𝑠𝑠 + 𝛾𝛾18𝑠𝑠𝑜𝑜𝑐𝑐𝑡𝑡𝑚𝑚𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑠𝑠 + 𝛾𝛾19𝑔𝑔𝑎𝑎𝑠𝑠𝑚𝑚𝑝𝑝𝑙𝑙𝑜𝑜𝑦𝑦𝑠𝑠𝑎𝑎 
(6d) 𝑜𝑜𝑤𝑤𝑎𝑎𝑖𝑖𝑎𝑎𝑝𝑝𝑔𝑔𝑡𝑡 = 𝛿𝛿0 + 𝛿𝛿1𝑤𝑤𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑡𝑡 + 𝛿𝛿2𝑝𝑝𝑙𝑙𝑎𝑎𝑖𝑖𝑎𝑎 + 𝛿𝛿3𝑚𝑚𝑠𝑠𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑠𝑠𝑚𝑚 + 𝛿𝛿4𝑎𝑎𝑙𝑙𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑖𝑠𝑠𝑎𝑎𝑔𝑔 + 𝛿𝛿5ℎ𝑖𝑖𝑙𝑙ℎ𝑠𝑠𝑚𝑚𝑠𝑠𝑎𝑎𝑔𝑔 + 𝛿𝛿6𝑎𝑎𝑙𝑙𝑠𝑠 +
𝛿𝛿7𝑎𝑎𝑙𝑙𝑠𝑠2 + 𝛿𝛿8𝑐𝑐𝑚𝑚𝑜𝑜𝑝𝑝 + 𝛿𝛿9𝑜𝑜𝑡𝑡ℎ𝑠𝑠𝑚𝑚 + 𝛿𝛿10𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑖𝑚𝑚𝑠𝑠𝑎𝑎 + 𝛿𝛿11𝑜𝑜𝑤𝑤𝑎𝑎𝑙𝑙𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎 + 𝛿𝛿12𝑙𝑙𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑞𝑞𝑔𝑔𝑎𝑎𝑙𝑙𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡𝑦𝑦 + 𝛿𝛿13𝑡𝑡𝑜𝑜𝑡𝑡𝑎𝑎𝑙𝑙𝑠𝑠𝑞𝑞𝑔𝑔𝑖𝑖𝑝𝑝𝑚𝑚𝑠𝑠𝑎𝑎𝑡𝑡 +
𝛿𝛿14𝑠𝑠𝑎𝑎𝑝𝑝𝑠𝑠 + 𝛿𝛿15𝑡𝑡𝑎𝑎𝑚𝑚𝑓𝑓𝑚𝑚𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠 + 𝛿𝛿16𝑙𝑙𝑜𝑜𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎 + 𝛿𝛿17𝑖𝑖𝑎𝑎𝑠𝑠𝑔𝑔𝑚𝑚𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑐𝑐𝑠𝑠 + 𝛿𝛿18𝑠𝑠𝑜𝑜𝑐𝑐𝑡𝑡𝑚𝑚𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑠𝑠 
(6e) 𝑜𝑜𝑤𝑤𝑎𝑎𝑐𝑐𝑜𝑜𝑎𝑎𝑠𝑠 = 𝜁𝜁0 + 𝜁𝜁1𝑤𝑤𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑡𝑡 + 𝜁𝜁2𝑝𝑝𝑙𝑙𝑎𝑎𝑖𝑖𝑎𝑎 + 𝜁𝜁3𝑚𝑚𝑠𝑠𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑠𝑠𝑚𝑚 + 𝜁𝜁4𝑎𝑎𝑙𝑙𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑖𝑠𝑠𝑎𝑎𝑔𝑔 + 𝜁𝜁5ℎ𝑖𝑖𝑙𝑙ℎ𝑠𝑠𝑚𝑚𝑠𝑠𝑎𝑎𝑔𝑔 + 𝜁𝜁6𝑙𝑙𝑠𝑠𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑠𝑠𝑚𝑚 +
𝜁𝜁7𝑎𝑎𝑙𝑙𝑠𝑠 + 𝜁𝜁8𝑎𝑎𝑙𝑙𝑠𝑠2 + 𝜁𝜁9𝑐𝑐𝑚𝑚𝑜𝑜𝑝𝑝 + 𝜁𝜁10𝑜𝑜𝑡𝑡ℎ𝑠𝑠𝑚𝑚 + 𝜁𝜁11𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑖𝑚𝑚𝑠𝑠𝑎𝑎 + 𝜁𝜁12𝑜𝑜𝑤𝑤𝑎𝑎𝑙𝑙𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎 + 𝜁𝜁13𝑙𝑙𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑞𝑞𝑔𝑔𝑎𝑎𝑙𝑙𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡𝑦𝑦 + 𝜁𝜁14𝑠𝑠𝑎𝑎𝑝𝑝𝑠𝑠 +
𝜁𝜁15𝑡𝑡𝑎𝑎𝑚𝑚𝑓𝑓𝑚𝑚𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠 + 𝛾𝛾16𝑙𝑙𝑜𝑜𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎 + 𝛾𝛾17𝑖𝑖𝑎𝑎𝑠𝑠𝑔𝑔𝑚𝑚𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑐𝑐𝑠𝑠 + 𝛾𝛾18𝑠𝑠𝑜𝑜𝑐𝑐𝑡𝑡𝑚𝑚𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑠𝑠 
(6f) 𝑚𝑚𝑜𝑜𝑔𝑔𝑙𝑙ℎ𝑡𝑡𝑖𝑖𝑎𝑎𝑝𝑝𝑔𝑔𝑡𝑡 = 𝜂𝜂0 + 𝜂𝜂1𝑤𝑤𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑡𝑡 + 𝜂𝜂2𝑝𝑝𝑙𝑙𝑎𝑎𝑖𝑖𝑎𝑎 + 𝜂𝜂3𝑚𝑚𝑠𝑠𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑠𝑠𝑚𝑚 + 𝜂𝜂4𝑎𝑎𝑙𝑙𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑖𝑠𝑠𝑎𝑎𝑔𝑔 + 𝜂𝜂5ℎ𝑖𝑖𝑙𝑙ℎ𝑠𝑠𝑚𝑚𝑠𝑠𝑎𝑎𝑔𝑔 + 𝜂𝜂6𝑎𝑎𝑙𝑙𝑠𝑠 +
𝜂𝜂7𝑎𝑎𝑙𝑙𝑠𝑠2 + 𝜂𝜂8𝑐𝑐𝑚𝑚𝑜𝑜𝑝𝑝 + 𝜂𝜂9𝑜𝑜𝑡𝑡ℎ𝑠𝑠𝑚𝑚 + 𝜂𝜂10𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑖𝑚𝑚𝑠𝑠𝑎𝑎 + 𝜂𝜂11𝑜𝑜𝑤𝑤𝑎𝑎𝑙𝑙𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎 + 𝜂𝜂12𝑙𝑙𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑞𝑞𝑔𝑔𝑎𝑎𝑙𝑙𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡𝑦𝑦 + 𝜂𝜂13𝑡𝑡𝑜𝑜𝑡𝑡𝑎𝑎𝑙𝑙𝑠𝑠𝑞𝑞𝑔𝑔𝑖𝑖𝑝𝑝𝑚𝑚𝑠𝑠𝑎𝑎𝑡𝑡 +
𝜂𝜂14𝑠𝑠𝑎𝑎𝑝𝑝𝑠𝑠 + 𝜂𝜂15𝑡𝑡𝑎𝑎𝑚𝑚𝑓𝑓𝑚𝑚𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠 + 𝜂𝜂16𝑙𝑙𝑜𝑜𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎 + 𝜂𝜂17𝑖𝑖𝑎𝑎𝑠𝑠𝑔𝑔𝑚𝑚𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑐𝑐𝑠𝑠 + 𝜂𝜂18𝑠𝑠𝑜𝑜𝑐𝑐𝑡𝑡𝑚𝑚𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑠𝑠 
(6g) ℎ𝑚𝑚𝑜𝑜𝑎𝑎𝑓𝑓𝑎𝑎𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚 = 𝜅𝜅0 + 𝜅𝜅1𝑤𝑤𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑡𝑡 + 𝜅𝜅2𝑝𝑝𝑙𝑙𝑎𝑎𝑖𝑖𝑎𝑎 + 𝜅𝜅3𝑚𝑚𝑠𝑠𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑠𝑠𝑚𝑚 + 𝜅𝜅4𝑎𝑎𝑙𝑙𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑖𝑠𝑠𝑎𝑎𝑔𝑔 + 𝜅𝜅5ℎ𝑖𝑖𝑙𝑙ℎ𝑠𝑠𝑚𝑚𝑠𝑠𝑎𝑎𝑔𝑔 + 𝜅𝜅6𝑙𝑙𝑠𝑠𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑠𝑠𝑚𝑚 +
𝜅𝜅7𝑎𝑎𝑙𝑙𝑠𝑠 + 𝜅𝜅8𝑎𝑎𝑙𝑙𝑠𝑠2 + 𝜅𝜅9𝑐𝑐𝑚𝑚𝑜𝑜𝑝𝑝 + 𝜅𝜅10𝑜𝑜𝑡𝑡ℎ𝑠𝑠𝑚𝑚 + 𝜅𝜅11𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑖𝑚𝑚𝑠𝑠𝑎𝑎 + 𝜅𝜅12𝑠𝑠𝑎𝑎𝑝𝑝𝑠𝑠 + 𝜅𝜅13𝑡𝑡𝑎𝑎𝑚𝑚𝑓𝑓𝑚𝑚𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠 + 𝜅𝜅14𝑙𝑙𝑜𝑜𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎 +
𝜅𝜅15𝑖𝑖𝑎𝑎𝑠𝑠𝑔𝑔𝑚𝑚𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑐𝑐𝑠𝑠 + 𝜅𝜅16𝑠𝑠𝑜𝑜𝑐𝑐𝑡𝑡𝑚𝑚𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑠𝑠 + 𝜅𝜅17𝑔𝑔𝑎𝑎𝑠𝑠𝑚𝑚𝑝𝑝𝑙𝑙𝑜𝑜𝑦𝑦𝑠𝑠𝑎𝑎 
The correlation coefficients of the estimation (included in the Table C2 in Appendix C) 
confirm the equations’ interdependence: the largest correlation (approx 0.3) exist between (1) 
sales income, on-farm work hours, and bought inputs and (2) off-farm income, on-farm work 
hours and bought consumption.  The correlation is weaker but significant among the remaining 
combinations of the variables. This suggests that the seemingly unrelated regression procedure 
is indeed meaningful and will increase efficiency by taking into account the relationship among 
the error terms and cross-equation correlations. The individual OLS equations estimated 
separately (Table C3 in Appendix C) and the SUR estimates were also formally tested against 
each other19. Manually, 𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿 = −2��(−308.38) + (−430.12) + (−169.04) + (−458.12) +
19 By running -lrtest- in stata the value of the LR test was 83.39 with p-value <0.05: LR chi2(21) = 83.39; Prob > 
chi2 =  0.0000. [lrtest (m1 m2 m3 m4 m5 m6 m7) (mysureg)] 
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(−452.71) + (−122.23) + (−344.13)� − (−2243.03)� =  −2[−2284.73 + 2243.03] = 83.4. The 
chi-square distributed LR test with 21 degrees of freedom was 83.39, which is larger than the 
critical value of 40.32 from the chi-squared distribution table at the 1 percent level. Thus, we 
are able to reject the H0 of independence of residuals between the OLS equations. With other 
words, the OLS equations are indeed dependent; and therefore it is better to estimate them with 
the SUR model that can exploit the between-equation correlation of errors.  
4.5 Variable Specification 
In accordance with the previous literature’s findings and the availability of variables in 
the dataset, household characteristics include the number of household members, education, 
gender and age. Production characteristics include farmed own land in hectares, land quality, 
total equipment in monetary value and whether the farm is a crop, animal, mixed or other plant 
producer. Transaction cost type variables were difficult to find given that the farms’ exact 
location was not provided for this research, only NUTS3 location. It was also not possible to 
clearly distinguish between fixed and proportional TCs. The closest fit to transaction cost 
proxies were: (i) if the household is exempt from taxes (lower input and higher sales prices); 
(ii) the value of loan and insurance the household could access (credit constraints); (iii) the 
value of social transfers the household receives and a NUTS3 regional indicator of the number 
of unemployed people (proxy of labour quota); (iv) insurance; and (v) social transfers. These 
transaction cost type variables are indicative of the importance of credit and labour market 
(im)perfections and risk management strategies; as well as the role of social safety nets. 
Given the relatively small sample size in comparison to the large number of potential 
regressors, care must be taken to avoid overfitting the model and multicollinearity between the 
explanatory variable. In order to do this, careful inclusion of the regressors was undertaken. 
Overall, the regressors represent five themes of explanatory variables: location, household 
characteristics, production characteristics, subsidies and support, and transaction cost type 
variables. These themes correspond to the model specification in Chapter three.  
When selecting regressors, special attention was given to the endogeneity of regressors. 
We handle all the variables on the RHS as exogenous because of the derived reduced form 
equations (Chapter three) that define all endogenous variables as a function of exogenous 
variables based on microeconomic theory and the work of Sadoulet and de Janvry (1995), Key 
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et al. (2000), Huffman (2010), and Vakis et al. (2004). Moreover, we take them as exogenous 
because of the reasoning of Strauss and Thomas (1995) who state that having loan or 
investment may be seen as an endogenous variable in dynamic models; however in cross-
sectional estimation such as this, they can be included as exogenous regressors (Strauss and 
Thomas, 1995:1930).  
Besides endogeneity, multicollinearity of regressors was also investigated. Investment 
was excluded due to high multicollinearity with total equipment assets of the household. This is 
not surprising: these SSF households invest into machinery and buildings; and hold no 
monetary investment such as stocks or dividends. Similarly, ‘Natura 2000’ subsidies and 
‘consultation support20’ subsidies were excluded due to high multicollinearity with other 
subsidies. Further multicollinearity was tested by collinearity statistics of the variance inflation 
factor (VIF).VIF defines as: 𝑉𝑉𝐼𝐼𝑉𝑉(𝛽𝛽𝚤𝚤� ) = 11−𝑅𝑅𝑖𝑖2, where 𝐿𝐿𝑖𝑖2 is the squared multiple correlation 
coefficient between xi and the other explanatory variables21 (Maddala, 2001). The VIF for all 
included variables is below the critical value of 5-10 see in Table C4 in Appendix C (Stine, 
1995), with the largest being 2.85. Thus, we can conclude that multicollinearity may not be a 
problem for the regression.  
Overfitting the model was addressed by reducing the number of variables by (i)  
redefining location variables and production types into 3 groups rather than using 19 NUTS3 
regions and 6 production types; (ii) removing multicollinear variables such as ‘investment’, 
‘Natura 2000’ and ‘consultation support’; and (ii) using Akaike’s Information Criterion 
(AIC)22 to compare an alternative model specification. In this way, 19 location variables 
(NUTS3 regions) were redefined into three broad regions as dummy variables of North-East, 
Great Plain and Transdanubia (West), with the reference category being the North East. This 
20 In survey: “szaktanácsadás”. 
21 However, VIF is only a “measure of how mad things are relative to an ideal situation, but the standard errors 
and t-ratios will tell a better story of how bad things are” (Maddala, 2001:273). If t-ratios are significant, standard 
errors are low and confidence intervals are not wide, we may not have problem with multicollinearity (Maddala, 
2001). Thus, inspecting the model and standard errors in this way also leads us to conclude that multicollinearity 
may not be a problem. Despite this, it is worth noting that “multicollinearity is one of the most misunderstood 
problems in multiple regressions” (Maddala, 20001:267). Thus, measuring and judging multicollinearity is not 
straightforward. For further discussion see Maddala (2001:274). 
22 The problem of selecting regressors stems from that there are typically a large number of potential explanatory 
variables from which a subset should be chosen (Maddala, 2001). When economic theory cannot give guidance to 
chose from the variables, we have to make the choice on statistical grounds. Maddala (2001:485) reviews the 
criteria for choice among the potential regression models with different sets of regressors for further discussion. 
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classification was justified because of the geographic and production differences among these 
broad regions, encompassing 2-3 NUTS2 regions each. Now, the Great Plain refers to the 
Southern and Northern Plain and represents the crop growing, relatively rich agricultural 
region; the West of the river Danube includes all parts of Transdanubia and represents the more 
wine, fruit and vegetable oriented regions; whilst the North East of the country includes 
everything above the Grain Plains and said to be the poorest region of Hungary – for which it 
was also chosen to be the reference group. Similarly, six production types were condensed to 
be crop, animal, mixed and other (incl. fruit, wine vegetable and green house production), with 
animal husbandry being the reference category, given that it is viewed as the traditional 
subsistence activity (Kemény et al. 2014). Household characteristics and transaction cost type 
variables were generally kept in the equations due to their importance for the economic 
interpretation.  
Following Maddala (2001:488), two model specification were tested: model (1) is the correctly 
specified model containing less regressors and model (2) the misspecified model with all 
potential regressors (excluding multicollinear variables)23.  As such, excluded variables in 
model (1) were ‘rent paid for equipment and buildings’, ‘additional training expenditure’, and 
other subsidies such as ‘animal support’, ‘cost support’ and ‘support for unfavoured regions’.  
The variables that remained in the specification of model (1), with similar economic 
meaning to those excluded, were: ‘total equipment including buildings and machinery’, 
‘agricultural education’, ‘higher education’, and ‘SAPS’ respectively. According to the 
Akaike’s Information Criterion, we minimise 𝐴𝐴𝐼𝐼𝐶𝐶 = −2𝑙𝑙𝑜𝑜𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙
𝑝𝑝
+ 2𝑘𝑘
𝑝𝑝
, where k is the number of 
parameters in the likelihood function. This gives us 𝐴𝐴𝐼𝐼𝐶𝐶𝑚𝑚𝑜𝑜𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑙𝑙1 = −2(−2208.73)157 + 2∗127157 = 29.75 
and 𝐴𝐴𝐼𝐼𝐶𝐶𝑚𝑚𝑜𝑜𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑙𝑙2 = −2(−2186.38)157 + 2∗155157 = 29.83 for the two -mysureg- robust estimates of the 
seven equations. “Given two models fit on the same data, the model with the smaller value of 
the information criterion is considered to be better” (StataCorp, 2013:helpBIC). Thus, our 
23 Model 1 regressors: west plain member agriedu higheredu age age2 gender crop other mixed ownland 
totalequipment lnlandquality saps taxfree loan insurance soctrans unemployed 
Model 2 regressors: west plain member agriedu higheredu age age2 gender crop other mixed ownland 
totalequipment lnlandquality saps taxfree loan insurance soctrans unemployed rent eduexp envsup animalsup 
costsup unfavsup 
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model (model 1) is specified better and we can exclude ‘rent paid for equipment and 
buildings’, ‘additional training expenditure’, and ‘other subsidies’.  
After reducing the potential variables from 46 (including all NUTS3 regional and 
production type dummies, as well as multicollinear variables) to 19 variables; and having 
looked at endogeneity, multicollinearity and selection of models, we can say that our model is 
not majorly misspecified and will yield meaningful results.  
To measure the fit of the model a pseudo R-squared was computed manually as “the 
square of the correlation between the model's predicted values and the actual values.  This 
correlation can range from -1 to 1, and so the square of the correlation then ranges from 0 to 1.  
The greater the magnitude of the correlation between the predicted values and the actual 
values, the greater the R-squared, regardless of whether the correlation is positive or negative” 
(UCLA, 2015)24. We can compare the pseudo R-squared with the R-squared from the -sureg- 
FGLS estimation with bootstrapped standard errors and degrees of freedom-adjustment 
included in Table C1 Appendix C, given that the β estimates are nearly identical to that of -
mysureg-. However, standard errors are different in the two models; and therefore R-squared 
are different too. Moreover, the R-squared reported at -sureg- is not adjusted R-squared and it 
is not a well-defined concept when GLS is used (Statalist, 2010). Thus, it may be used for 
descriptive purposes but it is rather discouraged to make conclusions based on it. The pseudo 
R-squared ranges from 0.05 and 0.51 among the seven equations, and the -sureg- R-squared is 
unsurprisingly larger in each case. Given that we do not have two alternate models to compare 
and the estimation of a system R-squared was not performed due to too high operation system 
requirements for the computation, we will not interpret the pseudo R-squared further. However, 
we can say that the pseudo R-squared shows that some equations have better fit than others in 
our model. For example, the sales equation has the smallest pseudo R-squared, whilst the own 
input use equation has the largest. 
24 Alternatively, McFadden’s likelihood ratio index pseudo-R2 could be computed as 𝑃𝑃𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑔𝑔𝑎𝑎𝑜𝑜 𝐿𝐿2 = 1 −(𝑙𝑙𝑎𝑎𝐿𝐿)/(𝑙𝑙𝑎𝑎𝐿𝐿0) (Greene, 2012:574) or -r2reg3- command in stata that uses 5 types of criteria and tests to calculate 
system R2 (StataCorp, 2013:help r2reg3). From each type of these system R2's, r2reg3 can calculate Adjusted R2, 
F-Test, and Chi2-Test: Adjusted R2 = 1-(1-R2)*((QN-Q)/(QN-K)), F-Test = R2/(1-R2)*[(QN-K)/(K-Q)]; Chi2-
Test = -N*(log(1-R2)). Further details at StataCorp (2013:help r2reg3). Although it is the most meaningful 
measure of fit for a system of equations, the latter approach was not performed because the operation system 
requirements of the computation were too high. 
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To further reason about variable specification, we can say that the theoretical 
framework specifies the inclusion of prices as an explanatory variable; as well as many similar 
studies include representative prices (e.g. Key et al., 2000) in order to represent transaction 
costs faced by the household. Despite this, prices were not included as regressors in this study. 
The inclusion of prices in this estimation was not possible because of the difficulty to aggregate 
the prices of many different products (i.e. animal, crop, vegetable and fruit products) each 
household produces. Whilst in developing country studies, like in Key et al. (2000)’s, it is 
possible to select the price of rice, for example, as a representative of sales prices, given that 
rice is the most marketed good by the households. This approach is not feasible for Hungarian 
producers’ much diversified activities. Neither finding a representative price for all products is 
possible, nor is it reasonable to make an aggregate price that combines both animal, milk, crop, 
vegetable and wine prices produced and sold by these highly diversified farm households. 
Thus, prices are not included as regressors.  
For estimation purposes, two variables were “recoded” and dependent variables were 
included in logarithmic form. As such, ‘bought consumption’ and ‘social transfer’ variables 
that originally appeared in the survey as intervals with 9 categories were re-coded by inserting 
the median value of each category. E.g. ‘category 2’ was expenditures between 50-100 
thousand HUF; and the redefined value now is 75 thousand HUF. Moreover, very small values 
(i.e. 0.001) were inserted to replace all zeros in the dependent variables in order to enable a 
log-linear specification that can (i) aid interpretation by creating constant percentage effects 
and (ii) help handling heteroskedasticity inherent in the sample (Wooldridge, 2002). In this 
way, 3 zeroes in sales, 22 zeros in off-farm income, 80 zeros in own input use, 71 zeroes in 
own consumption and 5 zeroes in bought consumption were recoded. In addition, the log of 
land quality was taken in order to make the interpretation of this variable easier.  
Each equation of the SUR model was specified with individual reasoning behind them 
due to the fact that the SUR framework allows different explanatory variables to determine 
each dependent variable. It is important to note that variable selection for the seemingly 
unrelated equation system is of particular importance because “if we are interested in the first 
equation, but we make a mistake in specifying the second equation, FGLS will generally 
produce inconsistent estimators of the parameters in all equations” (Woolridge, 2002:166). The 
specific variables excluded from each equation are signalled with grey background in Table C5 
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in Appendix C. In general, variables that were statistically highly insignificant in preliminary 
OLS results (p≥0.20) were disabled from the estimation if, and only if, there was no strong 
economic reason to believe that they would have a particularly interesting causal interpretation 
with respect to the given dependent variable. For example, gender and land quality was omitted 
from the sales equation as the quality of land and gender of the manager is not expected to have 
significant relationship to sales decision in Hungary. Gender is considered to be a better 
indicator of on-farm work or consumption (if any), whereas land quality is a more important 
determinant of input use. The equation of off-farm labour income excluded gender and land 
quality for the same reasons. Input equations excluded the regional variable of unemployed 
because unemployment has more meaning towards labour decisions rather than input use. The 
equation for bought consumption excluded land quality and quantity of owned land owned by 
the household because bought consumption is interdependent on own consumption, which is 
determined by land quality and land ownership to a larger extent. Both consumption equations 
excluded total equipment as it was very highly insignificant in preliminary OLS regressions 
and there is no strong causal relationship between these variables. 
4.6 Variable description 
The included variables’ expected signs outlined in Table C5 in Appendix C are based 
on the findings of previous literature reviewed in Chapter Two. With focus on the most 
important equations and variables, a few observations can be emphasised as follows. For 
example, age is expected to affect sales and off-farm income negatively but at an increasing 
rate (age squared positive) because the elderly are less mobile, flexible or productive. Because 
land, investment, equipment, subsidies, insurance, tax breaks are complements in production, 
they are expected to affect sales and production positively but off-farm labour participation 
negatively. Similarly, more unemployment in the region should have the same production 
enhancing but off-farm income educing effects. On the flipside social transfers are expected to 
negatively affect sales and even the supply of off-farm labour but the real effect on off-farm 
income will also depend on family size and risk aversion mechanisms. Gender should have no 
significant impact for sales; however it may have an impact on the hours spent on-farm. Own 
input use and bought input use is expected to be mostly dependent on the production type and 
agricultural support. Similarly, own consumption and bought consumption is expected to be 
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positively affected by household characteristics such as number of household members, 
education and social transfers. Higher unemployment is expected to affect off-farm labour 
income and bought consumption negatively; and on-farm hours and sales positively given that 
households would be more constrained into agricultural activities where jobs are not widely 
available (Davidova et al., 2013). 
Table 4.6.1 presents the descriptive statistics of variables used in the analysis. In this 
non-pensioner sub-sample of 159 observations, 45 percent of farms are engaged in only animal 
husbandry, about 27 percent in mixed production and 21 percent in only crop production. Other 
production types, such as wine, vegetable and green house and fruit production altogether 
includes five percent of the farms only (own calculations). In table 4.6.1 we can see that the 
average manager’s age is 48 with the youngest manager being 21 and the oldest manager being 
89 years old (non-retired, active worker). The average land owned by the household is around 
2.61 ha, which is interestingly smaller than the average land owned by pensioners (3.65) in 
Table C6 in Appendix C. The fact that the largest land owned is not greater than 33 ha suggests 
that these farmers are indeed very small scale, and fit into the subsistence category rather well. 
Land quality, measured in Golden Koronas/ha25, is also lower for non-pensioners (13) than for 
pensioners (16). These statistics mentioned so far confirm the historical heritage of farm 
structures and the imbalanced age-structure that hinders productivity levels: pensioners do not 
specialise much and farm more land that is also of better quality, whereas non-pensioners 
specialise on animal husbandry, farm less and farm on worse quality land, yet both groups have 
the same average results. The dummy variables included in this analysis are the location, 
education and production type variables, as well as the variable ‘tax free’ that shows difference 
if the household is exempt from taxes. Sales income is defined as the total sales revenue 
excluding own consumption and own input use, this is why its average value seems so large 
(2,997 EUR). As discussed earlier, net profits are a lot smaller than total gross sales. There are 
four real zeroes in sales income: three of them do not produce but take subsidies in the form of 
SAPS, and the fourth household which may be a start-up farm as it has large input and 
investment expenditures with no sales. Average sales income in the sample of 159 observations 
25 Quality determined by Golden Korona/ha which is a value rating number used to determine the potential net 
income from quality of the land based on fertility, location, water availability etc. It is a historical measure of all 
land in Hungary therefore it can be used for quality of land comparisons. 
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for non-pensioners is 917 thousand HUF (or 2,997 EUR26), with much larger off-farm income 
on average reaching 1506 thousand HUF (4,921 EUR) per annum. This shows that non-
pensioner (or younger and more educated) households exit agriculture more often for 
additional employment; as well as more of their income stem from off-farm activities than the 
pensioner group in Table C6 in Appendix C. We can also see that the largest sales and off-farm 
income maximum values are about five times larger than the average, with distribution 
negatively skewed. Households work off-farm on average 31 hours per week, whilst they work 
only 13 hours per week on their farms. In addition, many households work most of their 
working hours on-farm with no salaries attached to it. This implies that farm owners do not 
often pay salaries for themselves for on-farm work; and off-farm incomes are indeed of great 
importance for this SSFs group as they choose to spend more labour time in off-farm activities 
whilst not paying themselves for on-farm activities. Average own input use (356 EUR) and 
own consumption (209 EUR) are 43 times and 10 times smaller than the maximum 
respectively. They are also significantly negatively skewed and may have large outliers. 
Bought consumption and bought inputs on average reach about 2,000 EUR per annum, with the 
largest expenditures three times higher than the average. Average household size is 2.81 
persons, with 26 single-member households and only two households with six members. This 
shows that many people in the rural countryside are alone or live in very small families, for 
which economies of scales guaranteed by larger household structures are not always achieved. 
There are 28 female managers (17.6%) in the sample. Furthermore, there are large deviations in 
farm households’ total equipment (encompassing vehicles, machinery and buildings) with 
mean value 10,000 EUR and standard deviation 16,000 EUR. The largest equipment owner 
possess 146,000 EUR worth of equipments and buildings, which shows that some farms have 
significantly more production and specialisation potential than others, just as Kemény et al. 
(2014) highlighted earlier. SAPS on average are 600 EUR, with 59 zeroes and with the largest 
beneficiary receiving 4,000 EUR per annum, indicating that not all farms are capable of 
attracting such subsidies whilst others are very successful at it. There are 54 tax free farm 
households in this sample and 98 who has some agricultural loans or liabilities, which averages 
at 1,560 EUR per annum. 57 percent of farms have no insurance and the largest insurance 
contractor household pays 650 EUR for their annual insurance. This implies that loans seem to 
26 Exchange rate is 306 HUF = 1 EUR (MNB, 2015)  
46 
 
                                                 
be generally available, however, insurance and hedging is rather embryonic or not affordable 
for these household. Farm households receive 310 EUR of social transfers on average; however 
the largest beneficiary receives around 4,900 EUR per annum. The number of unemployed in 
each NUTS3 region was included as a regional indicator of the macroeconomy and to proxy 
the difficulty to find a job as a search-type transaction cost variable for the labour allocation 
decision.  
4.6.1. Table - Descriptive statistics of dependent and independent variables for the non-pensioner group 
Category Variable Measurement Mean Std Dev. Min Max 
Dependent 
Variables 
Sales Income thousands of HUF 917.11 664.92 0 4757 
Off-farm Income hours 1506.60 1403.49 0 8500 
 
On-farm labour hours hours 631.41 467.59 10 3800 
 
Input use of own produce thousands of HUF 109.41 375.15 0 4381 
Own consumption of produce thousands of HUF 64.87 108.98 0 626 
 
Bought inputs thousands of HUF 622.45 367.89 82 1903 
 
Bought consumption thousands of HUF 707.08 344.79 0 2250 
Location Transdanubia (west) dummy 0.38 0.49 0 1 
Northern and Southern Great Plain (plain) dummy 0.34 0.48 0 1 
Household 
characteristics 
No. of household members number 2.81 1.29 1 6 
Agricultural Education dummy 0.52 0.50 0 1 
 
Higher Education dummy 0.47 0.50 0 1 
 
Age of manager  years 48.84 12.24 21 89 
 
Gender of manager dummy 0.18 0.38 0 1 
Production 
Characteristics 
Crop producer dummy 0.21 0.41 0 1 
Fruit, vegetable and wine producer (other) dummy 0.07 0.25 0 1 
 
Mixed plant and animal producer (mixed) dummy 0.27 0.45 0 1 
 
Land owned by household (in ha) hectare 2.61 4.09 0 32.9 
 
Land quality in Golden Korona per ha Korona/ha 13.05 9.94 0 40 
 
Total equipment thousands of HUF 3279.04 5036.18 0 44789 
Agri-Support Single Area Payment thousands of HUF 186.04 216.29 0 1258 
Transaction 
Costs 
Tax free farm dummy 0.34 0.48 0 1 
Agricultural Loans and Liabilities thousands of HUF 464.98 673.06 0 3300 
 
Insurance thousands of HUF 15.19 30.18 0 200 
 
Social transactions thousands of HUF 95.91 277.70 0 1500 
 No. of Unemployed in NUTS3 regions thousands of ppl 28.99 29.85 5 120 
Note: Min=minimum, Max=maximum, Std. Dev.= Standard Deviation, HUF = Hungarian Forints, 1 EUR=306 HUF 
(MNB, 18.05.2015) 159 Observations in 2013 (N=159), excluding pensioners. Missing values were kept as they 
appeared. Source: own calculations based on survey data of AKI (2014) 
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Chapter 5 – Results and Discussion 
5.1 Analysis of descriptive information 
In order to complete the first objective of the study, we use the farm classification 
framework outlined in Chapter Two “to define and assess the role and importance of SFs and 
SSFs”. According to this, the used non-pensioner sample falls under market-oriented SSFs that 
have less than 5 ha of land on average and sell more than 50 percent of produce. To locate 
them in the national ‘farm economy’ the following table can serve as illustration: 
5.1.1. Table - Classification by size and market orientation 
 Pure subsistence farm Farms selling surplus 
only: sales<50% 
Farm producing for 
markets: sales>50%.  
<2000 EUR SO x  α 
2000-4000 EUR SO x α Ω 
4000-8000 EUR SO  x  
>8000 EUR SO  x x 
Based on Kemény et al. (2014:63). Legend: 
: intensive animal farming         : mixed farm with dominant crop and plant production 
x: typical farms                                α: market-oriented farms 
Ω: surveyed sample – SSFs between 2000-4000 EUR SO, sales>50%. 
 
In the table above, we can see that our sample represents a rather atypical section (with 
other words this is a “top marginal group” Ω) that may have higher potential for further 
specialisation and commercialisation. Classifying our sample of farm households as market-
oriented SSFs is possible because these households’ seasonal production volumes are 
deliberately larger than what the household can physically consume in one amount. Thus, these 
farms have market-orientation from start as Kostov and Lingard (2004) prescribes. However, 
farms between 2000-4000 EUR SO size in this sample do not produce enough for sales to be 
the households’ sole income source, rather they are supplementary to the family’s consumption 
and income. Illustrative of which is that about 50 percent of the family’s income come from 
non-agricultural employment, i.e. non-agricultural off-farm work, and 23 percent from pension 
(Kemény et al., 2014). The latter indicate a large number of pensioners in this sample. 
Moreover, off-farm income27 gives on average 62 percent of the total non-pensioner household 
budget; whilst net sales contribute only around 10 percent (own calculations). It is also 
interesting that total production of these SSF households is more than about 3,300 EUR per 
27 Off-farm work in this paper is defined as all labour the household provides off their own farm, i.e. both 
agricultural, non-agricultural and self-employment incomes classify as off-farm income. 
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annum, yet their net sales income or profits from total sales are only around 350-700 EUR per 
annum. Consequently, sales income on average covers only a third of the total bought food 
expenditure of households (Kemény et al., 2014:52). At the same time, (Kemény et al., 
2014:61) estimates that agricultural sales increase households’ disposable income by 30 
percent on average through the different income and substitution effects. According to Kemény 
et al. (2014:51), households whose main income source is agricultural employment off their 
farm maintain negative income balance per hectare by taking all costs and only official sales 
into account (2014:59). Conventionally, this means that these households have negative profits. 
However, including the household’s own consumption as an item of total sales, we can see that 
their income balance becomes positive. Thus, these households are economically rational 
actors: they produce for own consumption and sell the surplus; by which they produce positive 
income effects for the household (leave alone negative profits in terms of accounting). Despite 
their significant contribution to households’ budget, the true population of this sample 
(representing 14.9 percent of total farm population) produce only 1.06 percent of agricultural 
output nationally.  These statistics supply evidence for our first two hypothesis: (1a) SSFs 
agricultural activities play a very important role in the life of rural households as they increase 
households’ disposable income by 30 percent28; however (1b) small farms’ agricultural 
activities do not contribute significantly to the competitiveness of the agricultural sector, given 
their small share in production; and (2a) agriculture is only an auxiliary activity of these SSF 
farm households. 
To further investigate the role of SSFs corresponding to hypothesis (1a), we can 
investigate the level of households’ market participation and income status. Looking at total 
production, on average 85.4 percent of produce is used for sales, 8.5 percent of the produce is 
used on-farm as own input and 6.1 percent is used for the household’s own consumption (own 
calculations), implying that that there not many autarkic households in this sample. In terms of 
the level of disposable income per month, the surveyed group lives of 80-310 EUR disposable 
income per month29 (Kemény et al., 2014:58); where 94 percent of the group lives off less than 
28 This is also in accordance with the findings of previous literature predicting that agricultural activities 
contribute 20-50 percent of households’ budget of those households who are at the risk of poverty in the CEECs 
(Davidova et al., 2013). 
29 When dividing the total disposable income with 12 and the number of household members. 
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285 EUR per month which is the established national poverty line30 (for one adult with no 
children or elderly attached) (own calculations based on KSH, 2014B). Thus, most of the group 
can be considered to be impoverished households. This implies that SSFs’ farming activities in 
fact have a “buffer role” and provide a risk aversion strategy for these impoverished rural 
households in Hungary, as prescribed by the previous literature such as Davidova et al. (2013).  
5.2 Econometric Results 
In order to complete the second objective of the study and “to reveal the determining 
factors of Hungarian SSFs market participation and sales decisions for goods and labour”, the 
results of the econometric estimation are presented in Table 5.2.1 and explained hereafter. 
Location variables are important for sales, on-farm labour decisions and both 
consumption decisions; suggesting that agri-businesses strive, and agricultural production is 
indeed more advanced in the Western and Southern side of the country, whilst the North-East 
falls behind both in terms of agriculture and living standards (given that the reference group 
was North-East). On the other hand, location variables seem unimportant for off-farm work and 
input decisions. 
Surprisingly, household characteristics do not seem to affect the sales and bought input 
decisions; however, they have a statistically significant effect on off-farm income, own input 
use and bought consumption. For example, an additional household member increases bought 
consumption by 26.8 percent (other things kept constant), which seems to be a realistic result, 
given that some of the households’ consumption may come from the farm itself and the 
household maintain economies of scale by adding more family members. In addition, on-farm 
hours decrease by 13.8 percent and own input use decrease by nearly 50 percent if the 
household grows with an addition member31. This may reflect the rather small economic size 
of the farm for this SSF group, which has less and less role for the family, the more the family 
grows and the more labour it can supply off-farm for higher and more stable incomes. 
Interestingly, the age of the manager has a positive but decreasing impact on off-farm income. 
Given that our sample is focused on non-pensioners, this may represent older farmers’ attitude 
and preference to bring their increased skills and equipment to the labour market.  
30 This refers to the Hungarian term “létminimum”. 
31 All effects are interpreted when other things are being held constant, i.e. ceteris paribus. 
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5.2.1. Table - Seemingly Unrelated Regressions 
  lnsalesinc lnoffarmin
 
lnhronfar
 
lnowninput lnowncons lnboughtinp
 
lnboughtcons 
Location 
west 1.591* -0.518 0.999*** -0.0401 2.098+ 0.0905 -1.114+ 
  (0.803) (1.008) (0.230) (0.906) (1.126) (0.131) (0.622) 
plain 1.526* -0.586 0.469* -1.033 1.800+ 0.0115 -0.0809 
 (0.774) (0.812) (0.221) (0.937) (1.032) (0.123) (0.367) 
Household characteristics 
member -0.231 0.314 -0.138* -0.497* 0.363 0.0196 0.268** 
  (0.147) (0.306) (0.0551) (0.216) (0.338) (0.0357) (0.101) 
agriedu 0.156 0.769 0.159 -1.199 1.387+ -0.126 0.985+ 
  (0.275) (0.841) (0.136) (0.755) (0.820) (0.123) (0.515) 
higheredu 0.225 2.210** 0.0377 -0.853 1.380 -0.0744 1.247* 
  (0.257) (0.829) (0.124) (0.665) (0.840) (0.0922) (0.541) 
gender   -0.0177  -0.0407  -0.232 
    (0.155)  (0.915)  (0.559) 
age -0.0107 0.338** 0.0501 0.218* -0.0145 -0.00933 0.0779 
  (0.0431) (0.121) (0.0613) (0.104) (0.171) (0.0197) (0.113) 
age2 -0.0000745 -0.00482*** -0.000570 -0.00243* 0.00000779 0.0000550 -0.00113 
(0.000434) (0.00121) (0.000657) (0.00107) (0.00164) (0.000190) (0.00126) 
Production characteristics 
crop 0.271 0.758 -0.747*** -9.586*** -7.713*** -0.137 0.530 
  (0.336) (1.015) (0.184) (0.909) (1.013) (0.126) (0.598) 
other 0.215 0.195 0.0825 -6.322** -7.413*** -0.338 -0.506 
  (0.532) (0.830) (0.249) (1.944) (1.557) (0.209) (0.914) 
mixed -0.962+ -0.341 -0.0866 -1.997* -3.311** -0.0907 -0.401 
  (0.576) (0.785) (0.142) (0.850) (1.059) (0.118) (0.557) 
ownland 0.128+ -0.0340 -0.00978 -0.00975 0.240+ -0.00716  
  (0.0654) (0.207) (0.0255) (0.0970) (0.125) (0.0132)  
lnlandquality    1.052*** 0.241* -0.00354  
     (0.0808) (0.109) (0.0159)  
totalequipment -0.000119+ 0.0000617 0.00000823 0.0000828 -0.0000585 0.00000324  
  (0.0000664) (0.000114) (0.0000160) (0.0000940) (0.0000839) (0.0000128)  
Agricultural Support 
saps -0.000674 -0.00595* 0.000471 0.00189 -0.00890*** 0.000228 0.000824 
 (0.000639) (0.00241) (0.000336) (0.00181) (0.00227) (0.000248) (0.00118) 
Transaction cost indicators 
taxfree -0.659+ -2.732*** 0.0640 -0.291 0.0958 -0.0583 -0.563 
 (0.366) (0.751) (0.128) (0.706) (0.906) (0.101) (0.406) 
loan -0.000212 0.000171 0.000160* -0.000524 0.000166 0.000175** -0.000172 
  (0.000181) (0.000355) (0.0000739) (0.000366) (0.000616) (0.0000666) (0.000236) 
insurance -0.00563 0.00598 0.00000831 -0.0344* 0.0161 0.00253 -0.0223+ 
  (0.0132) (0.0102) (0.00247) (0.0162) (0.0137) (0.00176) (0.0123) 
soctrans -0.000646 -0.00308* -0.000203 -0.000341 -0.00135 -0.000261+ -0.000450 
  (0.000702) (0.00144) (0.000315) (0.00110) (0.00131) (0.000138) (0.000861) 
unemployed 0.0107* 0.00239 0.00509*    -0.0131* 
  (0.00469) (0.0125) (0.00199)    (0.00528) 
Constant 6.936*** 0.912 4.816*** -0.329 0.234 6.542*** 4.809* 
  (1.115) (2.876) (1.353) (2.662) (4.509) (0.489) (2.396) 
Ps.-R2 -mysureg- 
 
0.059 0.379 0.302 0.514 0.336 0.095 0.079 
R2 -sureg- 0.266 0.429 0.338 0.605 0.392 0.148 0.209 
Prob > F 0.000       
Standard errors in parentheses; Observations 157, + p < 0.10, * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001;  
Source: AKI database, AKI (2014) 
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Age also positively affect own input use. This corresponds to the traditional findings of the 
literature which says that older managers, being more risk averse and having more invested 
infrastructure and knowledge, prefer to use their own inputs for example to feed the cattle in 
case of a mixed, less specialised farm (Genuis, 2013). If the manager receives higher education 
(university or college), he/she will have 220 percent more off-farm income than others. 
Equally, he/she will spend 125 percent more on bought consumption, which means that higher 
education helps people earn more off-farm, consume more and subsequently to reach out of 
poverty. It is interesting to note here that the correlation coefficient between the off-farm 
income and sales income equation is negative, which supports previous findings that off-farm 
work lures resources away from farming and prompts the household to quit agricultural 
activities (Bakucs et al., 2010). It is clear that higher education would only amplify this effect. 
On the other hand, agricultural education significantly increases both own consumption of 
produce and bought consumption which may reflect that skilled managers are richer - they 
have a larger budget to spend - as well as they prefer to take advantage of their activities by 
consuming their own produce. The positive effects of education imply that skilled and educated 
farmers may have bigger capacity to generate incomes or larger volumes of produce, which is a 
typical conclusion here.  
Within production characteristics, production type in particular have a significant 
negative effect on-farm labour decisions, own input use and own consumption of produce. The 
negative effect can be explained by the fact that the reference category of the production type 
was ‘pure’ animal husbandry. Thus, it is understandable that animal husbandry needs more on-
farm labour input, use more of its own inputs, and the households embracing this activity 
consume more of their animal products. Moreover, the total area of land owned in ha has a 
weakly significant but positive effect on sales and own consumption, implying the typical 
finding that more land can produce and sell more, from which the household can also consume 
more. We can also see that one percent change in land quality results in one and 0.24 percent 
change in own input use and own consumption. An explanation to which is that better quality 
land is usually in the possession of older (more traditional) farming families, who may have 
more knowledge or need to use more of their own produce – i.e. they have a propensity or a 
preference to be more self-subsistent. Interestingly, total equipment has a weakly significant 
negative effect on sales. This could be because farmers use their equipment for other off-farm 
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activities (renting the equipment, working with the equipment on other farms). However, this 
claim is unfortunately not supported by the econometric results as the effect of total equipment 
on off-farm income is not significant, even though it is positive.  
The representative variable of agricultural support, SAPS, is only significant and 
negative for off-farm income and own consumption of produce, suggesting that subsidies of 
this kind can divert efforts towards more specialised agriculture. However, we could only 
clearly conclude this way if the effect of SAPS on sales was equally significantly positive, 
which is unfortunately not. Thus we cannot not know whether SAPS encourages agriculture for 
own production only (and thereby increases the households’ general budget through a direct 
income effect and an indirect production effect); or as a result of the increased income flow 
from subsidies, the household will be truly prompted to produce for and participate more in 
markets. As it is visible in Table 5.1.1., this SSF group is a threshold group that needs a 
significant amount of investment/support in order to be “pushed” to the next production group 
in a way that they feel compensated for extending their activities. If the intervention is not large 
and targeted enough, households may remain to enjoy the ‘surplus money’ that the direct 
income effect of SAPS create for own consumption. 
Lastly, transaction cost type variables’ effects should be investigated. Following the 
reasoning behind SAPS, we can understand why being tax free has a clearly negative effect on 
both sales and off-farm work. It is likely that this SSF threshold group will want to abstain 
from moving upwards on the production-ladder if the compensation for such increased 
production is not rewarded enough (i.e. if they are no compensated for the opportunity cost of 
losing out on being tax free). Tax breaks for small farms was one of the strategy of previous 
programmes (NVT 2004-2007) to help small farms develop (Kemény et al., 2014:67). Whilst 
recognising that tax breaks may be useful for the typical member of the small farm group 
(signalled with x in Table 5.1.1.), our econometric results suggest that they negatively affect 
both income decisions (that of sales and off-farm work) of the marginal members in the top 
cluster of the SSF group. These farms may only prefer to remain tax free because the additional 
income from extra production or off-farm work is not enough compensation for losing the tax 
break. As a result, tax breaks and the little extra money from SAPS may create distorted 
incentives for this marginal SSF group in such a way that it signals them to remain in the SSF 
group. On the other hand, accessing loan and credit as expected have a positive impact on on-
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farm working hours and the amount of inputs bought for the farm, implying the typical finding 
that overcoming credit constraints is one way in which small farm development can be helped. 
Contrary to this, around 3.2 EUR increase in insurance paid by the household, decreases own 
input use by 3.4 percent and bought consumption by 2.2 percent. This could be because 
households who prefer to buy insurance are more specialised (or getting more specialised) and 
risk averse; thus, they spend more money on buying inputs and less on buying food product for 
household consumption. However, it is unclear whether insurance, by itself, increases the 
households’ potential to sell more. Unfortunately, insurance is not a statistically significant 
variable in the sales and own consumption equation, thus we cannot draw clear conclusions. 
Social transactions, however, have a clearly negative effect on off-farm income and bought 
inputs, signalling the typical finding that deprived households in need of social transfers are 
less mobile to undertake off-farm work and they have also smaller budget for market bought 
products, thus they can be considered more self-sustainable and poor. Furthermore, general 
unemployment in the NUTS3 regions have a significant positive effect on sales and on-farm 
work hours, implying that agricultural production is more prevalent in regions with scarcer job 
opportunities; and the households are pushed towards farming as a survival strategy. In fact, an 
additional thousand persons unemployed increases sales by 1 percent and on-farm work by 0.5 
percent. This finding clearly agrees with scholars who see the role of SFs and SSFs as a social 
buffer (eg. JRC, 2010; Kostov and Lingard, 2004; Davidova et al., 2013). It is also striking that 
farms in regions with higher unemployment spend a lot less on bought food. As such, a 
thousand extra people unemployed means that households’ bought food demand would 
decrease by 1.3 percent. This statistic together with the prevalent positive correlation between 
off-farm work and bought consumption are indications that households in poorer regions with 
macroeconomic uncertainty are more prone to fall into poverty and consume less than optimal. 
When unemployment prevails, these households may compensate for their reduced food 
budgets by increased sales, given the negative correlation between off-farm work and sales and 
the positive impact of unemployment on sales. These findings are in line with hypothesis (2b). 
5.3 Discussions 
Overall, we can see that the econometric results based on the household production 
model have provided meaningful insights. Household characteristics and transaction cost type 
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variables in general have proven significant for the household’s decisions, which support the 
claim that SSF households in Hungary face imperfect markets with transaction costs; and their 
production, consumption and labour allocation decisions are non-separable. The fact that 
household characteristics do not enter the sales equation may mean that the sales decision is the 
least constrained by such transaction costs. However, the correlation between equations and the 
way household characteristics enter other decisions of the family warns that not considering 
household characteristics as a production (and consequently sales) decision factor may be 
misleading. The household is in fact constrained by transaction costs and influenced by 
household characteristics one way or another. The most significant and also the most 
controversial findings of this study is that SAPS, tax breaks, and insurance may not create 
production effects for this group of producers. Conventionally, we would expect that 
decreasing the financial burden on households would enable them to focus on production and 
sales. In the case of our SSF group, this may be equally true if the support is large enough: (i) 
to make a significant difference for the household’s income status; and (ii) to overcome the 
opportunity cost of being tax free when becoming tax payer in the next production category. 
However, these marginal SSF households32 in an imperfect market situation face three options 
when receiving support (1) directly consume the subsidies (direct income effect), (2) put extra 
income into inputs and production and then consume the increased produce or (3) produce 
more for markets which represents the conventional solution to the maximisation problem 
under perfect markets. Since we can assume - which now we do with good reason - that 
markets fail for these households, the first or second behaviour is more likely. If this is true, 
then nudging certain households who are capable and willing to produce more for markets 
would need to be carefully targeted in order to support legitimate farm development and not 
simple income effects. 
In order to assess the extent to which small farms can develop to “undertake full-time 
farming activities” (corresponding to objective three and hypothesis (3)), this paragraph will 
discuss ‘who are the “upgradable” farmers’, ‘how removing transaction costs can help them’, 
and ‘how households would benefit from targeted agricultural policies’. In terms of predicting 
the number and characteristics of farms that can become more integrated into markets, Kemény 
32 Refers to households that already sell >50% of their produce and have a larger economic size (2000-4000 SO), 
Ω in Table 5.1.1. 
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et al. (2014) conclude that only those farmers whose main source of income is self-
employment have the potential to become profit maximising fully market-oriented producers. 
This is because the group of ‘self-employed’ (1) already has the “courage” to take initiative (2) 
they already receive and productively use most of CAP subsidies and (3) they already possess 
the largest amount of equipment among all other income groups. Pensioners and those living 
from social transfers are by principle not considered to have development potential due to their 
old age and lack of credit. On the other hand, farm households whose main income source is 
non-agricultural work would have the potential to succeed in farm development because they 
are more educated and they have the drive to generate profits. However, the amount of 
investment needed to increase farm equipment for a ‘meaningful’ upgrading of their farms is so 
large (given their initially small asset base) that it would not overall help the households’ 
income status (Kemény et al., 2014). Thus, farm development would be an irrational aspiration 
for these households. The problem with this interpretation is two-fold:  
Firstly, the fact that farm development is an irrational aspiration for most of this to SSF 
group is not supported by the data. In our sample, there are 66 farms with negative after tax 
profits, 71 farm with zero own consumption and 80 farms with zero own input use, as well as 
there are 40 farms that neither consume their own goods nor use them as inputs. There are even 
12 farms that have negative overall after-tax profits and yet they have no own consumption, but 
possess on average 7,720 EUR worth of total equipment, which is much higher than the sample 
average. Furthermore, for 29.7 percent of the farms in the sample, sales are the main income 
source; and for 56.8 percent it is non-agricultural off-farm work33 (statistics in Table D in 
Appendix D). From these statistics we can say that the 159 non-pensioner sub-section with a 
large number of non-agri workers: (1) are not typically autarkic (i.e. rather integrated); (2) may 
already rely on profits as the main income source of the family; and (3) may already maintain 
negative profits in favour of holding agricultural equipment that can be used for farm 
development. Thus, non-pensioner market-oriented SSFs can be in fact considered as having an 
investment potential.  
Secondly, to conclude that both agri-workers and non-agri-workers (who together make 
78 percent of the non-pensioner sample) are either not capable or willing to develop their farms 
(due to farm development being an “irrational aspiration for these households”) is unreasonable 
33  Groupings are made by main income source, considering total income: off-farm incomes and sales income too. 
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to suggest because we cannot fully understand households’ true motivations and aspirations34. 
On one hand, their participation in non-agri activities may be due to the continuing lack of 
targeted support for these small farms and the general economic insecurity of rural areas. On 
the other hand, the unemployment variable indicated that unemployment is a highly significant 
drawback for these households’ market participation; and their farming activity may not be 
because of their dedication to agriculture. As Davidova et al. (2013:24) and Kostov and 
Lingard (2004) suggest these households may be “pushed into farming” in order to navigate 
financial hardships. However, if opportunities arose (available and accessible subsidies) and 
credit constraints were eliminated, some of these households may choose to further invest into 
their farms. The potential to invest is in fact expected from this top-marginal group that is 
already market-oriented and only partly autarkic in own consumption and input use as outlined 
in the previous paragraph. After all, Kemény et al. (2014) say it themselves that the previous 
support packages (i.e. NVT 2004-2007 and ÚNVT 2007-201335), aiming at transitioning SSFs, 
gave too little amount (1,000 EUR/annum; 1,500 EUR/annum for five years) and too much 
bureaucratic hassle for small farms; and subsequently discouraged their application for 
subsidies. Thus, no wonder why these relatively impoverished households with enough skills 
(i.e. the majority of the sample who undertake off-farm work) have chosen to disinvest from 
their farms over time and look for more sustainable incomes at times when labour markets 
allowed (Bíró et al. 2012). However, if farm households in the top marginal group, in 
particular, saw real potential and the elimination of their constraints (transaction costs), they 
may choose to re-direct human resources back into agriculture.  
In summary, this study suggests that the top-marginal group of non-pensioner SSF 
farms (Ω in Table 5.1.1.) can be viewed as market-oriented farm households who have the 
investment potential to develop; and could be targeted with agricultural policy. The results of 
this study could be generalised to three groups of farms: the two αs and the Ω in Table 5.1.136. 
This is because these groups either demonstrate the necessary motivation (SSFs already selling 
>50%) or posses large production volumes that is necessary for moving to the next size 
34 As JRC (2010:35,32) argues “households’ aims and objectives are key drivers for embarking on a specific 
strategy” and that “small-scale farm households are also driven by non-economic aspects”; and researching these 
aspects would require the combination of economics with socio-psychological methods. 
35 NVT: [Nemzeti Vidékfejlesztési Terv] National Rural Development Plan and ÚNVT: [Új Nemzeti 
Vidékfejlesztési Terv] New National Rural Development Plan. 
36 Kemény et al. (2014) generalise their results for the whole group of 2000-4000 EUR SO producing farms. 
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category. It is also reasonable conclude that farms smaller in economic size or with smaller 
shares of sales volume would need even more agri-support to develop, which may not be 
feasible to provide. Thus, in line with the third hypothesis, it is a rather small section of farms 
(who are also a-typical in their characteristics) that have the capacity to become full-time 
farmers. These farms are: less autarkic in terms of own consumption and input use, non-
pensioners, have clear market-orientation and have some invested asset base. However, the 
decision to upgrade will be dependent on both the economic compensation that can push them 
to the next income group by helping to overcome market imperfections; and the intention and 
motivation of farm households. 
5.4 Limitations 
Despite the thorough analysis, careful interpretation of the results must be undertaken 
given the limitations of this study. To name the most important limitations we can say that (i) 
the sample was relatively small and represented a rather a-typical section of the small farm 
group; (ii) neither of the estimated equations took care of the corner solutions (zeroes); (iii) and 
true transaction costs (such as difficulty to access markets and information) as well as prices 
were not included in the regressions. As mentioned earlier, the Tobit specification did not yield 
significantly different estimators to those obtained by OLS; and the included transaction cost 
type variables have been well-behaved in the sense that they yielded expected results. 
Nevertheless, considerations about these limitations should be accounted for in future studies, 
if possible.  
In terms of transaction costs, the difficulty was to select the proxy transaction cost 
variables to be fully identical to the ones identified in the conceptual framework. As such, the 
lack of knowledge on the exact geographic location of farms within the NUTS3 region reduced 
measurement accuracy for most variables as the region dummies were not fully able to capture 
the within-region differences and the additional transaction costs farmers face in their 
immediate environments.  In particular, there were no variables available that could indicate 
the difficulty to gain information (e.g. consultation hours); or to market products (e.g. 
transportation, distance from markets,). Thus, recommendations and conclusions about the 
transaction costs these farmers face vertically in terms of the supply chain when marketing 
their goods; and horizontally in terms of gathering information and competing cannot be made.   
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Chapter 6 – Conclusions and Policy Recommendations 
The main objective of this study was to define and characterise SFs and SSFs below 
4000 EUR standard output in the Hungarian context, with particular attention given to 
identifying the determinants of their production, labour allocation and market participation 
decisions. In order to reveal the determining factors of Hungarian semi-subsistence family 
farms’ market participation and sales decisions for goods and labour, the thesis identified the 
household’s simultaneous decision equations based on the traditional farm household model 
and econometrically estimated them. According to the traditional farm household model cast 
into imperfect markets, transaction costs increase the price band the household faces and 
prompt the household to be self-subsistent or autarkic. To investigate whether transaction costs 
are in fact influential for SSF households in the Hungarian economy, a sub-section of non-
pensioner SSFs’ seven allocation decision were studied by the seemingly unrelated regressions 
framework. The econometric analysis showed that transaction costs and household 
characteristics in fact influence the SSF households’ decisions; and they are likely to induce 
internal pricing. Thus, we can say that SSFs in Hungary face market imperfections; and their 
behaviour cannot be fully understood without considering the additional constraints they face.  
In terms of defining and assessing the role and importance of SFs and SSFs in Hungary, 
the study concluded that (i) SSFs agricultural activities play a very important role in the life of 
rural households as they increase households’ disposable income by 30 percent; (ii) SSFs’ 
farming activities in fact have a “buffer role” and provide a risk aversion strategy for small 
impoverished rural households in Hungary; however (ii) agriculture is only an auxiliary 
activity of these SSF households; and (iii) small farms’ agricultural activities do not contribute 
significantly to the competitiveness of the agricultural sector, given their small share in 
production. 
The main results of the econometric model, estimating the household’s seven 
simultaneous decision equations with the SUR method37, can be summarised as follows. 
Education enhances the individual’s chances to work off-farm. However, off-farm work is 
negatively correlated to on-farm labour input and sales, thus higher education indirectly prompt 
37 The seven seemingly unrelated regressions are: (1) sales income; (2) off-farm income; (3) hours worked on-
farm; (4) input use of own produce; (5) bought inputs; (6) bought food consumption; and (7) consumption of own 
produce. 
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the household to quit farming. The more members the household have, the less they work on-
farm and more off their farm. Production type mostly influences own input use and own 
consumption decisions, implying that certain producers (i.e. animal producers who represent a 
small majority of the group) are more subsistence-oriented. As a typical finding, the 
household’s sales increase with the amount of owned land. However, the more equipment the 
household possesses the less its sales become, suggesting that the household members will 
increasingly work off-farm and provide services with their machinery, instead of utilising all 
their equipment on-farm. In terms of transaction cost proxies, tax-breaks may help some 
farmers in the SSF group to aid production; however in our sample (representing the top 
marginal group of farmers who are already market-oriented and has relatively large sales 
volume) tax breaks does not increase sales. Instead they may prevent the household from 
pursuing higher sales and off-farm income. This suggest that becoming a tax payer on the 
margin (i.e. becoming the “bottom” of the next income group) does not provide large enough 
compensation for the household, or with other words it does not change the household’s 
income status. Thus, for the top marginal SSF group relatively large compensation would be 
needed to nudge them into further production. Moreover, given that the variables of loan and 
subsidies had positive production effects, we can say that providing credit and targeted 
subsidies could aid SSFs farm development if these increments are simple, secure, accessible 
and large enough. On the other hand, the results show that an increase in social transactions has 
negative effects on both off- and on-farm work, suggesting that those receiving social transfers 
are less capable of participating in the general labour force altogether. Another important 
finding is that unemployment has a clearly positive effect on sales and on-farm work decisions, 
supporting the argument that SSFs’ production and labour allocation decisions are in fact 
bound by labour quotas and transaction costs rooted in general (macro)economic conditions. 
Considering the labour decision, off-farm work can increase household income directly; as well 
as it could create liquidity for additional investment into the households’ agricultural activities 
if the household: (i) is large enough to supply enough members for the labour market besides 
keeping up production and (ii) has agri-orientation. However, according to our results (and 
other studies, such as Bakucs et al. (2010)), re-investment of off-farm income does not usually 
happen as off-farm income has a negative relationship with sales. From the unemployment 
variable we also know that: if there are not enough work opportunities in the economy and the 
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labour force cannot relocate to undertake off-farm work, sales will increase and the household 
will be increasingly pushed “into subsistence farming by poverty and an underdeveloped social 
safety net, for whom operating a SSF is a survival strategy” (Davidova et al., 2013:24).  
From these conclusions, the following policy suggestions can be derived. Agricultural 
policy may target those farm households who are: (i) already market-oriented or have larger 
production volumes (i.e. the top groups of small farms: two αs and Ω ; hereafter progressive 
farmers); (ii) younger and have no pension income; and (iii) committed to invest.  According to 
the regression results, this could be done by easing transaction costs farm households face. In 
particular, credit constraints could be lowered by supporting low-interest loans catered for 
progressive farmers in the small farm group or by supporting the spread of community banks 
such as MagNet Bank (the only community bank in Hungary) (MagnetBank, 2015). Given that 
the insurance variable in our model also had significant effects on input use, the development 
of more accessible insurance and risk sharing strategies could be beneficial for progressive 
small farms. In this respect, special governmental insurance programmes that respond to small 
farms needs could be implemented to encourage the progressive small farmers undertake more 
risky opportunities and push them towards their optimal investment potential. Insurance 
support programmes like these are already in affect from April 2015 in Hungary that 
specifically target micro, small and medium enterprises according to the new CAP 
framework38. These programmes are supplementary to the already existing government 
insurance framework that gives compensation for farmers encountering natural catastrophes 
and climatic hazards39. To further aid risk management of small farms, it would also be 
reasonable to increasingly support research funds that can analyse and develop other risk 
sharing strategies (such as marketing contracts, production contracts, hedging on futures 
markets, participation in mutual funds) for rural communities (EC, 2008). In addition to which, 
the formation of new cooperatives could also help progressive SSFs to overcome risk (Mathijs 
and Noev, 2004), however this may not be easy to support given the alienation of farmers from 
such organisational structures in the previous system.  
38 Further information about insurance regulations in Government of Hungary (2015); Jogtar (2015); EC (2006). 
39 [„biztosítási esemény: tűzkár, valamint a mezőgazdasági termelést érintő időjárási és más természeti kockázatok 
kezeléséről szóló 2011. évi CLXVIII. törvény (a továbbiakban: Mkk. tv.) 2. § 7. pontja szerinti elemi káresemény 
a belvízkár kivételével” Jogtar (2015)]. 
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In terms of subsidies, if the aim was to provide targeted, simple, secure, accessible40 
and large enough subsidies for progressive SSFs’ farm development within the new CAP 
framework, subsidies would have to be larger than before, advertised, explained and their 
application made easier41. Thus, not only more materials and advertisement of the CAP 
reforms could be carried out throughout the country, but also trained and unbiased extension 
workers (or advisors) could be available for consultation about the CAP changes. Furthermore, 
to overcome complicated application processes that demand much planning and paper work 
from the farms side but give little monetary support in exchange (Kemény et al., 2014:58), 
shortened application forms and skilled personnel to guide application processes could be 
available; together with more grace periods for the fulfilment of pre-requisites and application 
deadlines. These suggestions are in accordance with the 2013 CAP changes which aim at 
“simplifying rules and/or reducing the related administrative burden where possible” (EC, 
2015). Moreover, the new CAP’s agricultural subsidies, replacing the previous SAPS, need to 
be large enough for the top marginal group to ‘make their efforts worth’ and push them to the 
next production category. The Hungarian adaptation of the new CAP 2014-2020 programme 
already encompass this element by planning to allocate a maximum of 15 thousand EUR per 
farm on a five years horizon, which is three times larger than previous packages. Additional 
funds to aid such small farm developments could come from the new CAP’s second pillar 
greening subsidies, accompanied by adequate information on present trends about ecological 
farming in Europe.  
Furthermore, the government could pay increased attention to supporting those small 
farms that are more subsistence-oriented and produce mainly for own consumption (i.e. the rest 
of the small farm group, hereafter we call them opportunistic farmers). This is because 
subsistence production is a traditional and already working safety net for households near the 
poverty line that can provide a functioning buffer for those who cannot find off-farm 
employment when unemployment is high. In this way, it is not social policy that should look 
after those who cannot farm efficiently (e.g. by giving unemployment benefits), but it is 
agricultural policy that can meaningfully enable rural populations to ‘help themselves’ in ways 
40 These suggestions are based on the econometric results as well as the reviewed literature in Chapter Two. 
41 In this process, the monitoring of subsidy distribution would be equally important in order to avoid “pocket 
contract” such as those highlighted by TNI (2013). 
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they have always done so. Thus, we may ‘not fix what is not broken’; and embrace people’s 
knowledge of survival. This could be achieved by continuing providing tax breaks and a sort of 
small farm ‘garden support’ that targets food security of opportunistic farmers and their (likely) 
impoverished households. This support could be done by making sure that the already planned 
simplified flat-rate aid, (“átalánytámogatás”) replacing SAPS, can reach all small farms 
(including both opportunistic and progressive farmers) by which the income of all households 
under 4000 SO can be directly increased (Kemény et al., 2014). Generalising agricultural 
policies to the whole small farm group in this way would be in line with the EU’s rural 
development policy, known as the second pillar of the Common Agricultural Policy (EC, 2015); 
and could assist Hungary to achieve the sixth common priority of Horison 2020, which is 
“social inclusion, poverty reduction and economic development in rural areas” (EC, 2015). 
If the goal is to develop the potentially progressive small farms and create a less 
dualistic farm system, the separation of producers from non-producers will be inevitable. 
Therefore, apart from agricultural policies, robust social policies will be needed to accompany 
the separation of producers from non-producers. It is very likely that pensioners, those living 
from social transfers and the non-progressive SFs and SSFs will not develop to be profit 
maximising producers. These farm households will be left for social policy to deal with. In 
particular, pensioners and those who live from social transfers would need to be granted a safe 
retirement; and non-progressive farms would need to be relocated to new jobs by helping them 
to gain new skills and further education. Supporting these farms’ safe withdrawal from 
agriculture would be beneficial for the elderly and the newcomers; as well as for the overall 
rural economy.  
Finally, we can say that targeting the heterogeneous small farm group with 
heterogeneous policies and adequate support could enhance progressive SSFs chances to 
compete. Consequently, the development of progressive farmers could lead to a less dualistic 
farm structure; and would aid rural and agricultural development equally. It is targeted 
agricultural support for progressive farmers; financially secure retirement for the old; and the 
creation of other job opportunities for the rest of the rural society that can facilitate the 
separation of potential farmers from circumstantial ones; and the development of progressive 
small farms.  
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Appendix A  
Table A – Previous findings of developing country studies 
Paper and Method Decision Outcome / Quantity Sold 
Woldeyohanes, T. B. 
(2014) Tobit and duble 
hurdle 
off farm income, household characteristics, land area, livestock 
owned, distance from market, participation in extension 
programme, regional dummy 
off-farm income, family size, land area, livestock 
owned, distance form market, transport animals owned, 
regional dummy. 
Goetz (1992) 
 
Heckman two-step 
price of coarse grain, price of rice, ownership of carts for 
transportation, distance from market, regional dummy, interaction 
terms for the information variable, ethnicity, age, age2, poor 
access, members, dependency ratio, transformation technology. 
proportional transaction costs 
price of coarse grains, price of rice, equipment owner, 
transformation technology, ethnicity, number of 
persons, dependency ratio, age, age2. 
Key et al. (2000) fixed/proportional transaction costs: 
transport costs, distance to market, sell/buy  from official source, 
sell to consumer, buy from grower, own pick-up truck, 
membership in agri-org., membership in transport-org. 
head of household over 55 yrs, land, local high yielding 
varieties, chemical pesticides, natural or chemical 
fertiliser use, level of mechanisation, access to credit, 
access to common property pasture, livestock assets 
Alene et al. (2008) distance to fertiliser and maize markets, ownership of pack 
animals, membership in maize org, access to communication 
assets, ownership of transport equipment, gender, age, education, 
land per capita, number of adults, livestock, adoption of modern 
varieties, credit, off-farm incomes, lagged maize prices, location 
variables. 
all variables except communication and transport 
equipment 
Beyene (2008) 
Multivariate approach 
age, age2, sex of head, dummy for read and write, dummy for primary and secondary education, average school of the family, 
dummy for child, no of draft animals, dummy for health, dummy for handicraft training, no of dependants, distance to market, 
transfer income, size of land, credit 
Hwelthber et al. (2002) Log maize price, Log groundnut price , Farm size per household 
worker, Dependency ratio, Log number of trees, Traction 
ownership dummy, Log age of household head, Any member has 
paid Log of mean maize yield in Province Dummy for risky area 
Northern region dummy, central region dummy transport 
ownership dummy, log Distance to ailway,  log Distance to 
Province capital , Own radio, TV or telephone, Maximum 
education of household head, District population density  
all variables but last three 
Zamasiya et al. (2012) 
 
Bivariate probit and a 
Heckman two step 
procedure 
household  head’s  gender, head’s  age,  head’s  age  squared  and 
household  size  are  used  as proxies for household characteristics. 
Livestock wealth or resource endowment  is  represented  by  
number  of  cattle  owned  while information  is  represented  by  
contact  with  extension,  household head education, distance to 
nearest market, ownership of radio and ownership  of  a  mobile  
phone.  
gender of household  head,  age  of  household  head,  
size  of  the  household,  
farming experience; ownership of cattle and distance to 
the market, affect the intensity of  a household’s 
participation in the soybean  
market 
 
Ouma et al. (2009)  
 
Bivariate probit and a 
Heckman two step 
procedure 
bike owner, time to market, children, household no of members, 
farming experience, formal education yrs, gender of household 
head, off-farm income, dummy if market outlet is farm gate, if 
urban market, price information source, membership in farmers 
group, radio, location, price for banana, livestock, seller buyer, log 
of kgs sold, log of kgs bought.  
active member, children, price of banana, off farm 
income, access, farm size, credit, experience, female 
headed, if household carries out soil and water 
conservation measures, land tenure is freehold or rental, 
tropical livestock units. 
 
Sebatta et al. (2014) 
 
Heckman two step 
Age of farmer, Farmer’s gender, Potato farming experience, 
Farmer’s education level, Farmer’s household size, Farmer has 
other food sources apart from potato, Value of livestock owned, 
Value of farmer’s household durables, Farmer’s monthly non-farm 
income, Distance to nearest potato market, Number of extension 
visits made to the farm specifically on potato per year, Road 
condition to nearest potato market, Availability of a village market, 
Average Price of potato, Time farmer takes to walk to the garden 
Age of farmer, Farmer’s gender, Farmer’s household 
size, Farmer’s district of operation, Total annual potato 
harvest, Potato marketing experience, Value of farming 
equipment owned,  possession of a bicycle or motor 
cycle, Farmer’s monthly non-farm income, Distance to 
nearest potato market,  Farmer is a member of a group 
or cooperative, Transport cost for 100 Kg of potato to 
market, Availability of a village market 
Holloway et al (2000) 
Tobit 
Unit  increase  in  number of  cross-bred  cows, Unit  increase in  the number of  local cow, Time to the milk  group, Farm 
experience of hhld head, Formal schooling of hhld head, No. of visits by extension agent in the past year. 
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Appendix B 
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𝑐𝑐 �𝑝𝑝𝑚𝑚 + 𝜏𝜏𝑚𝑚�𝑧𝑧ℎ ,𝐴𝐴,𝐺𝐺,𝐶𝐶��
𝑚𝑚
�
+ ηi � �𝐺𝐺𝑖𝑖�𝑘𝑘𝑖𝑖,𝑘𝑘𝑚𝑚, 𝑙𝑙𝑖𝑖; 𝑧𝑧𝑞𝑞�–𝑘𝑘𝑖𝑖 − 𝑓𝑓(𝐺𝐺𝑖𝑖�𝑘𝑘𝑖𝑖, 𝑘𝑘𝑚𝑚, 𝑙𝑙𝑖𝑖; 𝑧𝑧𝑞𝑞�, 𝑧𝑧ℎ) + 𝐸𝐸𝑖𝑖�
𝑖𝑖
� + µ�𝐿𝐿 − 𝑙𝑙𝑖𝑖 − 𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙 − 𝑙𝑙𝑜𝑜�
+ ν[𝑙𝑙𝑜𝑜] 
First-order conditions: 
(a)   ℒ𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙 =  𝑔𝑔𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙 − 𝜆𝜆𝑤𝑤𝑙𝑙∗ − 𝜇𝜇  = 0 
(b)   ℒ𝑙𝑙𝑖𝑖 = 𝑔𝑔𝑙𝑙𝑖𝑖  𝑓𝑓𝑙𝑙𝑖𝑖  𝐺𝐺𝑙𝑙𝑖𝑖 + 𝜆𝜆 �𝐺𝐺𝑙𝑙𝑖𝑖 �𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖∗ − 𝛿𝛿𝑖𝑖𝜏𝜏𝑖𝑖�𝑧𝑧ℎ ,𝐴𝐴,𝐺𝐺,𝐶𝐶�� − 𝑓𝑓𝑙𝑙𝑖𝑖  𝐺𝐺𝑙𝑙𝑖𝑖 �𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖∗ + 𝛾𝛾𝑖𝑖𝜏𝜏𝑖𝑖�𝑧𝑧ℎ,𝐴𝐴,𝐺𝐺,𝐶𝐶�� − 𝑤𝑤𝑙𝑙∗� +
ηi �𝐺𝐺𝑙𝑙𝑖𝑖 − 𝑓𝑓𝑙𝑙𝑖𝑖  𝐺𝐺𝑙𝑙𝑖𝑖� − 𝜇𝜇 = 0 
(c)  ℒ𝑞𝑞𝑚𝑚𝑐𝑐 =  𝑔𝑔𝑞𝑞𝑚𝑚𝑐𝑐 − 𝜆𝜆 �𝑝𝑝𝑚𝑚 + 𝜏𝜏𝑚𝑚�𝑧𝑧ℎ,𝐴𝐴,𝐺𝐺,𝐶𝐶�� = 0  
(d)   ℒ𝑘𝑘𝑖𝑖 = 𝑔𝑔𝑘𝑘𝑖𝑖𝑓𝑓𝑘𝑘𝑖𝑖𝐺𝐺𝑘𝑘𝑖𝑖 + 𝜆𝜆 �𝐺𝐺𝑘𝑘𝑖𝑖 �𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖∗ − 𝛿𝛿𝑖𝑖𝜏𝜏𝑖𝑖�𝑧𝑧ℎ ,𝐴𝐴,𝐺𝐺,𝐶𝐶�� − 𝑓𝑓𝑘𝑘𝑖𝑖𝐺𝐺𝑘𝑘𝑖𝑖 �𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖∗ + 𝛾𝛾𝑖𝑖𝜏𝜏𝑖𝑖�𝑧𝑧ℎ ,𝐴𝐴,𝐺𝐺,𝐶𝐶�� −
�𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖
∗ − 𝛿𝛿𝑖𝑖𝜏𝜏
𝑖𝑖�𝑧𝑧ℎ ,𝐴𝐴,𝐺𝐺,𝐶𝐶��� + 𝜂𝜂�𝐺𝐺𝑘𝑘𝑖𝑖 − 1 − 𝑓𝑓𝑘𝑘𝑖𝑖𝐺𝐺𝑘𝑘𝑖𝑖�  = 0 
(e)        ℒ𝑘𝑘𝑚𝑚 = 𝑔𝑔𝑘𝑘𝑚𝑚𝑓𝑓𝑘𝑘𝑚𝑚𝐺𝐺𝑘𝑘𝑚𝑚 + 𝜆𝜆 �𝐺𝐺𝑘𝑘𝑚𝑚 �𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖∗ − 𝛿𝛿𝑖𝑖𝜏𝜏𝑖𝑖�𝑧𝑧ℎ ,𝐴𝐴,𝐺𝐺,𝐶𝐶�� − 𝑓𝑓𝑘𝑘𝑚𝑚𝐺𝐺𝑘𝑘𝑚𝑚 �𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖∗ + 𝛾𝛾𝑖𝑖𝜏𝜏𝑖𝑖�𝑧𝑧ℎ,𝐴𝐴,𝐺𝐺,𝐶𝐶�� −
�𝑝𝑝𝑘𝑘𝑚𝑚 + 𝜏𝜏𝑘𝑘�𝑧𝑧ℎ,𝐴𝐴,𝐺𝐺,𝐶𝐶��� +  𝜂𝜂�𝐺𝐺𝑘𝑘𝑚𝑚 − 𝑓𝑓𝑘𝑘𝑚𝑚𝐺𝐺𝑘𝑘𝑚𝑚�  = 0 
(f) ℒ𝜆𝜆 = �∑ �𝐺𝐺𝑖𝑖�𝑘𝑘𝑖𝑖,𝑘𝑘𝑚𝑚, 𝑙𝑙𝑖𝑖; 𝑧𝑧𝑞𝑞� �𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖∗ − 𝛿𝛿𝑖𝑖𝜏𝜏𝑖𝑖�𝑧𝑧ℎ,𝐴𝐴,𝐺𝐺,𝐶𝐶�� − 𝑓𝑓�𝐺𝐺𝑖𝑖�𝑘𝑘𝑖𝑖,𝑘𝑘𝑚𝑚, 𝑙𝑙𝑖𝑖; 𝑧𝑧𝑞𝑞�, 𝑧𝑧ℎ� �𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖∗ +𝑖𝑖 
𝛾𝛾𝑖𝑖𝜏𝜏
𝑖𝑖�𝑧𝑧ℎ ,𝐴𝐴,𝐺𝐺,𝐶𝐶�� − 𝑘𝑘𝑖𝑖 �𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖∗ − 𝛿𝛿𝑖𝑖𝜏𝜏𝑖𝑖�𝑧𝑧ℎ ,𝐴𝐴,𝐺𝐺,𝐶𝐶���  + ∑ 𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖𝐸𝐸𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + 𝑙𝑙𝑜𝑜 �𝑤𝑤𝑙𝑙𝑜𝑜 − 𝜉𝜉𝑙𝑙𝜏𝜏𝑙𝑙�𝑧𝑧ℎ,𝐴𝐴,𝐺𝐺,𝐶𝐶��  + 𝑉𝑉 + 𝑆𝑆 −
𝑙𝑙𝑖𝑖𝑤𝑤𝑙𝑙
∗ − 𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑤𝑤𝑙𝑙
∗ −  ∑ 𝑘𝑘𝑖𝑖  �𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖∗ − 𝛿𝛿𝑖𝑖𝜏𝜏𝑖𝑖�𝑧𝑧ℎ,𝐴𝐴,𝐺𝐺,𝐶𝐶��𝑖𝑖 −  ∑ 𝑘𝑘𝑚𝑚  �𝑝𝑝𝑘𝑘𝑚𝑚 + 𝜏𝜏𝑘𝑘�𝑧𝑧ℎ ,𝐴𝐴,𝐺𝐺,𝐶𝐶��𝑘𝑘𝑚𝑚 − ∑ 𝑞𝑞𝑚𝑚𝑐𝑐 �𝑝𝑝𝑚𝑚 +𝑚𝑚
𝜏𝜏𝑚𝑚�𝑧𝑧ℎ,𝐴𝐴,𝐺𝐺,𝐶𝐶��� = 0 
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(g) ℒ𝜂𝜂 =  ∑ �𝐺𝐺𝑖𝑖�𝑘𝑘𝑖𝑖,𝑘𝑘𝑚𝑚, 𝑙𝑙𝑖𝑖; 𝑧𝑧𝑞𝑞�–𝑘𝑘𝑖𝑖 − 𝑓𝑓(𝐺𝐺𝑖𝑖�𝑘𝑘𝑖𝑖,𝑘𝑘𝑚𝑚, 𝑙𝑙𝑖𝑖; 𝑧𝑧𝑞𝑞�, 𝑧𝑧ℎ) + 𝐸𝐸𝑖𝑖�𝑖𝑖  = 0  
(h) ℒ𝜇𝜇 =  𝐿𝐿 − 𝑙𝑙𝑖𝑖 − 𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙 − 𝑙𝑙𝑜𝑜 = 0  
(i) ℒ𝜈𝜈 = 𝑙𝑙𝑜𝑜 = 0 
To get the optimum demand and supply quantities for all endogenous variables including inputs, 
outputs, consumption goods, leisure, on-farm and off-farm labour, all endogenous variables must be 
expressed with only exogenous variables and plugged into each other’s equations. Since, this is overly 
complicated the following simpler observations can be made: 
To get the optimum demand for 𝑙𝑙𝑖𝑖 we can express 𝜆𝜆 from (b) and substitute it into (c) to solve for 
𝑤𝑤𝑙𝑙
∗and substitute it into (f): 
𝜆𝜆 = 𝜇𝜇 − 𝑔𝑔𝑙𝑙𝑖𝑖  𝑓𝑓𝑙𝑙𝑖𝑖  𝐺𝐺𝑙𝑙𝑖𝑖 − η�𝐺𝐺𝑙𝑙𝑖𝑖 − 𝑓𝑓𝑙𝑙𝑖𝑖  𝐺𝐺𝑙𝑙𝑖𝑖�
�𝐺𝐺𝑙𝑙𝑖𝑖 �𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖
∗ − 𝛿𝛿𝑖𝑖𝜏𝜏𝑖𝑖(𝑧𝑧ℎ,𝐴𝐴,𝐺𝐺,𝐶𝐶)� − 𝑓𝑓𝑙𝑙𝑖𝑖  𝐺𝐺𝑙𝑙𝑖𝑖 �𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖∗ + 𝛾𝛾𝑖𝑖𝜏𝜏𝑖𝑖(𝑧𝑧ℎ,𝐴𝐴,𝐺𝐺,𝐶𝐶)� − 𝑤𝑤𝑙𝑙∗� 
𝑤𝑤𝑙𝑙
∗ = �𝐺𝐺𝑙𝑙𝑖𝑖 �𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖∗ − 𝛿𝛿𝑖𝑖𝜏𝜏𝑖𝑖�𝑧𝑧ℎ ,𝐴𝐴,𝐺𝐺,𝐶𝐶�� − 𝑓𝑓𝑙𝑙𝑖𝑖  𝐺𝐺𝑙𝑙𝑖𝑖 �𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖∗ + 𝛾𝛾𝑖𝑖𝜏𝜏𝑖𝑖�𝑧𝑧ℎ ,𝐴𝐴,𝐺𝐺,𝐶𝐶���
−
�𝜇𝜇 − 𝑔𝑔𝑙𝑙𝑖𝑖  𝑓𝑓𝑙𝑙𝑖𝑖  𝐺𝐺𝑙𝑙𝑖𝑖 − η�𝐺𝐺𝑙𝑙𝑖𝑖 − 𝑓𝑓𝑙𝑙𝑖𝑖  𝐺𝐺𝑙𝑙𝑖𝑖�� �𝑝𝑝𝑚𝑚 + 𝜏𝜏𝑚𝑚�𝑧𝑧ℎ,𝐴𝐴,𝐺𝐺,𝐶𝐶��
𝑔𝑔𝑞𝑞𝑚𝑚𝑐𝑐
 
Thus,  𝑙𝑙𝑖𝑖∗ = ℎ1(𝒌𝒌𝒊𝒊,𝒌𝒌𝒎𝒎, 𝑧𝑧ℎ, 𝑧𝑧𝑞𝑞 ,𝒒𝒒𝒎𝒎𝒄𝒄 , 𝒍𝒍𝒍𝒍,𝑝𝑝𝑚𝑚,𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖,𝑝𝑝𝑘𝑘 , 𝒍𝒍𝒐𝒐,𝑤𝑤𝑙𝑙𝑜𝑜,𝑉𝑉, 𝑆𝑆,𝐸𝐸𝑖𝑖, 𝜏𝜏𝑖𝑖 , 𝜏𝜏𝑘𝑘 , 𝜏𝜏𝑚𝑚). 
To express the optimal demanded quantity from home production 𝑞𝑞𝑖𝑖𝑐𝑐 we have: 
𝑞𝑞𝑖𝑖
𝑐𝑐∗ =  𝑓𝑓(𝑞𝑞𝑖𝑖𝑠𝑠) =  𝑓𝑓(𝐺𝐺𝑖𝑖�𝒌𝒌𝒊𝒊,𝒌𝒌𝒎𝒎, 𝒍𝒍𝒊𝒊; 𝑧𝑧𝑞𝑞�, 𝑧𝑧ℎ)  ⇒  𝑞𝑞𝑖𝑖𝑐𝑐∗ =  ℎ2�𝒌𝒌𝒊𝒊,𝒌𝒌𝒎𝒎, 𝒍𝒍𝒊𝒊; 𝑧𝑧𝑞𝑞 , 𝑧𝑧ℎ�  
Similarly, we can express the supplied quantity 𝑞𝑞𝑖𝑖𝑠𝑠 by: 
𝑞𝑞𝑖𝑖
𝑠𝑠∗ =  𝐺𝐺𝑖𝑖�𝒌𝒌𝒊𝒊,𝒌𝒌𝒎𝒎, 𝒍𝒍𝒊𝒊; 𝑧𝑧𝑞𝑞�  ⇒  𝑞𝑞𝑖𝑖𝑠𝑠∗ =  ℎ3�𝒌𝒌𝒊𝒊,𝒌𝒌𝒎𝒎, 𝒍𝒍𝒊𝒊; 𝑧𝑧𝑞𝑞�  
Demand for non-produced goods 𝑞𝑞𝑚𝑚𝑐𝑐  can be obtained by expressing 𝜆𝜆 from (c) and substituting it into 
(a) solving for 𝑤𝑤𝑙𝑙∗ and substitute it into (f): 
𝑞𝑞𝑚𝑚
𝑐𝑐 = ℎ4�𝒌𝒌𝒊𝒊,𝒌𝒌𝒎𝒎, 𝑧𝑧ℎ , 𝑧𝑧𝑞𝑞 , 𝒍𝒍𝒊𝒊,𝑝𝑝𝑚𝑚,𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖 ,𝑝𝑝𝑘𝑘 , 𝒍𝒍𝒐𝒐,𝒘𝒘𝒍𝒍𝒐𝒐,𝑉𝑉, 𝑆𝑆,𝐸𝐸𝑖𝑖, 𝜏𝜏𝑖𝑖 , 𝜏𝜏𝑘𝑘 , 𝜏𝜏𝑚𝑚� 
We can get the quantity of leisure demanded by expressing 𝜆𝜆 from (a) and substituting it into (c) solving 
for 𝑤𝑤𝑙𝑙∗ and substitute it into (f): 
𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙∗ = ℎ5�𝒌𝒌𝒊𝒊,𝒌𝒌𝒎𝒎, 𝑧𝑧ℎ , 𝑧𝑧𝑞𝑞 ,𝒒𝒒𝒎𝒎𝒄𝒄 , 𝒍𝒍𝒊𝒊,𝑝𝑝𝑚𝑚,𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖 ,𝑝𝑝𝑘𝑘 , 𝒍𝒍𝒐𝒐,𝑤𝑤𝑙𝑙𝑜𝑜,𝑉𝑉, 𝑆𝑆,𝐸𝐸𝑖𝑖 , 𝜏𝜏𝑖𝑖, 𝜏𝜏𝑘𝑘 , 𝜏𝜏𝑚𝑚� 
To get the quantity of off-farm labour supplied, we can rearrange the time constraint (1e) and apply 
functions of  𝑙𝑙𝑖𝑖∗, 𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙∗: 
𝑙𝑙𝑜𝑜∗ = 𝐿𝐿 − 𝑙𝑙𝑖𝑖∗ − 𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙∗    ⟹     𝑙𝑙𝑜𝑜∗ = ℎ6�𝒌𝒌𝒊𝒊,𝒌𝒌𝒎𝒎, 𝑧𝑧ℎ , 𝑧𝑧𝑞𝑞 ,𝒒𝒒𝒎𝒎𝒄𝒄 , 𝒍𝒍𝒊𝒊,𝑝𝑝𝑚𝑚,𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖 ,𝑝𝑝𝑘𝑘 , 𝒍𝒍𝒍𝒍,𝑤𝑤𝑙𝑙𝑜𝑜,𝑉𝑉,𝐸𝐸𝑖𝑖 , 𝜏𝜏𝑖𝑖 , 𝜏𝜏𝑘𝑘 , 𝜏𝜏𝑚𝑚� 
We can see that the variables highlighted with bald letters are all endogenous decision variables in 
functions h1-h6.  These endogenous variables would all have to be expressed as a function of exogenous 
variables for a formal solution. However, without expressing them formally, it is visible that all 
exogenous variables will enter all equations due to the interdependencies of endogenous variables 
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among themselves given by the assumption of non-separability. Thus, we can write the endogenous 
variables as a function of all exogenous variables as: 
(4a)  𝑙𝑙𝑖𝑖∗ = ℎ1(𝑧𝑧ℎ, 𝑧𝑧𝑞𝑞 ,𝑝𝑝𝑚𝑚,𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖 ,𝑝𝑝𝑘𝑘 ,𝑤𝑤𝑙𝑙𝑜𝑜,𝑉𝑉, 𝑆𝑆,𝐸𝐸𝑖𝑖 , 𝜏𝜏𝑖𝑖 , 𝜏𝜏𝑘𝑘 , 𝜏𝜏𝑚𝑚 ) 
(4b)  𝑞𝑞𝑖𝑖𝑐𝑐∗ =  ℎ2�𝑧𝑧ℎ, 𝑧𝑧𝑞𝑞 ,𝑝𝑝𝑚𝑚,𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖 ,𝑝𝑝𝑘𝑘 ,𝑤𝑤𝑙𝑙𝑜𝑜,𝑉𝑉, 𝑆𝑆,𝐸𝐸𝑖𝑖 , 𝜏𝜏𝑖𝑖, 𝜏𝜏𝑘𝑘 , 𝜏𝜏𝑚𝑚� 
(4c)  𝑞𝑞𝑖𝑖𝑠𝑠∗ =  ℎ3�𝑧𝑧ℎ , 𝑧𝑧𝑞𝑞 ,𝑝𝑝𝑚𝑚,𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖 ,𝑝𝑝𝑘𝑘 ,𝑤𝑤𝑙𝑙𝑜𝑜,𝑉𝑉, 𝑆𝑆,𝐸𝐸𝑖𝑖 , 𝜏𝜏𝑖𝑖, 𝜏𝜏𝑘𝑘 , 𝜏𝜏𝑚𝑚�  
(4d)  𝑞𝑞𝑚𝑚𝑐𝑐∗ = ℎ4�𝑧𝑧ℎ, 𝑧𝑧𝑞𝑞 ,𝑝𝑝𝑚𝑚,𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖 ,𝑝𝑝𝑘𝑘 ,𝑤𝑤𝑙𝑙𝑜𝑜,𝑉𝑉, 𝑆𝑆,𝐸𝐸𝑖𝑖 , 𝜏𝜏𝑖𝑖, 𝜏𝜏𝑘𝑘 , 𝜏𝜏𝑚𝑚� 
(4e)  𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙∗ = ℎ5�𝑧𝑧ℎ, 𝑧𝑧𝑞𝑞 ,𝑝𝑝𝑚𝑚,𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖,𝑝𝑝𝑘𝑘 ,𝑤𝑤𝑙𝑙𝑜𝑜,𝑉𝑉, 𝑆𝑆,𝐸𝐸𝑖𝑖 , 𝜏𝜏𝑖𝑖 , 𝜏𝜏𝑘𝑘 , 𝜏𝜏𝑚𝑚� 
(4f)  𝑙𝑙𝑜𝑜∗ = ℎ6�𝑧𝑧ℎ, 𝑧𝑧𝑞𝑞 ,𝑝𝑝𝑚𝑚,𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖,𝑝𝑝𝑘𝑘 ,𝑤𝑤𝑙𝑙𝑜𝑜,𝑉𝑉, 𝑆𝑆,𝐸𝐸𝑖𝑖 , 𝜏𝜏𝑖𝑖 , 𝜏𝜏𝑘𝑘 , 𝜏𝜏𝑚𝑚� 
(4g)  𝑘𝑘𝑖𝑖∗ = ℎ7�𝑧𝑧ℎ , 𝑧𝑧𝑞𝑞 ,𝑝𝑝𝑚𝑚,𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖 ,𝑝𝑝𝑘𝑘 ,𝑤𝑤𝑙𝑙𝑜𝑜,𝑉𝑉, 𝑆𝑆,𝐸𝐸𝑖𝑖 , 𝜏𝜏𝑖𝑖, 𝜏𝜏𝑘𝑘 , 𝜏𝜏𝑚𝑚� 
(4h)  𝑘𝑘𝑚𝑚∗ = ℎ8�𝑧𝑧ℎ, 𝑧𝑧𝑞𝑞 ,𝑝𝑝𝑚𝑚,𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖 ,𝑝𝑝𝑘𝑘 ,𝑤𝑤𝑙𝑙𝑜𝑜,𝑉𝑉, 𝑆𝑆,𝐸𝐸𝑖𝑖, 𝜏𝜏𝑖𝑖 , 𝜏𝜏𝑘𝑘 , 𝜏𝜏𝑚𝑚� 
The interaction between endogenous and exogenous variables will be dependent on their relation; and 
the different ways and magnitudes in which they enter each others’ equations.  
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Appendix C 
Table C1 - Seemingly Unrelated Regressions with -sureg- 
 lnsalesinc lnoffarminc lnhronfarm lnowninput lnowncons lnboughtinput lnboughtcons 
west 1.609** -0.526 1.004*** -0.0406 2.097+ 0.0904 -1.105+ 
 (0.504) (1.101) (0.209) (0.960) (1.147) (0.139) (0.626) 
        
plain 1.537*** -0.591 0.472* -1.033 1.800 0.0114 -0.0747 
 (0.460) (0.999) (0.190) (0.926) (1.105) (0.134) (0.552) 
        
member -0.230+ 0.314 -0.138* -0.497+ 0.363 0.0196 0.268+ 
 (0.130) (0.282) (0.0538) (0.276) (0.330) (0.0400) (0.162) 
        
agriedu 0.152 0.771 0.158 -1.199 1.387 -0.126 0.983* 
 (0.386) (0.837) (0.160) (0.813) (0.974) (0.118) (0.476) 
        
higheredu 0.220 2.212** 0.0362 -0.854 1.379 -0.0745 1.245** 
 (0.358) (0.776) (0.149) (0.747) (0.898) (0.108) (0.443) 
        
age -0.0105 0.338* 0.0502 0.218 -0.0145 -0.00935 0.0780 
 (0.0741) (0.161) (0.0305) (0.157) (0.188) (0.0228) (0.0922) 
        
age2 -0.0000756 -0.00482** -0.000570+ -0.00243 0.00000846 0.0000552 -0.00113 
 (0.000741) (0.00161) (0.000305) (0.00157) (0.00188) (0.000228) (0.000922) 
        
crop 0.268 0.759 -0.748*** -9.584*** -7.714*** -0.138 0.529 
 (0.446) (0.967) (0.188) (1.020) (1.248) (0.147) (0.568) 
        
other 0.219 0.193 0.0835 -6.317*** -7.413*** -0.339 -0.504 
 (0.642) (1.392) (0.265) (1.492) (1.781) (0.215) (0.801) 
        
mixed -0.965* -0.339 -0.0875 -1.994* -3.312** -0.0912 -0.403 
 (0.414) (0.897) (0.171) (0.977) (1.166) (0.141) (0.505) 
        
ownland 0.128* -0.0337 -0.00989 -0.00974 0.240 -0.00714  
 (0.0595) (0.124) (0.0245) (0.126) (0.149) (0.0181)  
        
totalequipment -0.000118* 0.0000616 0.00000833 0.0000831 -0.0000581 0.00000330  
 (0.0000474) (0.0000988) (0.0000195) (0.000100) (0.000119) (0.0000144)  
        
saps -0.000668 -0.00596** 0.000473 0.00189 -0.00891*** 0.000227 0.000827 
 (0.000962) (0.00207) (0.000396) (0.00217) (0.00258) (0.000313) (0.00104) 
        
taxfree -0.658+ -2.732*** 0.0641 -0.291 0.0959 -0.0583 -0.563 
 (0.355) (0.770) (0.146) (0.755) (0.901) (0.109) (0.442) 
        
loan -0.000215 0.000172 0.000159 -0.000525 0.000166 0.000175* -0.000173 
 (0.000238) (0.000516) (0.0000980) (0.000501) (0.000598) (0.0000727) (0.000295) 
        
insurance -0.00569 0.00601 -0.0000105 -0.0345* 0.0161 0.00252 -0.0223** 
 (0.00661) (0.0142) (0.00276) (0.0139) (0.0168) (0.00202) (0.00720) 
        
soctrans -0.000641 -0.00309** -0.000202 -0.000339 -0.00135 -0.000261 -0.000448 
 (0.000550) (0.00119) (0.000227) (0.00117) (0.00140) (0.000169) (0.000687) 
        
unemployed 0.0112+ 0.00219 0.00522*    -0.0129+ 
 (0.00592) (0.0134) (0.00248)    (0.00758) 
        
gender   -0.0181  -0.0371  -0.232 
   (0.152)  (1.007)  (0.484) 
        
lnlandquality    1.051*** 0.241+ -0.00346  
    (0.105) (0.124) (0.0148)  
        
Constant 6.910*** 0.923 4.808*** -0.332 0.234 6.543*** 4.795* 
 (1.827) (3.966) (0.754) (3.837) (4.589) (0.556) (2.274) 
R-sq 0.2661 0.4295 0.3383 0.6050 0.3925 0.1478 0.2086 
Standard errors in parentheses, Source: AKI database, AKI (2014), + p < 0.10, * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001, Observations: 157 
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Table C2 -  Correlation matrix of residuals 
 
lnsalesinc lnoffarminc lnhronfarm lnowninput lnowncons lnboughtinput lnboughtcons 
lnsalesinc 1 
      lnoffarminc -.0489 1 
     lnhronfarm .3026 -.3046 1 
    lnowninput .1501 -.0756 .2361 1 
   lnowncons .1843 -.0713 .0594 -.0094 1 
  lnboughtinput .2834 .0278 .1515 .0906 .2253 1 
 lnboughtcons -.0667 .2844 -.1023 -.0673 .1545 .1502 1 
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Table C3 - Individual OLS regressions (robust estimates) 
 lnsalesinc lnoffarminc lnhronfarm lnowninput lnowncons lnboughtinput lnboughtcons 
west 1.828* -0.663 1.073*** -0.0306 2.072+ 0.0877 -1.008 
 (0.901) (1.073) (0.253) (0.961) (1.200) (0.139) (0.629) 
        
plain 1.680+ -0.681 0.516* -1.026 1.787 0.00942 -0.00677 
 (0.855) (0.875) (0.242) (0.994) (1.103) (0.131) (0.359) 
        
member -0.227 0.321 -0.137* -0.500* 0.367 0.0206 0.269* 
 (0.154) (0.324) (0.0587) (0.230) (0.360) (0.0378) (0.107) 
        
agriedu 0.107 0.787 0.143 -1.199 1.391 -0.126 0.969+ 
 (0.286) (0.896) (0.146) (0.803) (0.876) (0.130) (0.542) 
        
higheredu 0.162 2.213* 0.0181 -0.846 1.370 -0.0767 1.224* 
 (0.276) (0.873) (0.132) (0.708) (0.900) (0.0977) (0.569) 
        
age -0.00766 0.333** 0.0512 0.220* -0.0166 -0.00983 0.0792 
 (0.0473) (0.127) (0.0656) (0.110) (0.183) (0.0210) (0.120) 
        
age2 -0.0000949 -0.00478*** -0.000577 -0.00245* 0.0000316 0.0000600 -0.00114 
 (0.000473) (0.00128) (0.000702) (0.00114) (0.00175) (0.000202) (0.00133) 
        
crop 0.237 0.747 -0.753*** -9.519*** -7.769*** -0.152 0.497 
 (0.363) (1.079) (0.196) (0.971) (1.132) (0.136) (0.635) 
        
other 0.264 0.172 0.0981 -6.225** -7.444*** -0.359 -0.486 
 (0.574) (0.883) (0.267) (2.085) (1.719) (0.224) (0.964) 
        
mixed -0.997 -0.356 -0.0955 -1.921* -3.354** -0.108 -0.424 
 (0.613) (0.835) (0.152) (0.895) (1.148) (0.127) (0.591) 
        
ownland 0.123+ -0.0276 -0.0117 -0.0111 0.244+ -0.00676  
 (0.0667) (0.237) (0.0279) (0.104) (0.140) (0.0142)  
        
totalequipment -0.000118 0.0000813 0.00000779 0.0000780 -0.0000461 0.00000479  
 (0.0000727) (0.000136) (0.0000180) (0.0000986) (0.0000927) (0.0000145)  
        
saps -0.000557 -0.00620* 0.000513 0.00206 -0.00906*** 0.000189 0.000860 
 (0.000671) (0.00262) (0.000351) (0.00193) (0.00245) (0.000261) (0.00125) 
        
taxfree -0.654+ -2.728*** 0.0650 -0.301 0.103 -0.0559 -0.560 
 (0.388) (0.799) (0.136) (0.750) (0.966) (0.108) (0.429) 
        
loan -0.000242 0.000173 0.000151+ -0.000527 0.000160 0.000175* -0.000185 
 (0.000191) (0.000380) (0.0000782) (0.000391) (0.000657) (0.0000707) (0.000251) 
        
insurance -0.00619 0.00481 -0.000144 -0.0342* 0.0154 0.00243 -0.0224+ 
 (0.0138) (0.0112) (0.00260) (0.0170) (0.0151) (0.00185) (0.0132) 
        
soctrans -0.000578 -0.00311* -0.000184 -0.000316 -0.00135 -0.000266+ -0.000413 
 (0.000714) (0.00153) (0.000333) (0.00118) (0.00139) (0.000147) (0.000925) 
        
unemployed 0.0170** -0.000629 0.00699**    -0.0102* 
 (0.00631) (0.0124) (0.00221)    (0.00487) 
        
gender   -0.0303  0.0377  -0.176 
   (0.181)  (1.009)  (0.695) 
        
lnlandquality    1.036*** 0.245* -0.000132  
    (0.0866) (0.122) (0.0178)  
        
Constant 6.571*** 1.158 4.706** -0.423 0.279 6.564*** 4.626+ 
 (1.281) (3.009) (1.451) (2.812) (4.834) (0.524) (2.515) 
Observations 157 157 157 157 157 157 157 
F 1.203 7.923 3.307 48.42 11.31 2.174 1.764 
Prob > F 0.26 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.006 0.039 
r2_a 0.176 0.356 0.249 0.554 0.308 0.0371 0.113 
Standard errors in parentheses, Source: AKI database, AKI (2014), + p < 0.10, * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001 
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Table C4 - Collinearity Diagnostics 
Variable VIF SQRT VIF Tolerance R-Squared 
west 2.85 1.69 0.3515 0.6485 
plain 2.19 1.48 0.4574 0.5426 
member 1.19 1.09 0.8373 0.1627 
agriedu 1.54 1.24 0.6486 0.3514 
higheredu 1.50 1.22 0.6688 0.3312 
age 1.13 1.06 0.8854 0.1146 
crop 1.91 1.38 0.5241 0.4759 
other 1.52 1.23 0.6594 0.3406 
mixed 2.01 1.42 0.4987 0.5013 
ownland 2.79 1.67 0.3580 0.6420 
totalequipment 2.67 1.64 0.3739 0.6261 
saps 2.31 1.52 0.4337 0.5663 
taxfree 1.31 1.14 0.7647 0.2353 
loan 1.20 1.09 0.8365 0.1635 
insurance 1.91 1.38 0.5228 0.4772 
soctrans 1.11 1.06 0.8971 0.1029 
unemployed 1.65 1.28 0.6066 0.3934 
lnlandquality 2.11 1.45 0.4748 0.5252 
gender 1.16 1.08 0.8622 0.1378 
Mean VIF      1.79 
 
Table C5 - Expected sign of Explanatory Variables   
 Sales 
income 
Off-farm 
labour 
income 
On-farm 
labour 
hrs 
Own input 
use 
Own  
consumption 
Bought 
inputs 
Bought 
consumption 
location 
west + + + +/- + + - 
plain + + - - - + - 
household characteristics 
member + + + +/- + + + 
agriedu + + - +/- +/- +/- +/- 
higheredu + + - +/- +/- +/- +/- 
gender   +  +  + 
age - - + + - + - 
age2 + + - - + - + 
production characteristics 
crop + - - - - + +/- 
other + + + + - + +/- 
mixed + + + + - + +/- 
ownland + - + +/- + +  
landquality    +/- + +  
totalequipment + - + +/-  +  
subsidy and support 
saps + - + +/- - + + 
transaction costs 
taxfree + - + + +/- +/- + 
loan + +/- + + - + - 
insurance + - + +/- + + - 
soctrans - +/- +/- + + - + 
unemployed + - +    - 
*Variables in grey are not included in regression   
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Table C6 - Descriptive statistics of dependent and independent variables for the pensioner group 
Category Variable Measurement Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
Dependent 
Variables 
Sales Income thousands of HUF 979.41 784.78 0 6758 
Off-farm Income hours 783.33 1224.03 0 6050 
 
On-farm labour hours hours 814.04 673.18 27 3550 
 
Input use of own produce thousands of HUF 78.19 143.67 0 1014 
 
Own consumption of 
produce thousands of HUF 74.72 136.86 0 930 
 
Bought inputs thousands of HUF 570.16 356.64 44 2161 
 
Bought consumption thousands of HUF 621.11 355.01 0 1750 
Location Transdanubia dummy 0.43 0.50 0 1 
 
Northern and Southern 
Great Plain dummy 0.36 0.48 0 1 
Household 
characteristics 
No. of household 
members number 2.35 1.07 1 6 
 
Agricultural Education dummy 0.47 0.50 0 1 
 
Higher Education dummy 0.45 0.50 0 1 
 
Age of manager  years 61.31 13.61 25 90 
 
Gender of manager dummy 0.23 0.42 0 1 
Production 
Characteristics Crop producer dummy 0.31 0.46 0 1 
 
Fruit, vegetable, green 
house and wine producer dummy 0.10 0.31 0 1 
 
Mixed plant and animal 
producer dummy 0.28 0.45 0 1 
 
Land owned by 
household (in ha) hectare 3.65 4.88 0 38,11 
 
Land quality in Golden 
Korona per ha Korona/ha 16.17 11.55 0 60 
 
Total equipment thousands of HUF 3725.72 3939.56 0 30267 
Agricultural 
Support Single Area Payment thousands of HUF 243.93 247.89 0 1497 
Transaction 
Costs Tax free farm dummy 0.21 0.41 0 1 
 
Agricultural Loans and 
Liabilities thousands of HUF 483.39 927.85 0 8645 
 
Insurance thousands of HUF 14.35 25.55 0 150 
 
Social transactions thousands of HUF 52.96 204.00 0 1500 
 
No. of Unemployed in 
NUTS3 regions (in 1000) thousands of ppl 26.12 27.77 5 120 
Note: Min=minimum, Max=maximum, Std. Dev.= Standard Deviation, HUF = Hungarian Forints, 1 EUR=306 
HUF (MNB, 2015) 
135 Observations in 2013 (N=135), excluding non-pensioners. Missing values were kept as they appeared. 
Source: own calculations based on survey data, AKI (2014) 
 
  
79 
 
Appendix D 
Table D - Farms by income source 
No. of farms by main income source of the household, from total income (own calculations) 
 After tax profit 
from sales 
Self-
employment 
income 
Agricultural off-
farm income 
Non-agricultural  
off-farm income 
Social 
Transfers 
No of farms  46 
29,7% 
5 
3,2% 
10 
6,5% 
88 
56,8% 
6 
3,8% 
No. of farms by main income source of the household, from total other income (own calculations) 
 Only farm income Self-
employment 
income 
Agricultural off-
farm income 
Non-agricultural  
off-farm income 
Social 
Transfers 
No of farms  14 
 
10 
7% 
14 
9,9% 
107 
75,9% 
10 
7% 
No. of farms by main income source of the manager, from total other income, Kemény et al. (2014:53) 
 Pension Self-
employment 
income 
Agricultural off-
farm income 
Non-agricultural  
off-farm income 
Social 
Transfers 
No of farms from 
total population 
24198 
34,5% 
4144 
5,9% 
4745 
6,8% 
34567 
49,3% 
2471 
3,5% 
Excluding pensioners  4144 
9% 
4745 
10,3% 
34567 
75,3% 
2471 
5,4% 
Note: *blue areas can be compared. 
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